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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

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MR. PEARL'S

BOOK

ON

THE MIND.

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PORTLAND:  
WILLIAM HYDE

1842.

5358.42.680  
no. 1708

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
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**YOUTH'S**  
**BOOK ON THE MIND,**  
**EMBRACING THE OUTLINES OF**  
**THE INTELLECT, THE SENSIBILITIES, AND THE WILL :**  
**INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF**  
**MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.**

---

**BY REV. CYRIL PEARL,**  
*Principal of the Buckfield High School and Lyceum.*

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**PORTLAND :**  
**WILLIAM HYDE.**

*Boston, Crocker & Brewster—Hartford, Belknap & Hermersley—New York, Dayton  
& Saxton—Philadelphia, Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co.*

**1842.**

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## P R E F A C E .

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Several motives have combined to induce the author to prepare a book on Philosophy.

1. A conviction that the study of the mind is one of the most important that can claim the attention of rational beings; the grounds of which are briefly stated in the introductory chapter.

2. The belief that this branch might be pursued at an earlier period than it has usually been attempted.

This is not a new or hastily formed opinion. It has existed with various degrees of strength for many years.

3. The belief that a text book, differing in some respects, from any one in use, and embracing an outline of all the departments of the mind, was needed, to secure the best results of this study, if commenced thus early.

Most of the works now in use have been prepared upon the principle that a good degree of maturity of mind was needed to commence the study.\* Most of them, valuable as they may be, do not attempt to embrace all the departments of the mind.

4. The writer has labored with some zeal, but without success, to secure the preparation of such a work, by others. Within twelve years he has conversed with numbers of publishers and skilful writers, all of whom agreed in the opinion that such a book was needed, but who have failed to furnish it.

5. The writer has felt deeply the want of such a work in the Institution under his care, as an introduction to the study of other works on Philosophy.

6. Other teachers of Academies and High Schools have expressed the same feeling, and strongly urged the preparation of the work.

7. It is believed, by many teachers, that such a work is much needed in our Common Schools, and may be extensively used in them with great advantage to other studies.

8. Such a work may be extensively used in the Family circle, for the mutual advantage of parents and children.

9. It is believed that young persons of either sex may find such a work of some value, not only as a help to the study of other works on philosophy, but also in all their efforts for Self Improvement.

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\* See the introduction to Abercrombie's work on the Intellectual powers, by Jacob Abbott.



10. It has been the hope of the writer that such a work might be of service to Teachers, in preparing for the important work of instructing, unfolding, and governing the youthful mind.

#### PLAN AND DESIGN OF THE WORK.

This book is not designed to supersede other and more extended treatises on Philosophy, but to prepare the way for their greater usefulness. It is designed to draw attention to the study, at an earlier period, and increase the number of those who appreciate such investigations. The plan of the work embraces the three departments of the mind; *the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will*.—The writer has endeavored to explore, analyse, and arrange, in the most natural order, the principal phenomena of mind, and to bring them within as narrow limits as practicable.

Simplicity and directness of style have been sought, rather than ornament; and truth rather than the authority of names and opinions. The pages have few references to other treatises. The writings of Locke, Stewart, Reid, Brown, Coleridge, and Cousin, and various works on Phrenology, have been read with interest; but neither of them has been adopted as the basis of this work. More assistance has been derived from the three volumes of Professor Upham, than from all others; and one important object in preparing this work will be gained, if it shall secure for those a wider circulation. The general arrangement and use of terms being similar, this will be found a better introduction to those works, than to any others in use. For Colleges and the more advanced classes in Academies, those volumes are well adapted; and it is believed that a careful study of this will prepare the student to enter upon the study of those more successfully, and at an earlier period. In teaching from those admirable works, the writer has found classes, for a time, embarrassed for want of a more full outline view of the whole mind, and the relation of the three departments to each other, as a preliminary to the successful and extended study of either department. This outline view is here presented in as narrow limits as the nature of the subject seemed to admit. It is not the design of the work to dispense with the mental efforts of either teacher or pupils. It must be *studied* in order to be understood; and every topic, so far as practicable, subjected to the scrutiny of patient thought, observation and experience.

Buckfield, Jan. 30, 1842.

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

THE Study of the Human Mind is one of the most extensive and important that can be pursued. MAN is the noblest work of God with which we are acquainted; and the *mind* of man is of more value than his body.

It is the mind that raises man above the brute, that allies him to angels, and brings him near to God.

It is in the *mind*, and not in the body, that we are to search for the image of God.

Next to the study of the DIVINE MIND—the *character, government, and will* of God—we should hold in estimation, the study of the human mind. Of angels, or other created beings superior to man, we know but little; and the study of their nature and employments, must be reserved for another state of being. But the study of the human soul is now within our reach; and it is fitted to awaken the deepest interest.

“The proper study of mankind, is man.”

The benefits of this study are numerous.

1. It serves to strengthen, expand, and elevate the mind, and prepare it for the pursuit of all knowledge. Knowledge is gained by mental effort, and this effort is constantly fitting the mind for still higher attainments. No other study can do this more successfully than that of the mind itself.

2. Mental Philosophy is the basis of self-knowledge. It is the study of our nature, necessities, and capacities. It makes us acquainted with ourselves; for it is the study of our thoughts, feelings, and conduct in the various relations we sustain.

3. We thus learn to *discipline* our minds, and to direct them into right courses, and to useful ends. In all efforts for self-improvement we have occasion for just views of the philosophy of mind. We must necessari-

ly be acting upon principles, either of true or false philosophy, at every step, in self-education.

4. Our knowledge of others will be proportioned to our skill in Mental Philosophy ; which is but another name for a knowledge of human nature.

This knowledge is sometimes gained by the study of men, in the intercourse of life ; but there is need of instruction in this, as in every other science. It is a profound science ; and books, teachers, and direct efforts are as necessary in this, as in any science which claims our attention.

5. This knowledge is of vast importance to the teacher. He has need of the most thorough acquaintance with mind, both in teaching and governing the young. This is true of the teacher in every department ; whether it be in the family circle, the common school, the academy or high school, the college, or professional seminary, or the sanctuary. All, who in any relation or station attempt to teach and influence others, need a knowledge of mind.

6. Equally important is a knowledge of the mind in conversation, writing for the press, in public speaking, in the practice of law and medicine ; in mercantile and commercial pursuits ; in the study of history and languages ; in framing and administering human governments ; in all efforts for reforming the manners or morals of men ; in political action and political economy. It is useful in painting and sculpture, and in all the efforts of genius, and the creations of imagination in every art.

7. The study of the human mind is peculiarly fitted to lead us to the study of the DIVINE MIND. The more we know of ourselves, the more shall we feel our need of the knowledge of God ; and no other created object can give us higher ideas of his wisdom, power, and benevolence than the human mind. Its faithful study, in connexion with the truths of the Bible, is needed to qualify us for his presence and service, and for the intercourse of all holy and intelligent beings.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE MIND.

We cannot study the mind, as we can a book, a tune, a rose or a picture ; we can only know it by its acts. It is that part of us which knows, thinks, reasons, remembers, feels, desires, hopes, fears, loves, wills and puts forth, or causes actions of the body.

The acts of the mind are sometimes called mental states, and sometimes phenomena of mind.

As there are many different kinds of mental acts or states, we speak of various faculties or powers of mind ; but this does not teach that the mind is actually divided into different parts, like a human form, with its head, hands, feet, eyes, and ears ; or like a tree, with its root, trunk, branches, leaves, flowers and fruit.

The mind is not like matter, and cannot be compared with any created thing beside itself ; and it may be regarded as one and indivisible. Take away any one of its faculties, and what remains is not a perfect mind. Every part is essential to the perfection of the whole, and to the right action of every other part.

But it is more convenient to study the mind by attending to one of its acts or states at a time, than it is to attempt the examination of all at once ; just as it is easier to understand a book, by studying one line or one sentence at a time, than by attempting to study the whole book, or a whole page at once.

To do this, three things are necessary ; first, to begin at the right place ; second, to proceed in a proper order ; and third, to make such divisions as we can easily understand, and as shall seem proper and natural.

We study a book most easily if we commence at the beginning and read it in course. It is also a help to us if it is so arranged and divided into chapters, or sections, and paragraphs, that we can study one subject at a time, and find, in each part, assistance in understanding the next.

This is what we need in the study of the mind. We must look for the right place to begin, and for a convenient general division, by the aid of which, we can arrange all our mental acts. Philosophers formerly made a twofold division: the Understanding and the Will.— But a more convenient division will be three fold; as will be seen by reference to the definition of the mind, already given.

We can arrange all those acts, or states, and all those faculties of the mind, by which we gain knowledge, in one class; and all those which are connected with feeling or desire, in another; and those which cause bodily action, in another.

We may then call the first class Intellectual states and faculties, because they are employed in gaining knowledge or intelligence. The second class, Sentient or sensitive states and faculties, because they involve sensibility or feeling; and the third class, Voluntary states, because it is from this department that volitions or acts of the will proceed, and are manifested in outward conduct, or acts of the body.

We will then adopt three convenient terms to express the three departments of the mind. 1. THE INTELLECT. 2. THE SENSIBILITIES. 3. THE WILL.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE INTELLECT.

If we begin at the right place, we shall first endeavor to study the Intellect, because it is with this that we gain knowledge; and knowledge is fitted to produce feelings and desires; and these lead on to volitions, or acts of

the will. If we are to perform any operation, we must first know what it is ; then we must have some desire, or feeling of obligation to do it ; and then the will or determination to do it. This is the process of the mind in our employments, whether we stop to trace it or not.

The Intellect admits of division, because there are two sources of knowledge, and two methods by which we gain it. First, the objects around us, which we examine by means of our senses. Second, the mind itself, and the power it has of acting ; and of examining, and tracing its own acts, or states.

The knowledge we gain of the objects around us is called knowledge of the external world, or External Knowledge ; and, on this account, the department of mind by which we gain this, is called, for the sake of convenience, the **EXTERNAL INTELLECT**.

The knowledge which the mind gains of itself, and by its internal action, is properly called Internal Knowledge ; and that department of the mind by which this is gained, is called the **INTERNAL INTELLECT**.

There is reason to believe that our earliest knowledge is gained by the External Intellect, or the first of these methods ; and therefore our study of the mind may properly begin at that point.

#### THE EXTERNAL INTELLECT.

**SENSATION.** There are several ways in which we gain knowledge of things about us, or of the external world. We notice the Infant gazing at the fire, the burning lamp, or the bright picture, and then manifesting pleasure by his looks, and actions. He thus gives evidence of possessing a mind, and of having mental emotions, or feelings. These feelings are called Sensations ; and because they are produced by the sense of sight, they are called **SENSATIONS OF SIGHT**.

He listens to the sound of a bell or a whistle, or to a pleasant tune or the tones of his mother's voice, and his joyous countenance assures us that he receives pleasure by the sense of hearing. The feelings thus occasioned are called **SENSATIONS OF SOUND**.

Soon he learns to use his hands, and he desires to handle every thing he sees. This effort also gives

him pleasure; but he soon learns that there are some things he cannot safely handle. He takes hold of the burning lamp, and starts and shrieks with suffering. He feels a sensation of pain; and as it was produced by touching the burning light, it is called a **SENSATION OF TOUCH**.

He uses his hands to convey objects to his mouth, and some of these give him pleasure, so that he will cry for them, and manifest great delight in tasting them. Other things displease him, and he rejects them with a look which shows that he has experienced an unpleasant **SENSATION OF TASTE**.

He early learns that some things produce a pleasant feeling when applied to the sense of smell, while others offend him. He then furnishes evidence that he is capable of distinguishing **SENSATIONS OF SMELL**.

That child then has five distinct *channels* through which *sensations* are flowing in upon his mind, and by which he is gaining knowledge of the external world.

1. The eyes receive *Sensations of Sight*.
2. The ears receive *Sensations of Sound*.
3. The hands, and other parts of the body, to some extent, receive *Sensations of Touch*.
4. The mouth and tongue receive *Sensations of Taste*, and also those of *Touch*.
5. The nose receives *Sensations of Smell*.

As we receive sensations of five different kinds, and through five different channels, we are said to have five senses. The eyes, ears, hands, mouth, and nose, are sometimes called **Organs of sensation**.

We learned to use these organs before we can remember, and acquired a knowledge of many things so early that we cannot tell when, or in what way we learned them; and therefore, as remarked above, there is reason to believe that external knowledge was the earliest acquired, and that the **External Intellect** was first employed. We learned many things before we learned to reason about them. We had need of some knowledge before we could begin to reason. This becomes more apparent by noticing the mental progress of the infant. We find that he has learned many things before he can call their names, and before he gives evidence of pursuing trains of reasoning; or of forming conclusions by such a process.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE EXTERNAL INTELLECT.

**PERCEPTION.**—Nearly related to Sensation is Perception; and on this account some have found it difficult to distinguish them. A few illustrations will make their difference apparent.

A little boy, of four years, heard a noise in the adjoining room, one still evening, and took a light to go in and see the chickens. There were no chickens there; and he was filled with surprise: but his father showed him the black *crickets* that were making the noise. Before he saw the crickets, he had the *sensation* of sound, and he thought it made by chickens; but now he *perceived* that it was made by crickets, and therefore had the *Perception of Sound*.

The same boy on coming into the room one day, said: "Mother, what is it smells so sweet?" She showed him a rose, and he at once *perceived* that this occasioned the pleasant *sensation*. That sensation had now become a *Perception of Smell*.

A little girl returning from school, stood listening a few minutes in fixed attention, and then asked her mother what it was that made such pretty noises. Her mother took her to the window, and showed her the little cords of an *Æolian Harp*, which she had fitted there. The pleasant sensation of the child thus became a *Perception of Sound*. A child was one day requested to take an unpleasant medicine. He took a little in his mouth, but immediately refused it because it was unpleasant. He had not only an unpleasant sensation of taste but a perception of its cause. He was not willing to take more, because he perceived that the medicine caused the disagreeable taste. That was a *Perception of Taste*.

A little girl, one day as her mother left the room, took a hot cake from a dish by the fire, but immediately dropped it, and cried with pain in her hand. She dared not



pick it up again, for she had not only a painful sensation, but perceived that the cake caused it. That was a *Perception of Touch*.

The difference between Sensation and Perception is this : Sensation is a mere *state or feeling in the mind*. Perception recognizes or embraces this, and also *connects it with or refers it to something as its cause*. In order to gain knowledge therefore, of external objects, Perception is necessarily connected with Sensation.

Sensation alone would often mislead us, while if we had no sensations, we could have no perceptions. But, while we have the use of all our senses, we may have both sensations and perceptions of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. This is a wonderful provision of our Creator, but this is not all. The world is full of objects fitted to awaken these sensations and perceptions, and to occasion a high degree of pleasure, as the knowledge gained from them flows into the soul, by means of these various senses.

But how does this knowledge reach the mind ? Where is the mind ? And what is it ? These are questions we cannot answer. We cannot taste, touch, see, hear or smell it. We learn from those who have dissected and examined dead persons, that all the organs of sensation have a very fine substance called nerves, which connect these organs with the brain ; and that these nerves appear to be of the same quality with the brain. It is also known that disease in the brain, or a blow upon the head, sometimes injures or destroys the regular action of the mind.

The wrong or excessive use of the mind also sometimes injures the brain. It is therefore quite certain that the mind has a very intimate connexion with the brain. We may then conclude that the brain is the organ for knowing, thinking, feeling, willing, and acting, as really as the eye is for seeing and the ear for hearing. This is sufficient for our present purpose.

## CHAPTER. V.

### KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

It may not be possible for us to determine precisely how much of our knowledge is gained by the senses, nor is this necessary. We need only indicate the kinds of knowledge, or the classes of objects with which we thus become acquainted. We can then see that these furnish materials for reflection, and for the other internal intellectual processes.

**THE SENSE OF SMELL.**—We notice this first, because it does not seem to be the most important of our senses. We may reasonably conclude that we could do without this, better than without sight or hearing. Yet the loss of this would be a great calamity. We should be deprived of all the pleasure we now receive from the smell of flowers, fruit and food. The fragrance of the rose, the pink, the violet, the geranium, and the myriads of other flowers, which is wafted to us by the breath of heaven, would be lost to us.

All would

“Waste their sweetness on the desert air.”

We could not tell whether the food placed before us was pleasant or offensive, till we had tasted it. The sense of smell now furnishes us with this knowledge. It aids us in detecting poisonous plants, and liquids. We learn to distinguish one from another when it would be very dangerous to taste them. This sense is placed in the right position to guard us from such dangers

It warns us if our houses or any places about them become offensive and injurious to health. It teaches us when the sick room becomes offensive and injurious to the sick.

It sometimes helps us to ascertain that our clothes, or our dwellings are on fire, before we could discover

it in any other way. It increases our appetite and relish for food, and often enables us to know beforehand whether a particular kind of food would give us pleasure or pain.

It is capable of being greatly increased in power, so that persons, if deprived of taste or sight, can acquire by it a great deal of knowledge which is usually gained by those senses.

**THE SENSE OF TASTE.**—This does not seem to be a source of so much knowledge as that of sight, but is still a means of very extensive and important knowledge; and also when properly treated, of much enjoyment. It aids the sense of smell in determining the nature and quality of our food. It sometimes warns us against excessive indulgence in food and drink.

We learn the nature of many of the substances used in Chemistry and the arts, and also many facts in relation to metals and minerals, by the taste. If a piece of zinc is placed under the tongue, and a piece of silver placed over it, and then the two metals are made to touch, a peculiar sensation is produced. If then silver money were counterfeited by having a mixture of zinc in it, one who had learned the sensation referred to, could readily detect the zinc by this experiment, when he could not detect it by sight. We can distinguish salts and acids and alkalies by the taste, because we can learn, by experiment, the taste peculiar to each.

We learned to distinguish sour sweet and bitter tastes, and many different degrees in each, before we can remember. We have, from our earliest recollection, been able to distinguish many things, by the taste, which we could not otherwise determine, and thus have always been gaining knowledge by this sense.

**THE SENSE OF TOUCH.**—This is not only a source of extensive knowledge in itself, but it aids in correcting wrong views and avoiding mistakes which might be occasioned by the other senses, if we were deprived of this. We learn the sensations of heat and cold, of dampness and dryness, by the touch. We learn what bodies are hard or soft, sharp or dull, rough or smooth,

round, square or angular, in any form : also what are stiff or limber, elastic or non-elastic, brittle or tenacious, heavy or light, hot or cold &c. There is reason to believe that we learn to judge of the distance and size, and also the form of objects, originally, by touch. If we had not the sense of touch, there would be only a sensation of sight ; and this being in the mind, all objects which caused it, might seem to touch our eyes, or be very near them.

Persons who were born blind, have sometimes been made to see, by surgical operations, on the eyes ; and it has been found that they could not distinguish even the form of objects, at first, by sight, so as to determine which was round or which was square. Now that we have learned by the aid of touch, to judge by sight of the form and size of objects, we often err.

We look upon a painting and see plums, apples and peaches, which appear to be in perfect shape. We see human figures apparently in perfect form, and as though we could take them by the hand. So with landscapes, houses, or villages ; they may seem to cover a large space, and be of large and proper dimensions. But we find the appearances to be produced, by a skilful arrangement of paints, upon the paper or canvass, or other level surface.

If we see a bird high in the air, it appears very small, and we should suppose it to be so if we had not learned by experience. When we look at objects in a fog, or mist, they seem larger and more distant than they are.

So when we look off upon the ocean, or across a river, or an open plane, objects seem nearer than they are.

A man saw persons, at a distance, standing in the door of a church, and thought they were children ; but on coming near, found them to be full sized men. They had appeared small because standing in a large door.

When we see an object at a distance, we cannot judge accurately of its size, by sight, unless we know its distance ; nor can we judge accurately of

the distance of objects, unless we know their size. The experience which enables us to do this, is gained to a great extent, by the aid of touch, by which we can measure and compare objects, distances and dimensions.

The sense of touch in blind persons is greatly increased by instruction. They learn to read by means of their fingers, nearly as fast as others do by sight.—Books are printed for their use with large raised letters, which can be more easily felt.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

**SENSE OF HEARING.**—By this sense we are able to perceive the tones of kindness and joy, and the shrieks of distress and terror. We can share the pleasures of conversation and the sweet strains of music. We can gain knowledge from the experience of others, by our firesides, in the stage coach, or steam boat, in the legislative hall, or the court house ; in the Lyceum, the school, or lecture room, and the Sanctuary.

We can gain knowledge and receive impressions of delight from the myriads of sounds in the natural world. We hear the song of the birds, the bleating of lambs, the lowing of cattle, and the chirp or hum of the insect tribes. We listen to the rippling of the brook, the roar of the waterfall, the thunders of the ocean waves, and the thunders of the heavens.

The knowledge derived from this sense is very extensive and varied.

The sense of hearing can be greatly improved by exercise, so that we may learn to distinguish a vast variety of sounds, and perceive the most delicate variation in tone, strength, and quality of sound; and distinguish those made by different musical instruments from each other, and from those of the human voice. By this sense we learn to regulate the voice, and to imitate sounds.

Those who are born deaf, do not learn to talk; and young children, who after learning to talk, have lost the sense of hearing, have generally lost the power of speech also.

The blind, in the Institutions for their improvement, receive a large part of their instruction from the voice of the teacher. Before they learn to read with their fingers, this is their principal method of gaining knowledge. In this way the ear becomes exceedingly acute, and they learn to imitate sounds with great skill. They frequently become very skilful in the performance of vocal and instrumental music.

By experience, and the aid of the other senses, we learn to judge with some degree of accuracy, by hearing, of the *distance* and *direction* of sounds. There is reason to believe that this is an *acquired*, and not an *original* capacity of hearing, and it is liable to err.

**SENSE OF SIGHT.**—This is early used, and it is the source of a great portion of our knowledge. The different colors, the lights and shadows, the works of nature and of art, books, visible illustrations, and experiments, the changing of the seasons, the varying appearances of the heavens and the earth, the form, size, and motions of objects, all present knowledge through the eye. If we are indebted to the sense of touch for our *original* knowledge of the form, size, distance, and motions of objects, we at length gain the power of forming tolerably correct ideas, by sight. The boundaries of knowledge are thus extended, and the facilities for acquiring it greatly increased. The eye can be trained so as to perceive the nicest shades of coloring and the most exact proportions. It thus becomes a perfect guide to the painter and the sculptor. In all the arts, it is the

most important sense employed in studying and imitating models.

The eye can be aided by the use of a few lenses, so as to see distant stars, which it cannot see unaided, and also to discover objects too minute to be seen otherwise.— Thus the wonders of creation are unfolded in vast and beautiful variety.

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## CHAPTER VII.

### IMPROVEMENT OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

We have seen that a vast amount and variety of knowledge is secured by the use of the five senses, and that some of these senses aid in correcting the ideas gained by the others. It has also been said that some of the senses can be greatly improved by effort, when there is a necessity for this. This fact deserves more attention. We may now state as a general truth,

1. That all the powers of the human being may be improved by exercise, so as to become more perfect instruments than they would otherwise be.

2. It is equally possible for all parts of the body to be weakened and unfitted for any use. They may even become sources of suffering.

3. The same general law prevails in relation to the mind in all its powers and faculties. It is peculiarly so in relation to the *organs of sensation*.

4. These may be easily impaired, by neglect or abuse, so that they will give us defective or erroneous sensations, and then our *Perceptions* will also be wrong, and consequently our *feelings*, and *reasonings*, and *conduct*, will be more or less erroneous.

5. It is equally true that all the *organs of sensation* can be improved, by right exercise, so as to become more rapid and accurate in their operation. Consequently our sensations, and perceptions will be the more rapid and accurate—our feelings, and reasonings will be more just, and our conduct less likely to err.

The repeated and proper exercise of the senses leads to the formation of just *habits of sensation and perception*. Habit is said to be "*second nature*." Its effect is to render any effort *natural* and pleasant, which otherwise might be difficult or unpleasant. This fact is of great importance, and lays the foundation for just principles in education, and points out the proper efforts for its promotion. It shows us the necessity for—1. *Frequent and active exercise* of our senses, in the pursuit of knowledge.—2. A careful attention to the sensations and perceptions we receive.—3. The use of more than one of the senses, in securing our knowledge of objects, when this can be properly done. One of the senses may some times mislead us, and its sensations must be corrected by another. When we gain knowledge of an object by several of the senses our impressions are more vivid, as well as more just, and they may be more easily recalled.—4. The use of our organs of sensation must not be excessive, or too long continued, so as to overtask them; nor should their use be impaired or wasted upon worthless objects.

The more full and definite illustration of these principles belongs to a work on Education.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### MENTAL STATES OCCASIONED BY SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

It is evident that the knowledge derived from the senses is of great importance. It is so, not only in itself, but as the basis of action for the Internal Intellect. It is the means of exercising the various Mental Powers and thus leading on to other knowledge. Several mental processes can be specified, which naturally arise in consequence of the knowledge gained by sensation and perception. These may perhaps be considered as belonging to the Internal Intellect; but as they rise in consequence of the knowledge derived from sensation and perception, they may be considered in this connection. Of this description we may notice Attention, Reflection, Simple Ideas, Complex Ideas, Abstraction, Classification, Conception and Dreaming.

**ATTENTION.**—We are able to retain the perceptions which we receive, and to examine them. We can shut out, for a time, other matters, and occupy the mind especially with those we wish to examine. This is called *attention*, and it may exist in different degrees. It is to some extent a voluntary effort, yet all persons have not equal power to fix their attention on a particular subject.

One person cannot read or write while others are conversing near him. I knew a student who could not study if a child cried within hearing, or if a goose or a dog were making a noise near the house.

Some scholars cannot study while others are reciting in the school room. Others are not interrupted by anything, when they choose to study.

Some will fix attention for a *long time* and with great strength, on one subject; others are soon weary.

Some will attend to several things apparently at the same time. It is said that Julius Cæsar could write a despatch, and dictate to four other writers at the same

time. If he did not write himself he could dictate seven letters as fast as seven persons could well write. Napoleon Bonaparte, it is said, could do the same. President Dwight, of Yale college, it is said, could dictate to four or five writers at a time.

Some persons have very feeble power of attention, and are confused if two or three things demand immediate attention. The difference in attention depends partly on original difference in the power of the will, and partly on cultivation and habit. As memory depends greatly upon attention it is important to cultivate it in the best manner.

**REFLECTION.**—We fix attention, upon a subject for the purpose of examining it; and in doing this we are said to think or *reflect* upon it. We examine the matter in its various parts and its connexion with other things, and thus gain knowledge by *reflection*. The power of reflection, and the increase of knowledge gained by it, depend much upon attention, as well as upon the talents of a person.

**SIMPLE AND COMPLEX IDEAS.**—Reflection furnishes Ideas. When we think, or reflect upon a subject, the knowledge we gain is made up of parts, or of distinct mental states, which may be called Ideas. These are either simple or complex. A complex idea is made up of simple ones, and consequently *may be separated into parts*.

We may think of a tree, and have a clear idea of it as a whole. Yet it is made up of many parts. There are the roots, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, and perhaps the blossoms or the fruit. It has life, strength, form, size and color. When we think of a tree, therefore, we have a *complex idea*, because it can be divided and separated into parts.

But a simple idea cannot be separated into parts; it admits of no division, and therefore it cannot easily be defined by words; but we can understand it, and distinguish it from the complex idea of which it forms a part.

**ABSTRACTION.**—This is intimately connected with

the relations of simple and complex ideas. We may take any object, having several properties, and examine one of those properties by itself, leaving out of view the others. We may think of an apple, and then we can think of its color. We will suppose it to be red. We can then think of red color, as belonging to some other object, or without connecting it with any particular object. Thus we can abstract the color from the object, and have an *abstract idea*.

We can think of the apple as sweet or sour, large or small, hard or soft, ripe or unripe, sound or decayed; and we can think of each of these qualities in connection with an orange, a peach or pear, or without connecting the quality with any particular object. Each quality of any object may thus be abstracted and become an abstract idea.

The uses of this power are very numerous, in all the employments of men, as well as in efforts to gain knowledge. Every artist, who makes any improvement in his profession, has occasion to use the power of abstraction in doing so.

It is used in relation to trains of thought and reasoning, and processes purely mental, as well as to objects examined by the senses.

**CLASSIFICATION.**—This is intimately connected with abstraction. As we examine any quality of an object we may see that it belongs also to many others. Lead has weight, or gravity; and so have iron, steel, gold, silver, zinc, and various other substances. We can then conveniently class these together for certain purposes.

They have also a peculiar lustre, which distinguishes them from the earth, from wood, and from stone. It is called a metallic lustre, and the substances which have it, are classed together, and called *metals*. It is thus that we come to use general abstract Ideas.

The term metallic lustre may be used to express a *general abstract idea*, because we can think of it as applied to metals *generally*, without connecting it with any particular metal.

So we may think of any color. Snow is white, and so

are milk, chalk, paper, cloth, and many other substances. We may then think of whiteness as a general property common to many objects. We can do the same with any other quality.

In this way we can arrange all objects into groups or classes, and form notions of genera, and species. We may arrange particular objects of the same description together, and thus form a *species*, embracing all the objects which have certain specific qualities in common.

There may be several species which have some more general resemblance, while they differ in particular qualities, and these we may unite and form *genera*. These may again be compared and united in a still more general or indefinite group, and form an *order* or a *class*. In this way we can distribute trees and plants and other objects, into a variety of classes, orders, genera, and species; and each species may contain a great number of individuals.

#### CLASSIFICATIONS NOT ALWAYS PERFECT.

It would be reasonable to expect more or less diversity, and defect, in the classification of the numberless objects in nature, especially while our knowledge is limited and defective. Children often make mistakes in classification. A little boy of three years, had seen, with much delight, a military company on their march. Their waving plumes and regular step had greatly interested him. A few days after, he rode out of the city with his mother, and saw, for the first time, a flock of geese pacing along the street, and exclaimed, "O mother, see the *trainers*! the *trainers*!" His mother told him they were not trainers, but geese. "O yes" was his eager reply, "*trainer geese*! *trainer geese*!"

The inhabitants of Pitcairn's Island, in 1814, saw two large English vessels at anchor near their Island. Two of the young persons came on board and were filled with wonder at the novel and strange objects they saw. They were somewhat afraid of the cow on board, and could not tell whether it was a huge *goat* or a *horned hog*. As

these were the only kinds of animals with which they were acquainted, they supposed it must be one of them.

Capt. Cook, in his voyage round the world, touched at an Island called Wateoo, on his way from New Zealand to the Friendly Islands. The inhabitants were acquainted with only three kinds of animals; these were birds, hogs and dogs. They did not know what to call the cows and horses, and were afraid of them, but the sheep and goats, they supposed to be birds. They had probably seen but one kind of hogs and dogs, but as there were many kinds of birds on the Island, they supposed these might be a kind of birds.

Notwithstanding the defects and mistakes which sometimes occur, the power of classification is of great value in the acquisition and proper use of knowledge. This, in connexion with abstraction, distinguishes the cultivated and philosophical mind from that which is undisciplined and unfurnished.

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## CHAPTER IX.

### CONCEPTION.

There is a state of mind somewhat analogous to sensation and perception, and somewhat like remembrance, but which can be clearly distinguished from both.

We may think of an absent object, so that we seem to perceive it, in all its particulars, and yet have no recollection of the time when we saw the object. As I sit here I can think of the home of my childhood: The house, the fields, the trees which I planted, the form and features of my father, the companions of my youth, the scenes of the school room, and other objects too numer-

ous to be recorded, come thronging before the mind as if they were but scenes of yesterday, or were now passing before me.

But these scenes are not present. I can take no account of them, by sensation or perception. I can only recall past sensations of these absent objects; or, in other words, I *conceive* of them. I take no notice of the time when these objects were before me, but can grasp the events of years into a single view. This is done by the conceptive faculty or *power of conception*. The mental states thus called up are named CONCEPTIONS.

They differ from sensations and perceptions *because their objects are absent*.

They differ from remembrances, because we can produce them without any reference to the time when they were presented.

Conceptions are highly important in several respects. They may afford a high degree of satisfaction to the mind. A person may call up, almost at pleasure, endeared associations of past events and distant objects, and thus in a sense, experience, again and again his former joys.

We may form conceptions of objects of sight in almost endless variety. We can conceive of myriads of objects which we have never seen, but of which we have heard or read a description. Distant cities, ancient temples, monuments, ruins, costumes, customs, and every object within the range of thought can thus be made to pass before the "eye of the mind," and seem almost like present realities. Blind persons who once could see, and were accustomed to gaze upon the beautiful objects of nature, and art, can revive the most vivid conceptions of them. They are sometimes able to describe them, and to combine and re-arrange them, in new forms and relations, so as to appear as present objects of sight. Milton exhibits this power with great advantage, in some of the descriptions of scenes in *Paradise Lost*.

Conceptions of sound too, may be very numerous, if not so vivid as those of sight. Beethoven was able to compose some of his best pieces of music after he became entirely deaf. When we have listened for some

time to sweet music, we may reflect upon it in such a way that we seem to hear its rich tones.\*

Conceptions of touch, taste, and smell, do not seem to be so vivid or so easily produced as those of sight or sound; perhaps because not so much aided by Association, which is an important help in forming conceptions.

The conceptive power may be greatly improved by exercise and habit, and it becomes thus of great service in public speaking, in giving written or oral descriptions, in writing poetry or romance, in painting portraits or landscapes; and in short, in the efforts of genius of every description.

*Conceptions are sometimes attended with a momentary belief.*—I can think of a wound till for the moment I seem to feel the pain, and see the blood flowing. Sir Joshua Reynolds, after being for some time engaged in painting, as he walked into the street seemed to see the lamp posts as trees, and the men and women as moving shrubs. A little boy returning home with his parents in the evening said "I see little brother taking hold of the side of my bed, and looking right at me." He had a vivid conception which seemed to him like reality.

*Conceptions are sometimes joined with perceptions.*—In the dusk of evening or morning we may seem to see a man by the road side, in a threatening posture, and soon find it only a bush, or a stump, with a knot or a dry limb projecting. It is by a similar process probably that many persons have seen ghosts, and other frightful objects, which would have lost all their mystery and terror, if they had been examined.

Persons will gaze upon fictitious and tragical representations, when well performed, and laugh or weep as if the whole were a reality; notwithstanding they have a general conviction that it is a fictitious performance.

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\*A friend reminds me, that bad music occasions more vivid conceptions than good music.

## CHAPTER X.

### DREAMING.

Our minds are sometimes active, and thoughts and feelings are passing within us while we are asleep. This is called dreaming. Dreams appear to be somewhat related to conceptions, but have marks which clearly distinguish them. Conceptions have sometimes been fitly termed *waking dreams*.

Dreams like conceptions are sometimes intimately connected with previous sensations and perceptions. We frequently dream of subjects which interested us either pleasantly or painfully when awake. Persons sometimes continue trains of thought which were left unfinished when they retired to sleep. Condorcet, a French scholar has stated that he, more than once, finished in his dreams abstruse and profound calculations, which he had been obliged to leave unfinished when he retired.

Franklin also has stated that he had often discovered in dreaming, the bearing and results of political events, which had given him much trouble while awake.

In ancient times as we learn from the Scriptures, God sometimes communicated with men in their dreams.

President Edwards thought his dreams worth noticing, on account of the light they might throw upon his predominant inclinations and traits of character.

We sometimes dream of things which we cannot trace to any of our waking thoughts.

*Sensations may occasion dreams.*—I once lodged with a man whom I could sometimes cause to dream on almost any subject. Taking advantage of times when he appeared restless, I could speak to him in a low voice, on almost any subject with which he was familiar, and continue a conversation with him for some minutes. His answers would occasionally be indistinct or incoherent, but he would often reveal secrets that he would regret when awake. More than once I made him very angry in his sleep so that the venting of his anger awoke him.



Similar facts are related of an English officer. His companions once made him go through the process of fighting a duel ; and when the preliminary arrangements had been made, they put a loaded pistol in his hand, which, at the word, he fired, and thus waked himself.

A person by sleeping with something hot placed at the feet, may dream of walking on hot sand or coals, or on the summit of a volcano.

Persons from a feeling of hunger sometimes dream of eating or trying in vain to eat.

*Dreams sometimes are incoherent.*—We are unable to make different parts come together and harmonize.—One reason for this probably is that our Associations are interrupted, and broken by the want of the connecting links, which outward objects supply to our waking thoughts. These objects are shut out from the mind by the sleep of the senses, at least, in part. Some of the senses may be partially awake, but not so as to give correct impressions.

Another cause may be that our trains of thought and feeling in sleep are not subject to the control of the Will. When awake we can exert over them directly, or indirectly, a great degree of influence. We cannot always think or feel as we desire, by a mere act of the will ; but we can direct our attention to one subject, or another, and adopt various methods of examining whatever comes before the mind. In sleep we have not this voluntary control.

We have not usually a voluntary control of our limbs, in sleep, although this is sometimes the case, as in Somnambulism. Something like this irregular or occasional control, the will may have, at times, over our trains of thought ; but it is not uniform, and it gives occasion for incoherence in dreams.

*Our dreams may appear to be real.* This is often the case with children. They speak of having seen persons or objects and performed actions, as if they were realities, and are sometimes troubled to distinguish between conceptions, or recollections, and dreams. Dreams in this way, sometimes exert a powerful effect upon the feelings. I have dreamed of walking, or of laboring ex-

cessively, and on awaking, I have found myself covered with perspiration, and felt a weariness like that occasioned by such efforts. It is this apparent reality that leads persons to talk in their sleep, when no one speaks to them. This is the case in what is termed incubus or *night mare*: Some dreadful object of terror seems to be present, or approaching us, from which we are unable to escape.

Two causes of this apparent reality may be stated.—  
1. As other objects are closed upon us, the mind is exclusively occupied with its own creations, and these are, on that account, the more vivid. 2. Another reason probably is that our conceptions are not under the control of the will, in the same degree as when awake. Beside this, we are not able to bring reason and the senses to our aid, in correcting the conceptions.

We may sometimes be conscious of efforts to reason away the apparent reality of our dreams. I have in several instances been conscious of such a struggling, and, balancing between the dream and the reality; at one instant persuaded it was a dream, and the next that it was a reality, and have been awaked by the conflict.

*Time in dreaming.*—We sometimes appear to pass through scenes and changes which would require months and years, in a very few minutes. It seems as if the mind in such cases broke loose from the restraints of the bodily senses, and organs, and flew with the wings of light, through almost unlimited time, and unbounded space. "We go," says Professor Upham, "from land to land, and from city to city, and into desert places; we experience transitions from joy to sorrow, and from poverty to wealth; we are occupied in the scenes and transactions of many long months; and then our slumbers are scattered, and behold, they are the doings of a fleeting watch of the night!"

It is supposed by some that our waking thoughts are, at times, equally rapid, and that the apparent reality of dreams causes the illusion referred to. Our conceptions appear to be real events, and as such events require a long time and a variety of efforts, the time occupied in dreaming seems to be thus long.

**SOMNAMBULISM.**—This term denotes the act of walking in sleep, but is applied also to other bodily efforts while asleep. I knew a young man who rose in his night dress, and walked barefooted on the frosty ground, nearly half a mile to a neighbor's house, before he awoke.

A farmer in Massachusetts who had been engaged in threshing, and intended to finish the next day, rose in the night, dressed himself, went to his barn, ascended a ladder to the great beams, threw down a flooring of rye, threshed it, bound the straw, and carried it up to the beams, and put it on rails over the floor. He then threw down another flooring and continued to do so, till he had threshed five bushels; raking off the straw, and shoving the rye to the side of the floor, after each flooring. After throwing down the sixth and last flooring he fell from the hay mow, where the hay had been cut down, some six feet, and was awakened by the fall. He found the way, from the barn to the house, and the next day he ascertained that he had threshed five bushels, without the least consciousness of what he was doing till he fell from the hay.\*

Such cases show that the will sometimes exerts its power over the muscles in dreams. These with other cases, also confirm the opinion that some of the senses may sleep more soundly than others, and that some fall asleep earlier than others.

Cabanis, a French writer, who made several experiments, came to the conclusion that the sense of sight first falls asleep, then that of taste, and then that of smell. The next in order is hearing, and lastly, that of touch. Perhaps however the same order does not take place in all persons, and in all instances.

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\*Abridged from Professor Upham's work.

## CHAPTER XI.

### INTERNAL INTELLECT.

CONSCIOUSNESS.—The soul has *internal sources of knowledge*, as well as emotions and exercises, occasioned by external objects. This opinion has generally been held by philosophers, though sometimes very obscurely, and indefinitely ; and a few have denied it, and endeavored to trace all knowledge to the senses.

A diversity of sentiment has prevailed, as to the extent of knowledge derived from this source, and as to the classification of the internal intellectual states and faculties. It is not consistent with the plan of this work to discuss the conflicting opinions which have prevailed ; but rather to state such principles, and matters of fact, as seem to be established, on a solid basis, or as may be referred to and confirmed by our own experience.

The beginnings of knowledge, we have already seen, are from external objects, by means of the senses, ; but these give rise to mental acts, and processes which are strictly internal. This intimate connection between the internal and external occasions of knowledge, causes some difficulty in classifying the intellectual states ; and gives room for diversity of opinion, and of arrangement.

We have already enumerated several processes which may be regarded as belonging to the Internal Intellect. The reasons for arranging them in that relation is found in their immediate connection with sensation and perception.

Other mental states may be enumerated which clearly belong to the Internal Intellect ; such as are expressed by the terms, *Believing, Disbelieving, Doubt, Certainty, Faith*, and the like.

We know when we believe, disbelieve, or doubt a statement, as well as we know that we see, hear, touch, taste or smell an object : Yet this knowledge is not derived from without by means of the senses. The pro-

cesses themselves are internal, and exist in the mind. The knowledge thus arising is gained by *Consciousness*.

I can say that I am conscious of thinking, feeling, willing, desiring, dreading, doubting, and so of every other state which exists, or process which is carried on in the mind.

Consciousness, then, may be defined to be the notice which the mind takes of its own states and acts.

Three ideas are embraced or assumed in every instance of consciousness.

1. The existence of the mind or the person thinking or feeling.

2. A thought, or feeling, or some state or act of the mind.

3. The relation of this thought, feeling, state, or act, to the mind, or the person. If I say *I am happy*, or *am conscious of happiness*, the expression assumes (1) The existence of myself or my *personal existence*, (2) The existence of happiness. (3) Its existence *in my mind*, or *its relation to me*.

CONSCIOUSNESS IS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND A GROUND OF BELIEF.—There may be mistakes in the interpretation of consciousness. Persons may assume that they know things by consciousness, which do not come within its province, and which exist only in the imagination. The mind may be impaired by disease or insanity so that consciousness may mislead us ; but, in its natural, and healthful action, it is a source of knowledge, and of evidence, as absolute and decisive as any of the senses. Indeed, if properly understood and interpreted, it is less liable to mislead us than the senses. We do, and with propriety, believe as confidently the truths we gain by consciousness, as those we gain by any of the senses.

THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—The objects of consciousness are extremely numerous, yet they are not unlimited.

1. We may be conscious of thinking, and of the possession of ideas on all subjects on which our minds are employed.

2. We may be conscious of sensations and percep-

tions; and also of feelings, emotions, desires, or aversions, occasioned by objects around us through the medium of our senses.

3. We are conscious of enjoyment or suffering, occasioned by the proper action or the injury of our bodily organs; or by disease, or a wound, in any part of the body.

4. We may be conscious of hope, fear, joy, sorrow, grief, anger, love, hatred, belief, doubt, distrust, anxiety, remorse, penitence, and all other sentient states, produced by thinking.

5. We may be conscious of volitions or acts of the will, and all those states designated by the terms choice, preference, purpose, decision, determination, hesitation, and the like.

6. All the moral and religious emotions and affections, are matters of consciousness; and on the power of a person to analyze and examine these, will depend in a great measure, the clearness and strength of religious hope and peace.

#### OBJECTS NOT KNOWN DIRECTLY BY CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. We cannot with propriety say that we are conscious of *past* thoughts or feelings, although we may be conscious of the *remembrance* of them.

2. We may be conscious of a *conception* of absent objects, but not of the *existence* of those objects.

3. We cannot be *conscious* of the *existence* of objects of sense which are present; although we may be conscious of the *sensations* and *perceptions* occasioned by them.

4. Nor is the existence of our mental faculties, or of the mind itself, the direct object of consciousness; but of another property of the Internal Intellect, which we shall next notice.

## CHAPTER XII.

### SUGGESTION.

This term is used to express the fact that the mind is so constituted, that by its own action, it may suggest, or give rise to ideas; and that one idea suggests another.

The two things here noticed render it convenient to use the terms Original Suggestion and Relative Suggestion.

**ORIGINAL SUGGESTION.**—This term expresses the fact that the action of the mind gives rise to certain ideas. As we receive sensations from external objects, perception connects these sensations with their objects; and thus the *existence* of external objects is *suggested*. But the perception of these objects suggests also the existence of the mind that perceives.

Consciousness gives rise to the action of the suggestive principle, in many particulars.

If we are conscious of thinking or of possessing knowledge, the existence of a mind that thinks and knows is naturally *suggested*. If we have strong feelings the existence of a mind that feels is suggested. If we have volitions or acts of the will, the existence of a mind that *wills* or a *voluntary power*, is suggested.

### INSTANCES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM ORIGINAL SUGGESTION.

It is not necessary to attempt the specification of all the ideas which arise from this source, if this were possible. Some of these have already been noticed.

1. The existence of *Matter*, or of external objects.
2. The *Mind*, which may be suggested by sensation and perception, and also by consciousness.
3. *The different Departments, Faculties, or Powers of the Mind*, which are called into exercise in the processes of thought, feeling and volition.

To these may be added

4. Our own *Personal Existence* and *Personal Identity*. We think and feel and act; and we yesterday thought, felt and acted.

We are conscious that the thoughts and feelings we now have belong to us; and memory assures us that the thoughts and feelings of yesterday also belonged to us; hence the suggestion of *Personal Identity*; or the idea that we are the same persons to-day that we were yesterday.

5. MOTION.—We can see objects in motion but cannot see motion itself. The appearance of the moving body may suggest the idea of motion.

6. SPACE.—We cannot see or feel space; but we can see and feel objects that are separated from each other, and the idea of space is necessarily suggested. So also when we see a boat, a horse, or a cloud in motion, we have the idea of space, by suggestion.

7. SUCCESSION.—In performing any operations, either of mind or body, we do one thing first. Sometimes we are perplexed in ascertaining which to do first. We take one step after another, in walking, and running. In writing, or speaking, we place one word after another, and thus the idea of succession is suggested by the most common occurrences.

8. DURATION.—This is intimately connected with succession, yet is clearly to be distinguished from it. Succession requires duration. It requires some time to take one step, or write one word; but much longer to take the *successive* steps of a long journey; or write, *successively*, the words of a large book. Succession then may occasion the suggestion of duration.

9. TIME.—Time is *measured* and *limited* duration. Succession and duration may aid the mind in its notions of time. The idea of time is doubtless derived from suggestion, and originates from the very constitution and action of the mind.

10. ETERNITY.—This is duration *unmeasured* and *unlimited*, without beginning and without end. This idea is developed in the mind itself. It originates in the Intellect, from its suggestive power. It may perhaps be viewed



as a *necessary* idea ; if the intellect is fairly unfolded. Not that the mind can *comprehend* eternity, still how can we conceive of duration *limited*, except in contrast with duration *unlimited* ? Does not the finite and limited imply and *necessarily* suggest, the Infinite and unlimited ?

11. UNITY. This idea is obtained in our earliest years. The infant exhibits evidence of distinguishing unity from plurality, and grasps a second object, while retaining the first. This characteristic is supposed to be unfolded by suggestion, and is a *necessary* idea of the internal intellect, arising in the examination of objects. It is incapable of verbal definition, but is one of the most simple and definite ideas we possess.

12. POWER. The idea of power is *necessarily* suggested. If I think, it is certain that I have *power* to think. The idea of power is readily suggested by the acts of the will. We will to speak and thus demonstrate the power of speech. We hear others speak, and suggestion assures us that men have the power of speech.

When we see the trees bending, or falling prostrate, and hear the roaring of the wind, the idea of power springs up in the mind, or is suggested. So when we witness the vessel tossed upon the billows, and plowing its way onward, with its full swelling sails, the idea of power is suggested. The steam engine in the boat, or on the rail road, suggests vividly the idea of power.

13. CAUSE AND EFFECT. We are so constituted that this idea springs up *necessarily* or spontaneously in connection with exhibitions of power, and with every change we witness.

"Ma," said a little boy as the sun was setting, "who blows the sun out at night?" We cannot look upon any object, and reflect upon it, without feeling that it had a cause. If we witness an exhibition of great power, we spontaneously think of effects. If a furious gale or tornado sweeps by us, we expect to hear of its devastations, in the destruction of trees, or buildings. In the dark and dreadful storm, if we think of the ocean, we think of vessels dismasted, and wrecked, and sailors perishing in the ocean depths. Suggestion early gives us the idea

that every effect we witness must have its cause ; and that a powerful agent will produce corresponding results.

14. **FIRST CAUSE.** The process of the mind from the idea of cause to the *First Cause* is a very natural one. We may perhaps say a *necessary* one, if the intellect is fully unfolded. Even in childhood, the question "*Who made it?*" is among the earliest evidences of the action of the Internal Intellect. The question is asked in relation to the sun, moon, and the stars ; the grass, the trees, the fruits, and flowers ; the rocks and mountains ; the winds and storms ; snow, hail, rain, frost and fire. The mind is thus travelling back in search of a *First Cause*, and cannot well rest short of that point. It is thus that the mind, by its own action, is fitted to develop the idea of *First Cause*, and to array that cause in *absolute* and *unlimited attributes*. The idea of a final or first cause—a Supreme Being—the Cause of all other causes, the *Designer* of all that is above human capacity, and the Author of that capacity—seems *necessarily* to arise in the Intellect that is itself unfolded. If a person can be found who has no belief in the existence of God, it seems to be absolutely certain, either that his mind is not fully or fairly unfolded, or that it is in some respects perverted.

15. **RIGHT AND WRONG.** The mind is so constituted that it has, in its own nature, the ideas of right and wrong. We *feel* that somethings are right, and others wrong. A child manifests this at an early period. The *idea* of right and wrong, and the fundamental and immutable distinction between them, is suggested by the Intellect, in connection with the consciousness of *emotions* of right and wrong, and feelings of obligation.

16. **MERIT AND DEMERIT—INNOCENCE AND GUILT.** Along with our notions of right and wrong, we have those of merit, and demerit—of innocence, and guilt. If we are conscious of having done right, we have the approval of conscience. If we are conscious of doing wrong, we feel reprov'd, and guilty. If we see others constantly doing wrong, and that, too, *knowingly* and *willingly*, we view them as guilty, and undeserving of merit or approval. If we see them always endeavoring to know

and do what is right, and for the love of right, we regard them as innocent and virtuous ; and their conduct as meritorious and praiseworthy. The idea of merit and demerit, virtue and vice, is thus suggested in the mind itself.

17. OTHER IDEAS FROM SUGGESTION. Doubtless we may refer to the same source, our ideas or conceptions of beauty and deformity ; fitness and unfitness ; congruity and incongruity ; proportion, order, truth, design, intelligence, and all others of which we have emotions or conceptions. If we have either emotions or conceptions, we seem, of necessity, to infer or assume the existence of some *quality*, or *property* in objects, which gives rise to those mental states.

18. Many *principles*, which we regard as fundamental, seem to arise thus in the intellect, and to be suggested by it.

As we ascribe every effect which we witness to some cause, we naturally adopt the *principle* that *there is, and can be no beginning, or change of existence, without a cause.*

As we examine the qualities of an object, and as our senses cannot perceive qualities except in connection with objects, we adopt the *principle* that *every quality perceived belongs to some object, or implies an object to which it belongs.*

Wherever we see means conspiring to produce a certain end, we feel constrained to ascribe the arrangement of these means, with their results, to intelligence. Hence the principle *that all wise arrangements, and adaptations, of means to ends, imply a designing intelligence adequate to the results.*

In a similar manner we may arrive at the principle that *there are laws, relating both to mind and to matter, which are uniform and permanent ; and that each has laws adapted to its own nature.*

In a similar way, probably, may we discover the principle, that *every truly NECESSARY simple idea has a corresponding reality in nature.*

The ideas here ascribed to Suggestion, are by some writers ascribed to the Reason. The term Suggestion is

preferred, on account of the danger of confounding the term Reason in the transcendental sense, with its use in the ordinary sense of Deduction.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

### SUGGESTION.

**RELATIVE SUGGESTION.** There are perceptions or feelings of relation, connected with suggestion, which deserve a separate consideration. They are intimately concerned with trains of Association and Reasoning. They are as numerous as the objects of sensation or of thought. The innumerable objects of sight may be compared, and no two will appear precisely alike. One is larger or smaller, lighter or darker, or more or less beautiful than another. So with the objects of sound, one is louder or softer, nearer or more distant, higher or lower, longer or shorter, more or less pleasing than another. One is of the bird, another of the wind, another of the ocean. One is of the lamb, another of the dog, another of the human voice. The feeling of relation arises in the mind, indicating or suggesting the *quality, tone, strength*, and also the *occasion* of the sound.

Similar remarks apply to the other senses.

One substance feels, more or less, hard, soft ; smooth, rough ; round, level or angular ; large, small ; long, short ; sharp, dull ; cold or hot ; pleasant or unpleasant to the touch, than another.

One substance is more or less bitter, rancid, sour, sweet, agreeable or disagreeable to the taste than another. So also with objects of smell.

Feelings of relation also exist in connection with all the operations of the *Internal Intellect*.

One train of thought is more simple, complex ; easy, difficult ; beautiful, sublime, or the reverse, than another.

One emotion or desire is more intense or feeble, transient or permanent ; pleasant or painful, than another.

One volition or act of the Will is more or less prompt, decided, energetic, or efficient, than another. We have terms of relation, or relative terms, to express many of our ideas of *definite* relations. The term father expresses a definite relation, and *suggests* the idea of child. So with the terms husband, wife, child, brother, sister, cousin, uncle, nephew. Each of them expresses a *definite* relation, and suggests its corresponding or related term. The terms president, governor, general, captain, judge, king, emperor, dictator, deliverer, oppressor, each indicates a relation, and suggests its corresponding term, or counterpart.

A great variety of relations are expressed by the various adjectives in a language, and their degrees of comparison. There is also a large class of adverbs which express relations of *actions* and *ideas*.

A large number of our ideas of relation can be arranged in the following classes. (1.) Relations of blood or of family. (2.) Relations of law or of civil society. (3.) Relations of dependence and obligation. (4.) Relations of office and government. (5.) Relations of time. (6.) Of place. (7.) Of possession. (8.) Of degree. (9.) Of proportion. (10.) Of identity and diversity. (11.) Of Cause and Effect.

These different relations can be traced in the mind, by reflection, and for a more full exhibition of those of the last seven classes, the student may consult the work of Prof. Upham on the Intellect.\* The exercise of this species of suggestion is spoken of as the exercise of judgement ; and a man who has skill in perceiving and tracing relations, and coming to right conclusions or results, is said to be a man of good judgement. The intimate connexion between relative suggestion and reasoning is thus seen ; and not less intimate is the connection between this and association ; and also between Association and reasoning.

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\*Vol. 1. § 199-214.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### ASSOCIATION.

This term expresses the fact that our processes of thought are more or less connected, so that one thing naturally follows another, and may be said to be suggested by it. It is not meant that one idea will always occasion or suggest *the same Associations, in all minds*, or even to the same mind, at all times and in all circumstances. But that one idea gives rise to another, and to *one that is in some way related to it*, is a fact of common experience.

If I think of China, I may also think of tea and opium, and the war which grew out of the traffic in opium; of British soldiers and British armed vessels. And perhaps before I have time to write this, I shall think of the independence of America, and the exercise of British power, and oppression, which led to the Declaration of Independence, and of the bloody conflict which secured it. Another mind, or my own at another time, might take an entirely different course.

Again, if I see a person buying tea and complaining of its high price, I may think of the cause of it and have nearly the same train of associations as before; or I may, by a shorter process, arrive at the tea exploits in Boston harbor, when our fathers threw the article overboard, rather than pay a few additional cents for it, in the form of a tax, imposed by British authority.

Associations may thus be various, yet they are not wholly arbitrary, nor wholly accidental. There are certain principles or laws of association which can be specified. These may be arranged into two classes; *Primary and Secondary Laws of Association*.

**PRIMARY LAWS.**—1. *Resemblance*. I saw a person the other day and called him by name; but soon found him to be a stranger. My mistake arose from his resemblance to a friend. I cannot now see one of these persons without thinking of the other. Resemblance in dress will sometimes lead us to mistake one person for

another. A painting of a departed or absent friend, will recall vividly that friend. A resemblance in the tones of the voice, will often call up an absent person.

Resemblance need not extend to all particulars in order to be an occasion of association; it may exist only in a single particular; or it may be only a resemblance in *effects* produced, that gives rise to associations of this class.

2. **CONTRAST.**—This is also a fruitful occasion of Association. If we see a person totally blind, we at once contrast his condition with our own, or that of others whose sight is perfect. If we see a friend overwhelmed with sorrow and suffering, we think of freedom from suffering, and prize it more highly. If we see poor ragged children, bare footed in the cold of winter, we think of those surrounded with every comfort, and provided for by kind parents. The same principle applies to a great variety of subjects, which come before the mind. One idea may thus suggest its opposite as well as its like.

3. **CONTIGUITY.**—There may be contiguity of *time*, and also of *place*. I often meet with persons whose countenances are familiar, but I cannot call them by name. Sometimes I can recall their names by recalling the time when we met; but still more easily, if I can remember both the *time* and the *place* of our meeting. If we recall the scenes of our early days at school, the forms and features of numerous associates, the names and qualities of the different teachers, the skating, coasting, and games of ball, rush upon the memory; to say nothing of mischievous plans and practices, and their detection and punishment.

· **CAUSE AND EFFECT.**—If suggestion leads to discover the *relation* of cause and effect, Association occasions us to think of a particular cause, when we witness its effect. So also when we see a well known cause in operation, we think immediately of its effect. The one is thus associated with the other. If we see the stumps from which the forest trees have been cut, we associate with them the woodman and his axe, and possibly also the blacksmith who made his axe, and the implements with which he made it. If we see a razor, we associate

with it the process of shaving, and possibly the slight wounds sometimes inflicted by it. Or we may think of the accidental wounds which children inflict upon themselves when taking the razor without leave ; or the intentional and fatal wounds which insane people sometimes inflict upon themselves with it.

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## CHAPTER XV.

### ASSOCIATION.

**SECONDARY LAWS.**—There are several modifications of the laws of association which affect them in a considerable degree, and deserve a careful notice. It has already been intimated that all minds may not have the *same* associations ; and that the associations of the same mind may not always be similar. This diversity may be accounted for in several particulars.

1. All minds are not constituted alike. There is reason to believe that this is true originally ; and that no two minds are to be found precisely alike, in original structure. Education has perhaps increased this diversity. A cultivated, and richly stored mind is likely to have very different associations from those of an ignorant and uncultivated one.

2. *Associations are modified by the strength of feeling existing in connection with their causes.*—If a scene we have witnessed excited strong feelings, whether painful or pleasant, we retain and recall it more easily on this account. The Jews in captivity wept when they remembered Zion. The worship and scenes of the beloved city had awakened in them feelings which they could not forget.

3. *Associations are influenced by habit.*—The fre-



quent repetition of any effort of the body or mind renders the effort easy and natural. We see men performing very difficult operations which they are accustomed to, with great skill and ease. The mother, who has long been confined with the care of her little children, is lost and perplexed if she leaves them for a time, and hardly knows how to conduct herself without them. "Can a woman forget her child?" There are two causes operating with her, the *strength of feeling*, and the *force of habit*. If her dear child is taken from her arms by death, every act she was accustomed to perform while the child was living, reminds her of her loss. She thinks of him as she lies down, and as she rises up.—She startles with thoughts of him in her dreams. Every plaything he sported with, opens afresh the wounds in her heart. But this fact involves another modification of association, viz.

4. *Present objects of Perception*.—The sight of the child's toys produces vivid associations of all the arts and actions of the one who used them.

The sight of a ring, or any keepsake of a departed friend will call up fresh recollections of that friend.—Here is the secret of that magic power in the "Mother's Gold Ring," illustrated in one of Mr. Sargent's "Temperance Tales."

On this principle an aged slave, who was permitted to go and see a lion, in a caravan of animals, leaped and danced and shouted for joy, on hearing the animal roar. In his early days he had heard the lion in his native forests; and now that sound nearly banished every thought and feeling of his long servitude, of half a century, and roused up vividly the memory of his native land, and the enjoyments of childhood, when he was free as the uncaged lion.

5. *LAPSE OF TIME*.—While it is true that the scenes and recollections of childhood may thus be vividly restored by association, it is also true that the lapse of time generally weakens associations. We cannot recall the events of the last year, so easily as those of the last week; and the difficulty generally increases as we go back through a longer period. This is the general prin-

eiple. An apparent exception to this is found in the vivid associations by which aged people call up the scenes of childhood, while they remember little of the occurrences of last week ; but this can be explained on other principles.

1. Their minds were actively and eagerly employed with the events of childhood, while of the affairs of the last week they took but little notice.

2. The events of childhood awakened in them deep *feelings*, while those of the last week interested them but little.

3. It is doubtless true that the power of the mind, to seize and retain impressions, is weakened by its connection with the growing weakness of the body, and the gradual failure of the organs of perception. The body is thus becoming a defective instrument of the mind. It will still be found in relation to such, that the events of yesterday are better remembered than those of the last week, or the last month.

The principles we have noticed in this chapter are called *secondary laws of Association*, not because they are of less importance than the Primary laws ; but because they seem to be modifications of them.

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS.—There are other modifications of the associating principle, of some interest, but which we cannot now examine at much length.

1. We speak of a *long time* and *short time*, thus connecting time with *extension* as if it was a material thing, and could be measured, like a chain, or piece of cloth.

2. We call certain tones of voice and of instruments, high and others low, while the ancient Greeks and Romans used these terms exactly the reverse. Those we call *high*, they called *low*, and our *low* tones they called *high* till the time of Boethius. Which usage is right ? And what is the precise meaning of high and low in this connection ?

3. We speak of *pain* in our *eyes*, *hands*, *feet*, &c. But pain and every other sensation is truly in the mind, or is a *state of mind*. In a similar way we use terms in relation to other bodies. We say the fire is hot, the ice is cold and smooth, snow is white, sugar is sweet, be-

cause there is something in these objects that produces the sensations of such qualities in the mind.

4. We speak of the *meaning of words*, while it is well known that the same word is often used in a diversity of senses, and many words have come to be used in entirely a different sense from what they once were. Words thus frequently convey to one mind a very different meaning from what was intended, showing that the use of words is various, if not arbitrary or conventional.

5. We often control our associations to some extent by the Will. This is not done so much by a *direct*, as by an *indirect* effort. We can fix our attention upon a particular subject, and can think, converse, or read upon it, and thus give some direction to our associations.— We also, by repetition, form habits which more or less control our associations.

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## CHAPTER XVI.

### MEMORY.

Memory is closely connected with Association, and also with Reasoning. It is a complex state of mind, embracing a *conception of an object or event*, and a *connexion of it with past time*. It is modified by various circumstances, and differs in several particulars in different persons. It is, in proper circumstances and within certain limits, an important ground of belief, but must be relied upon with some caution.

1. We do not remember all events with equal certainty and confidence. This may be true of events of the same day, and of the same hour.

2. Where different persons witness the same scenes

and events, all will not remember each particular with equal clearness. Some will remember one thing most distinctly, others will best remember some other thing. Some things may be, for a time, entirely forgotten, and be recalled by association.

3. Different persons exhibit great difference in the *strength* of memory. Some persons will remember whole sermons or speeches which they hear, so as to write them out afterwards with great accuracy; others are unable to do this.

Some will repeat a long piece of composition by reading it once, while others have great difficulty in committing to memory.

The Roman orator Hortensius, after attending an auction all day, could, in the evening, give an account from memory of all the articles, the prices and the names of the purchasers.

Some will remember all the persons they have met with and readily call their names. Others will remember countenances but cannot recall names.

4. Some persons will remember all the trifling circumstances of an event with great accuracy, who are not distinguished for extensive knowledge or for high mental capacity in other respects. Their minds seem engrossed with trivial thoughts, and their associations are chiefly those of *contiguity in time and place*. This is called *Circumstantial memory*.

5. Others who do not remember all minute particulars with so much accuracy, yet remember the *main facts*, and all their *bearings and relations*. Their associations are more regulated by philosophical principles and the relations of *cause and effect, resemblance, and contrast*. This is called *Philosophic memory*; and is more useful in reasoning, and the general improvement of the mind, than the circumstantial memory.

But some possess both, in a good degree. They will reason with great skill, and deal with the most profound principles; while, at the same time, their memory is very exact and definite in all minute circumstances. The Philosophic memory is doubtless of more value than the circumstantial, while the proper union of the two is better than either.

6. *Intentional Recollection.*—The memory, like association, is, to some extent, under the control of the will. This control is rather *indirect* than otherwise. We cannot remember, merely by *willing* to remember. But where some general outlines, or some of the circumstances of that which we desire to recall are already in the mind, we can dwell upon them, and by reflection; and the earnest examination of every circumstance which is already remembered, we can often call up, by association, the circumstances which had been forgotten.

We can also aid this process sometimes, by reasoning. We can make several suppositions, either of which might be possible, and compare these with the facts in the case, the outlines or circumstances of which are before the mind.

We often notice illustrations of intentional recollection in children. The boy loses his knife, or his hatchet, and he will not only enquire and search for it, but will stop and think, and manifest efforts to call up the memory of it. We also find ourselves enlisted in the efforts of children to find the lost object. We enquire of them *where they had it last*, and direct them to *think or try to remember* where it was.

Three things are necessary to a good memory. (1) The power to perceive clearly, and seize with a strong grasp, the objects to be remembered. (2) Ability to retain facts, ideas, and principles in their just relations. (3) Facility in calling up these treasures of the memory for present use.

Some persons seem unable to have clear ideas of a subject, and then it is impossible that they should have just remembrances of it.

Others have apparently clear ideas for the moment, but, like traces in the sand, they are soon lost, and the memory cannot be trusted.

Others again are more deficient in the capacity to recall and bring forward their ideas, than in either of the particulars just named. They seem to have ideas, but in efforts to use them they are perplexed and confused.

#### IMPROVEMENT OF MEMORY.

The memory, like the other qualities of the mind, may be improved by effort.

1. The first step to be attempted is *to get clear ideas and accurate knowledge of things*. Never be satisfied with vague, indefinite, and half formed ideas on any subject. It is very injurious to the mind, in other respects, as well as fatal to the memory. No one can ever become a sound scholar, or be a desirable friend and associate, who treats the mind in this way.

2. This can be gained *by using various helps*, and such as are adapted to the subject. Of objects addressed to the senses, we gain more distinct impressions, if we use several of the senses in their examination.

If we have heard the tones of a musical instrument, we may retain a distinct impression of them. If we have seen the instrument, we may recall a conception of its form and appearance. But if we have opportunity to see it, and hear its tones, and, in addition to this, to take it in our hands, and produce the tones ourselves, we shall have more distinct and vivid ideas, both of its form and tones, and shall, the more easily, retain or recall them.

I may remember a verbal direction, and take the right road in my journey, where many roads lead in other directions : but let me have my way marked out on paper, each of the others being indicated by a short mark, and I shall remember and pursue the right one more easily.

We remember the facts of Geology and Mineralogy and Conchology more easily if we learn them in connection with specimens, or with localities where they are found.

We remember the name, class, and order of a plant more easily if we learn them with the plant before us.

We remember facts in Natural Philosophy and Chemistry more easily if we see them illustrated by experiments.

We remember facts in Geography the better for the use of maps, and of History by the aid of charts.

3. *Exercise will improve the memory* as well as the other properties of the mind. We remember those things more easily which cost us effort, and in which we have a deep interest ; and of which we have given written, oral, or visible representations.

4. We can aid the memory by *arranging our ideas in clusters or classes*, so that each thing to be remembered may be retained, or recalled by some principle of association.

5. We must observe *a natural and obvious order in the arrangement* of our ideas, and avoid strange and distorted associations.

6. We must have *a strict regard to truth* in all statements of facts, and descriptions of scenes and events. If we color or misrepresent facts, or disregard truth in our statements, the memory will be misled and greatly impaired.

*Artificial Memory.*—Various systems of mnemonics, or of artificial memory, have sometimes been recommended, and by some have been practiced with considerable success; but in general these cost more than they are worth. The same amount of effort, to improve the memory by natural methods, would probably be productive of more good.

#### DURATION OF MEMORY.

It is supposed, by some, that nothing is ever absolutely lost which is laid up in the memory. Many things are forgotten for a time, which afterwards are vividly recalled.

Sometimes on being rescued from the water, and recovered from a drowning condition, persons have stated that, before they became insensible, they experienced the most rapid succession of ideas and recollections; and that things long since forgotten were recalled vividly and impressively.

Inflammation of the brain and attacks of fever have sometimes produced similar results. Dr. Flint, in his recollections of the Valley of the Mississippi, mentions a young man who, from the effects of fever, could not recognize his friends, yet would repeat passages from different languages with great accuracy, which he could not repeat before or after his sickness. Other instances are recorded by medical writers, of persons who, in paroxysms of fever, repeated passages from different languages they had never studied, but which they had heard

repeated in early life, and which they could not recall when in health.

From these and similar facts Mr. Coleridge and some other writers have supposed that all thoughts are in their nature imperishable; and that only some peculiar change of bodily condition, may be needed, to revive a remembrance of all past thoughts and feelings. They have supposed that the investment of the soul with a spiritual, instead of a natural body, may be sufficient to produce an entire recollection of all past ideas.

The declarations of scripture which indicate that every secret thought shall be disclosed in the Judgment, become exceedingly probable, in connexion with this view of the memory.

This view also lays the foundation for important principles of education.

It warns us, on the one hand, against fixing in the young mind false and pernicious sentiments. These may lodge there forever, and it may be impossible to forget them or resist their ruinous effects. Or, if for a time they slumber in forgetfulness, it is, perhaps, only that they may wake again to a terrible resurrection.

On the other hand this view holds out strong encouragement, to fix early in the mind just ideas and pure principles. These, for a time, may lie dormant, and apparently fade from the memory, but they are destined to revive again. In moments of sorrow or of temptation they may be restored with great vividness, and come to the rescue like ministering angels.

A father's counsels or a mother's prayers, which seemed to have passed away with the visions of childhood, have been as life from the dead, to the wandering prodigal.



## CHAPTER XVII.

### IMAGINATION.

It may be proper to consider the imagination in connection with memory, as it is doubtless somewhat concerned in efforts of *intentional recollection*, and is also employed to a greater or less extent in reasoning. It may thus be regarded as a sort of connecting link, between the ideas gained, both by the external and internal Intellect, and the results of reasoning. It is also liable to an eccentric action, and in danger, from its perversion, of exerting a disturbing influence upon our processes of reasoning.

Imagination is the name given to that process of the mind by which we combine various separate ideas, or conceptions, so as to produce from them a new whole.

It is a complex mental process, embracing several distinct mental states or efforts, particularly Conceptions, trains of Association, and Relative Suggestion.

It is attended ordinarily with emotions and feelings, more or less vivid, and it has therefore sometimes been confounded with feelings, and classed with the Sensibilities, rather than with the Intellectual states ; but, when the process is analyzed, the creations of Imagination are seen to be the results of Intellectual processes. This may be better understood if we notice the mental process in efforts of imagination.

Suppose a painter wishes to produce a landscape, not precisely like any he has ever seen, but combining the most beautiful objects imaginable. He has, to begin with, a *desire* which secures the *attention*. There is also the *purpose or decision of the will* to paint a beautiful landscape, although an imaginary one. He now summons before his mind the various beautiful objects he has seen, or heard described, and by the power of association he is able to bring together a great many different landscapes, or paintings, and descriptions of scenery.

From these he selects with judgement and taste, the several beauties which he combines by the aid of *relative suggestion*, so that the parts shall have a proper relation, and fitness, and the combined effect of the whole shall be pleasing.

A similar illustration might be given, of the process in the composition of a beautiful poem, or other writing involving the efforts of imagination.

Milton's *Paradise Lost* affords ample illustrations of the power of imagination. The general design and outlines of the work, were doubtless gradually formed in his mind by reflection, aided by imagination; and the desire to write such a work kept his attention fixed upon its outlines, and enabled him thus to mature the several parts.

In each of these parts there is ample range for the imagination, and the various scenes described afford evidence that the materials which compose them are drawn from a great variety of sources. He could not have described the garden of Eden, as he has done, if he had never seen but one garden, or if he had never been accustomed to view beautiful scenery.

There is also reason to believe that his descriptions would have been less vivid, if he had not become blind; as by this means real scenes were shut out, and the mind left to deal purely with *conceptions*, and to range among all the scenes of beauty, on which the eye had formerly rested.

The selections could thus be made, and fitted to each other, and be gilded with the glittering hues of the mind itself, rather than copied from any thing presented to the senses. His conceptions were not restricted by the intrusion of surrounding objects.

It should be remarked, that while the mind has thus the power of selecting the parts to be united, in making up the whole, these selections are not wholly arbitrary. There is a fitness, or unfitness, in each element which is to be combined, and which is discovered by the cultivated taste. The skill manifested in perceiving this fitness or unfitness, and in combining harmonious elements, and

excluding those which are discordant, marks the gifted and cultivated mind.

#### USES OF THE IMAGINATION.

Great diversity of sentiment has prevailed, in relation to the utility of the imagination, and the propriety of cultivating it. Some have seemed to regard it as the chief faculty to be excited, and have excited it, even to madness; while others have regarded it, and perhaps on account of such abuses, as a dangerous element, and one that ought to be suppressed, and, so far as practicable, eradicated.

Either of these extremes is mischievous. The true view doubtless is, that this, like every other mental power, is bestowed on man for wise purposes; and is to be used accordingly. Its tendency to perversion renders its proper discipline the more necessary; and if properly cultivated, and regulated, it occupies an important rank among the phenomena of mind.

While its perversions are very mischievous, its appropriate discipline, and right use, may be regarded as of high value in several respects.

A cultivated imagination is a source of exalted pleasure to its possessor; and it gives him power to promote the happiness of others, in a high degree.

It renders important service to the teacher in every department of science. It enables him to illustrate and explain the more intricate truths of science.

It gives the preacher not only a command of his subject, his thoughts, and his words, but gives him also the control of his audience.

The writer combines the "thoughts that breathe and words that burn," by the efforts of imagination; and the same power enables him, again and again, to touch the human soul, and rouse it to noble thoughts, and noble deeds.

The composer of music uses this power with effect, in arranging the most sublime and impassioned strains.

In the severest efforts of reasoning, the imagination may lend her friendly aid, and the logic of that argument will burn with intenser light and heat.

Forensic debate becomes increasingly earnest and interesting, when a glowing imagination warms, and inspires the thought, the action, and the utterance.

In the bible we discover the most marked exhibitions of the power of imagination, bursting forth in common discourse from the lips of the Saviour and of his apostles, as well as in the sublime poetry, and glowing predictions of the inspired prophets.

The language of Jehovah is often highly figurative, and the imagery is sometimes of the most glowing description.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### REASONING.

The consideration of Reasoning has been reserved for the closing topic of the Internal Intellect, for two reasons. - (1) *It is a very interesting and fruitful source of knowledge; and, (2) its materials are gathered from all other sources of knowledge.*

By comparing, combining, and arranging these materials, the most important results are brought out. Its range is exceedingly wide, embracing all those processes where results or conclusions are reached by the aid of two or more propositions, which are compared together.

Every train of reasoning is made up of parts, which are termed propositions; and these propositions sustain some relation to each other, so that they can be compared, and their relation perceived.

There are also antecedent propositions or assumed truths which are either *self-evident, or such as are generally believed, or they are facts already established by evidence.*

A proposition is an Idea which can be expressed in words and which makes complete sense by itself. There are different kinds of propositions adapted to the different kinds of reasoning.

There are two departments of reasoning, which differ, both in their methods, and in the subjects to which they relate. The one uses the method of demonstration, and is called *Demonstrative Reasoning*.

All other methods and the subjects to which they are applied are embraced under the head of *Moral Reasoning*.

#### DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.

Under this head are embraced the properties and relations of numbers, and all the departments of Mathematics; Geometry, including all extension, forms, dimensions; also duration, weight, velocity, and all other properties, or relations, which may be expressed by numbers, or mathematical signs.

We can demonstrate problems in Geometry, and questions in arithmetic, and algebra. But we must have something to begin with. Every problem, and every mathematical question, proposes something to be done, and gives certain *things with which to begin the operation*. These things given are the *propositions*; or, as they are some times called, the *terms*.

In Arithmetic we have two or more terms or propositions given by which we are to find another. These terms may be added together, and we thus demonstrate their sum or product. One may be subtracted from the other, and thus we find their difference. One may be divided by the other, or multiplied by the other, and in each case, the result we seek for is found by demonstration.

We may have several terms, or propositions, and several things to be ascertained; and thus have long trains of reasoning, calling forth the highest efforts of the mind.

In Geometry we have sometimes very complicated processes, and yet we are able to trace them, step by step, so as to arrive at the most exact and pleasing results.

By the use of Triangles, Circles, and parts of Circles, and the relations which parts of the Triangle or Circle

sustain to the whole figure, and the relations which one figure sustains to another, the most astonishing results are produced. It is by such processes that we can determine the height of a distant mountain, tower, or tree. It is thus that the astronomer determines the size of the sun, and the planets, and their distances from us, and from each other.

One circumstance of interest in demonstrative reasoning is, that its results, when properly reached, are entirely satisfactory. They are such that we rest upon them without the least doubt. We may doubt the correctness of our processes of reasoning, but if we are satisfied that these are correct, we cannot doubt the correctness of the result. Indeed, the opposite of the results of demonstration or any variation from them is impossible and absurd.

There are several benefits to the mind, from this kind of reasoning.

1. It is useful in fixing the attention intensely, and if necessary, for a long time.

2. It often requires strong mental efforts and thus increases the power of the mind, and fits it for effort in other departments of study.

3. It requires care and exactness both in the examination and statement of propositions, and also in the process of demonstration. It is thus useful in accustoming the mind to clear perceptions and distinctions, and careful habits of attention and investigation.

There are, however, some cautions necessary, in relation to the frequent or general use of demonstrative reasoning. It will not be safe to employ the mind exclusively with this kind of reasoning. This may be asserted,

1. On the general principle that it is not safe to confine the mind to one subject, or to the exercise of one faculty, or to one class of investigations. The mind as well as the body, demands *variety* of exercise.

2. The exercise of the mind exclusively or chiefly with demonstrations, is liable to render it mechanical and inflexible, and to disqualify it for the investigation of subjects which depend upon a different kind of reasoning.

I knew a student who was hardly willing to investigate

a subject unless he could bring it into a form similar to a mathematical problem. It used to be said of him that he would not decide any question, unless he could work it by Position, or the Rule of Three, or solve it by Algebra or the elements of Euclid.

3. The mind accustomed to deal only with demonstrations, and results which admit of no doubt, is *likely to undervalue results which are reached by moral reasoning, and which leave room for some plausible objections.*

4. It has been supposed that skeptical tendencies have sometimes been cultivated, by the fondness of men for mathematical demonstrations.

These evils are not *necessary results* of mathematical or demonstrative reasoning, and they may be guarded against successfully, by a due exercise of the mind in moral reasonings. Success in the one department may thus aid the mind in the other.

#### MORAL REASONING.

Moral reasoning, it has been said, differs from the demonstrative both in its *methods* and its *subjects*. Yet both have some things in common. In both there is something to be proved, or established. In both there are some things to begin with. Both have propositions or things to be compared and examined.

It may also be added, as stated in the beginning of the chapter, that both have some definitions, axioms, or established truths, which are assumed, or taken for granted in the outset. It is also true that in both there is a succession of propositions, and comparisons, and consequently, a succession of steps to be taken, to reach the result.

But there are also differences,

1. In relation to the degree of certainty in the result. Some conclusions of moral reasoning are as satisfactory as those of demonstration. We sometimes speak of such as moral demonstrations; still the opposite of these, or a slight departure from them, may not be such that it would appear to be necessarily absurd.

At other times the conviction produced is much less satisfactory, and sometimes such as to leave the mind in

doubt. In courts of justice, after all the evidence has been examined, and the case fairly presented to the jury, they cannot always agree in a verdict.

2. There is more variety in the kinds of evidence in moral, than in demonstrative reasoning.

Often instead of successive propositions, which depend one upon another, there are several distinct and independent propositions, each of which has some bearing on the question, and the result or conclusion is the combined effect of these several sources of evidence.—This will be seen if we examine some of the different methods of reasoning.

**REASONING FROM EFFECT TO CAUSE.**—We see a beautiful dwelling house, and we at once conclude it is built for some person, and built by one who had power and skill. We see that it is in good taste, and every part of it well planned for beauty; and we infer that the builder or the owner, is a person of taste. We find its internal structure adapted to the comfort of its inmates, and a special regard for the convenience of those who are to perform the labor. We then infer that the man has regard not merely to his personal comfort, but also to the comfort of those who perform the domestic labors.

By a similar process when examining the works of creation, we arrive at the conviction that there is a God; and that he is intelligent, powerful, and benevolent.—But this reasoning proceeds on the assumed propositions that every effect must have a cause; and that wisdom and benevolence in the design indicate these qualities in the designer. This is called *reasoning aposteriori*.

2. **REASONING FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT.**—Where we understand the nature of a cause, we reason from this to its effects. If we know that a school is to be conducted by a teacher who has all the requisite qualifications for teaching, and governing; who has great energy and skill in his work, and a high degree of virtue and benevolence; we believe the school will be well managed. We feel safe to commit ourselves, our children or friends to the care of such a teacher.

If we know that the judge, the jury and the witnesses, into whose hands a case is to be committed, are all hon-



est and true men, and have the means of knowing the right, we feel confident that a right result will be secured.

In like manner if we obtain a just view of the character of God; either from his works, or his word; and if our reasonings are not warped by wrong feelings, we believe that "the Judge of all the earth will do right." This is called reasoning *a priori*.

3. REASONING BY INDUCTION.—It is found by experiment that the magnet attracts iron. When we have seen this effect produced on several pieces of iron, without one failure, we naturally conclude that this is the effect of the magnet upon all iron.

Experiments also prove that iron and steel may be converted into magnets by electricity, with a common galvanic battery. But the steel retains the magnetic power, while the iron loses it, when separated from the electric current. I one day gave my scholars permission to bring in small steel bars which they had procured, to be converted into magnets. After several were fitted, one was tried which had no magnetic power. It was tried again, and again, but with the same result. The battery was tried with other bars, and found to be in good order. After another trial the bar was pronounced iron, and not steel. It was afterwards found that the blacksmith had given the boy an iron, instead of a steel bar.

While induction, when experiments are carried sufficiently far, is a source of very conclusive evidence, there is danger of applying it where it cannot be safely used, or of resting conclusions on too few experiments. If the results of experiments are not uniform—if an exception occurs to the general rule—it weakens, if it does not entirely destroy the evidence from this source.

4. REASONING FROM ANALOGY.—Resemblances which we discover lay the foundation for this kind of reasoning. We learn that there are other planets, beside our earth, revolving round the sun, and each also revolving round its own axis. Some also have moons to give them light. They thus in several respects resemble our earth.

Our earth is inhabited, and if from these resemblances we conclude that the other planets are inhabited, the con-

elusion is drawn from Analogy. There is a liability to err in reasoning from analogy, and it is not so much to be relied upon for proving a proposition, as for illustrating truths which may be proved by other kinds of evidence.

5. **REASONING FROM CIRCUMSTANCES.**—This is sometimes necessary in examining cases of crime, in the absence of direct testimony. It is often employed to reconcile conflicting testimony. It is also resorted to in connection with historical facts; and in each of these connections it is sometimes of great value.

Still there are cases where circumstances lead to wrong conclusions. This is especially true when a part of the circumstances are unknown, or where the mind examines circumstances under the influence of strong suspicions, or prejudices.

6. **REASONING FROM TESTIMONY.**—It is on testimony that we rely chiefly for our knowledge of distant countries and of past occurrences. It might seem, at first view, that reasoning has not much to do with testimony, but it is not so. We find ourselves enquiring after the character of the traveller who describes distant countries, and of the historian whose works we read. We enquire after his capacity to judge of the facts he relates—the motives which influence him—and the testimonies of others who describe the same things. The effort to discover truth, amid the discordant and conflicting testimonies often met with, demands a vigorous exercise of reason and judgment.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### USE AND IMPROVEMENT OF REASONING.

We notice great diversity among men in their power of reasoning. Some discover great power and skill; others very little. Some reason well on certain subjects, but very defectively on others. Some who once reasoned very defectively acquire the power of reasoning well. Much evidently depends on the right use of reasoning, as it may thus be greatly improved. Several practical hints may be given.

1. Take care to select subjects worthy of investigation. He who is always dealing with frivolous subjects will be a frivolous reasoner. Worthy subjects beget worthy thoughts.

2. Let the nature of the subject be fairly understood, and the appropriate methods of investigation be adopted. All subjects do not admit the same methods of treatment, or the same kinds of reasoning. Some subjects admit of several kinds of evidence, and afford opportunity for accumulative arguments.

3. Let the question be clearly expressed in definite and appropriate language. A lucid statement of a question is almost a key to its solution.

4. The object of all reasoning should be *truth*, and not mere victory. We must dare to know the truth, and to follow wherever it leads.

5. We must not suffer pride of opinion, prejudices, prepossessions, excited feelings, or party interests to warp our reasonings.

6. Nor should we on the other hand, suffer our convictions when produced by fair, and full investigation, to be wrested from us, because of some plausible objection, which we cannot, at once, remove; nor because of a trivial flaw, or defect in some particular argument which we may have used inadvertently.

7. We should not take advantage of any accidental

flaw in the argument of an opponent, nor assume that he is in the wrong, merely because he has not sustained his argument, or some part of it.

8. Avoid all sophistry and unfairness in the statements and discussion of questions. One species of sophistry is that of using equivocal terms ; or such as may be understood in different senses.

Another sophism is the assignment of a false cause, which may have some plausibility, and thus mislead the mind.

Another is that of begging the question, or taking for granted the thing to be proved, or some proposition which is essential to the proof, but which itself demands proof.

Another is that of supposing a sentiment or a course of conduct right because it is successful, or is extensively approved. It should be remembered that gross error may become exceedingly popular, and especially when connected with truth. It is also true that vicious conduct may sometimes be extensively popular, when disguised by certain accomplishments.

Nearly allied to this last sophism is the error of judging favorably, or unfavorably of a principle, from some *accidental circumstance* connected with it.

We may also be misled by immediate effects which are temporary, and which are followed by others of a very different character. Intoxicating liquors sometimes produce a very pleasant excitement, and arouse the social feelings, but these are followed by other effects exceedingly pernicious.

Erroneous opinions may be ingenious, and may amuse and interest by their novelty, but be followed, at length, by mischief and misery.

9. We must guard against coloring, or, in any way distorting the arguments or statements of arguments, used by ourselves, or by those opposed to us, in reasoning.

10. We must guard against filling our minds with arguments on one side of a question, while we exclude the arguments on the other side. This may easily be done by those who listen to, or read discussions, be-

tween different parties. Each one is likely to attend closely to those arguments which favor his own party, and to open his mind to their full impression; and to pass over or reject those against it. There is the more danger of this from the excited feelings occasioned by the discussion.

It is thus that we often see both parties claiming the victory, after such a discussion; and both are more fully confirmed in their opinions than before. The effect of such discussions is generally more decisive on those who engage in the discussion, than on those who listen to it.

11. We should guard against being influenced by mere *sincerity* or *confidence*, in the manner of advancing opinions and reasonings. We may yield our assent to error because its advocate is sincere in his opinions, and confident in defence of them. Sincerity does not make error to become truth, nor does confident assertion, however often repeated, become substantial evidence.

12. In cases depending on circumstantial evidence, take care to know all the circumstances, and give due weight to each. Great injustice is sometimes done to an innocent person, from a partial knowledge of the circumstances; injury that cannot be fully repaired when the whole truth is discovered. Hence the caution,—“Never decide till you know the facts.”

13. In reasoning and forming opinions from testimony, several things should be considered. Is the witness competent? Is he qualified to testify? Has he knowledge of the subject, or does he give us mere opinions or conjectures?

Is he interested, so that he has motive to testify incorrectly?

Is he accustomed to speak the truth, or does he prevaricate, and deal in *large stories*, or in loose and careless statements?

Is he prejudiced, so that his judgments and his statements shall be thus biassed?

Is his testimony confirmed, either by *circumstances with which he is unacquainted*, or by other testimony?

Is he consistent with himself, or does he often cross his track or contradict himself?

14. When our reasonings lead to practical results,—when they unfold duty and establish rules of life—we must discharge duty, and live and act in accordance with those rules. A wrong life will greatly warp and pervert our reasonings on moral questions.

There is an experimental evidence in relation to duty, as well as in the truths of natural science, which is a very important aid to correct reasoning. We can thus, by a right life, bring our consciousness and experience to the aid of different kinds of reasoning; while a bad life might greatly mislead our reasonings.

This last principle applies with great force to the practical truths of Christianity. The Saviour declares,—“If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself.”

The evidence on which Faith rests, as this term is used in the Scriptures, is not complete, till the truth is subjected to the test of experience.

We must receive the gospel as a rule of life and act upon its precepts, in order to perceive their precise nature and adaptation to our necessities. This is believing with the *heart*. The evidences of Christianity are not all examined till we thus believe. The experimental evidence is the *crowning* evidence. No man is qualified to reject Christianity, till, by fair experiment, he has examined this as well as its other evidences.

To reject Christianity, without submitting the heart and life to such experiments, would be as unreasonable as to reject Electricity and Magnetism, without attending to the experiments which illustrate those sciences.



## CHAPTER XX.

### THE SENSIBILITIES.

This term indicates the second department of the mind, according to the division proposed in the second chapter. It includes all which, in the Scriptures, and in conversation, is often expressed by the word heart. The Sensibilities embrace that department of the mind, and all those mental states, to which emotions, desires, and obligatory feelings belong.

The relation of the Sensibilities to the Intellect is very intimate, and each exerts over the other a very important influence. The action of the Intellect immediately gives rise to emotions, or feelings of some sort, and these have a tendency to produce volitions, and actions.

Every object of sensation, when perceived by the intellect, gives rise to some feeling, which may be expressed by a convenient term. The same is true of every train of thought and every act of the Internal Intellect.

It is also true that the emotions and desires exert an influence, not only on the will, but also on the Intellectual operations. Our perceptions, associations, reasonings, and opinions, are more or less influenced by our feelings and wishes.

The necessity of studying these, *in connection with the other departments of the mind*, is therefore apparent.

### DIVISION OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

The first and more general division of the sensibilities, is into two classes : *The Natural or Animal Sensibilities*, and the *Moral Sensibilities*. This division may not be entirely satisfactory without a limitation ; because most of the natural sensibilities are, in men, capable of being trained and influenced by the *moral* sensibilities, and thus may have a moral character. Still, the distinction may aid in the study of this department of the mind.



The *natural sensibilities* embrace those feelings which exist without regard to the consideration of right and wrong. These are possessed by animals as well as men; and, in animals, we do not regard them as having a moral character under any circumstances.

In men, we may regard them as having a moral character, so far as they can be influenced by the moral sense or the will.

The *moral sensibilities* embrace those feelings which exist in view of the consideration of right and wrong. They arise in the mind in connexion with what we term conscience. These we do not discover in the brutes. We may regard them as one of the marked distinctions between men and brutes.

The objects which give rise to these two classes of the sensibilities are essentially different. The natural sensibilities arise in connection with what seems to be *agreeable or disagreeable*.

The moral sensibilities arise in view of what seems to be *right or wrong*. These are more simple and less varied than the natural sensibilities, but we cannot fail to regard them as higher in rank and of more importance.

#### NATURAL SENSIBILITIES.

These admit of other divisions. The first and more general division, is into *Emotions* and *Desires*.

**EMOTIONS.**—The Emotions may first be noticed, because they are first in the order of time, and they occasion Desires. They also differ from Desires in being more *sudden* and *rapid*. We may have a great number and variety of Emotions, in a short time, but our Desires rise less suddenly, and depart more slowly.

Emotions may be very conflicting as well as sudden, while Desires, although subject to modifications, have more of unity as well as permanency. Emotions are as various as the objects of sense and of thought. They differ in two respects; in *strength*, and in *kind* or character. We may arrange them all in two classes; the *pleasant* or *agreeable*, and the *painful* or *disagreeable*. Every emotion of either class may be feeble or power-

ful—Some may be such as are hardly noticed or remembered, while others produce powerful and lasting effects on the mind.

Sudden, various, and fleeting, as they may be, they yet exert a great influence upon the character.

Emotions are simple states of the mind, and therefore cannot be defined in words. We know them by consciousness, and we can recognize them when we hear them spoken of. It is not necessary to enumerate all the emotions, if this were possible. A few illustrations will show their nature and occasions.

EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY.—I gazed one morning, with others, upon a column of smoke, as it rose from a chimney on fire. It was rolling up in various forms, and expanding into a cloud; and, as the outer edges became less dense, they received peculiar colors from the sun, which had just risen, and began to shine through the frosty atmosphere. In the dense and dark column near the flue, might also be seen the blaze, occasionally flashing out vividly and then disappearing.

“Look there!” said one, pointing to the smoke. “Is not that beautiful?” said another. “Splendid! splendid!” cried a third.

I looked upon it in silence, and felt an emotion of beauty rising higher and higher, and expanding into that of sublimity. Four things may be noticed in this illustration. (1.) An emotion of beauty in the mind. All who saw the smoke felt it. (2.) An object which caused it and which could be contemplated by the mind. (3.) Something peculiar to the object which fitted it to produce this emotion. The sight of smoke would not always produce it. There were the colors, form and motion of the smoke combined to produce the effect. (4.) Beautiful objects may be expanded and increased so as to produce emotions of sublimity. An emotion of beauty may expand to that of sublimity. Some of these remarks apply to all emotions of beauty. The emotion is always a pleasing one. It is also occasioned by some object which can be viewed by the mind. There is also in every beautiful object something peculiar to itself.

But emotions of beauty do not require that all the elements in this illustration should be combined.

*Form* alone may awaken emotions of beauty. Circular and curve lines may do this ; so also may square pyramidal and other forms.

We look upon one tree and admire its form without particularly thinking of its other qualities. We see another tree, of very different form, but feel as strong an emotion of beauty as before. But all forms do not produce pleasant emotions ; some are very disagreeable.

Color may excite emotions of beauty. The light itself is very beautiful. When we separate the rays of light by a prism, so as to give seven distinct colors, each one is beautiful ; and the effect of the whole, as in the rainbow, is very pleasant. Young children experience pleasant emotions, in seeing bright colors : They call them *beautiful*.

*Motion* is also an occasion of emotions of beauty. The child gazes with delight upon his whirling top, and his rolling hoop, and the balancing and waving of his kite, in the air. We look, with delight, upon the ocean waves, when not too violent, as they approach the shore. The motion of the full sail ship, in a fine breeze, is beautiful. So is the motion of the steam boat, as it plows the still surface of a river. The closing of the water in its wake, and the successive ripples it sends to the shore, are also beautiful. The movements of the little fish, in the clear brook, are very beautiful ; and so is the motion of the birds that fly in endless gyrations like the swallow, and that of the hawk, when he sails with gentle curve on his still, balancing wings.

*Sounds* occasion emotions of beauty. The notes of the distant bugle, the sound of the flute, and of other instruments of music, when skilfully played, produce emotions of beauty. We speak of beautiful tunes, and beautiful performers and performances of music.

The singing of birds, and the sound of other animals, sometimes give rise to emotions of beauty. So also do the murmurings of the water fall, and of the waves of the sea, also the sound of the breeze, on some occasions.

All sounds do not give us pleasing emotions ; some are

very disagreeable, at all times ; and others, which are sometimes pleasing, at others, are displeasing. The time, place, circumstances, and the state of our feelings, all have an influence upon these results.

Some objects, which at first pleased us, become very displeasing on further acquaintance. Others on the contrary, improve on acquaintance. Some *countenances* which, at first seemed displeasing, we come at length to admire ; and others, which at first were beautiful, become disgusting, when we learn the character of the persons. This effect is produced by association. Many places, which have nothing beautiful, in their general appearance, become dear to us by *association*. We should feel emotions of pleasure, on visiting the rock at Plymouth, not because of the beauty of the spot, but because our forefathers landed there.

I saw, a few years since, an Iron bound chest, and some parchments, and letters, which once belonged to the first of my name who came to this country. I had not, till then, been able to trace my ancestry back to this point. I will not attempt to describe the emotions produced by the sight of these relics, and by the remnant of the old mill dam he had erected, in the infancy of the New England colony. I sought, in vain, for some indications of the spot where he first erected his cabin, but lingered with pleasure by the remnant of an old apple tree planted by his hand. The spot is still dear to me ; and the old tomb-stone, which marks the spot where his wife was buried, seems now before me, with its surface overgrown with moss, and its inscription scarcely legible.

Emotions of beauty may be excited by works of art, as well as of nature, and by objects of thought, as well as by those addressed to the senses. Trains of thought, may be beautiful, — Demonstrations and arguments, may be beautiful. The mind which feels lively emotions of beauty will often give *beautiful descriptions*, in prose or poetry, or represent them by painting.

Traits of character may be beautiful and excite strong emotions, whether we see those traits exhibited in life, or whether we hear, or read descriptions of them.

Moral actions often awaken these emotions in a high degree.

**EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.** These we have seen, differ rather in degree than in kind, from those of beauty. Nearly all the sources, from which we receive emotions of beauty, may, by increase or expansion, awaken emotions of sublimity.

If the gentle breeze may awaken emotions of beauty, the whirlwind or the tornado, if we can view its effects free from danger, may cause emotions of sublimity. If the smaller waves, or the gentle cascades, produce emotions of beauty,—the mountain waves, or the foaming and thundering Niagara may cause those of sublimity.

The same remark will apply to the other occasions of beauty, and the general principles applied to the one, apply equally to the others. There is perhaps this difference, that emotions of sublimity, which are naturally pleasing, may sometimes become so intense as to be oppressive, and almost overwhelming.

**EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS.** We occasionally meet with scenes or descriptions that occasion mirthful feelings, and which cause us to laugh. There are sometimes exhibitions of character which we call ludicrous. There are also traits of character, and modes of expression which we call humorous.

There are some persons that always seek to say or do things that shall produce merriment or laughter. There is also in our nature a susceptibility to emotions of this description, so that in certain circumstances we cannot refrain from laughter. There is generally in the exhibitions of character or the verbal representations which occasion mirthful or ludicrous emotions, something unnatural and incongruous, but which is not easily described.

This incongruity is sometimes occasioned, by debasing objects which are pompous and imposing, or in coupling objects really noble, and elevated, with those that are mean and trifling.

At other times we find objects that are trifling, and frivolous, elevated to an imposing height, or coupled with objects really elevated.

Sometimes this principle in our nature can be excited

with advantage. Exhibitions of wit and humor, like the sports of childhood, may have their use ; but they are to be engaged in with caution. He who attempts to be habitually witty, may think it fortunate if he does not come to be accounted a fool.

There are persons on whom wit, humor, and ridicule, may be employed beneficially ; but these are not the ordinary means of reforming or influencing men. The teacher must be careful how he uses them in the treatment of children. Their general use is very pernicious. They should be used only as occasional remedies for particular faults.

In the following list of simple emotions, it will be useful for the pupil to state which term in each class, expresses the strongest emotion, and whether the emotion indicated by each is a pleasant or a painful one.

1. Cheerfulness, contentment, joy, gladness, delight.
2. Uneasiness, discontent, melancholy, sorrow, grief, remorse.
3. Curiosity, surprise, astonishment, wonder.
4. Respect, regard, reverence, adoration.
5. Modesty, diffidence, embarrassment, shame.
6. Dissatisfaction, aversion, displeasure, disgust.

Without attempting to swell the list of emotions or to describe any of them, or the occasions on which they arise, they are left thus to be studied by the consciousness, experience and observation of the reader.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### DESIRES.

Next to emotions, the desires claim attention, as they stand closely connected with, and are occasioned by emotions. We can examine the desires more easily by arranging them in the following order. 1. Instincts. 2. Appetites. 3. Propensities. 4. Affections.

In all of these it will be seen, as we proceed, there is the element of desire in one of its forms. A few words of explanation may be necessary in relation to desires.

It has already been said in connection with emotions, that desires are not only subsequent to emotions, but are also less sudden in their rise and more permanent in their hold upon the mind. It has also been said that they exert an influence upon the Will, and also upon the Intellect. It has also been intimated that they are susceptible of an influence or control from the Moral Sensibilities and the Will. These truths will be more distinctly seen as we advance. It will be proper to add to these statements the following :

1. Desires may differ greatly in strength.
2. Their direct tendency is always to produce action. They may not always result in action, for two reasons ; One is they may be too feeble ; Another is, that when they exist in great strength, there may be some strong obstacle to them, which shall prevent action.
3. Desires always imply some object desired. This is true whether the object is clearly defined in the mind or not.
4. The fulfilment of desire, is attended with pleasure, This pleasure may be short lived, and may be a prelude to utter ruin ; still the momentary effect is agreeable, in a higher or lower degree, according to the strength of desire.
5. Another characteristic of desires is that, except the instincts, they have both a natural or *instinctive* action,

and a *voluntary* or modified action. While they may begin to operate, and manifest themselves, under the mere impulse of instinct, they very soon come to be subject more or less, directly or indirectly, to the conscience and the will; and thus indicate that they were designed to be subordinate qualities of the mind.

**INSTINCTS.**—The instincts of the human species appear to be less remarkable than in brutes; Man has less occasion for them, as he has the nobler power of reasoning.

In brutes we see wonderful displays of Instinct. The Beaver builds his dam and his dwelling with great skill, so as to aid him in taking fish, and enjoying a comfortable home. The bird builds her nest the first time with skill, and without instruction from the parent bird.

The ant and the bee prepare their dwellings, gather and store away their provisions, rear their offspring and regulate the affairs of their several communities with such skill as to be instructive examples for men. In all this they are guided by a principle which their Maker has bestowed. We call it **INSTINCT**.

In man a similar principle is discovered, which operates before reason and conscience are unfolded, so as to be his guide. To this principle we give also the name Instinct. To this principle are usually ascribed, 1. Respiration or breathing. 2. Receiving food. The infant will draw this from the mother's breast, although the action is very complicated. About thirty pairs of muscles must be set in motion, each muscle being connected with a nerve which supplies it with the power of motion.

An uneasy sensation of hunger is all that is necessary to lead the infant to put all these muscles in action, and in their appropriate order, and then to cease their action when its wants are supplied.

3. Sudden efforts for self preservation. The infant that has never learned the effects of falling, will start instinctively, if the hands which hold it fall suddenly.—Older persons will make sudden efforts to recover, if they have lost their hold or their balance; and defend them-



selves if suddenly attacked. This is often done before they have time to reason.

Some would add to these a species of resentment and also power to interpret natural signs. It is certain that children very early manifest both of these tendencies.—The infant is pleased with certain sounds and looks, and displeased with others, before he can have learned much by experience; and anger is sometimes exhibited in the earliest days of life.

THE APPETITES.—The desire of food is *hunger*. The desire of drink is *thirst*. These are called *Appetites*.—They are a part of the original constitution of the mind *as connected with the body*. Their primary design is to supply the necessities of the body. They begin to act spontaneously, and occasion the instinctive effort for food already referred to. In this merely instinctive action, they are not supposed to possess a moral character, either virtuous or vicious. They are simply innocent and useful, and a source of enjoyment.

But they soon come to be modified, so as to demand gratifications that are injurious. Artificial appetites are formed which require indulgence, and which may inflict severe injury, both upon the body and the mind. Such are the appetites for intoxicating drinks, for opium, and tobacco. With some the appetite for tea and coffee is injurious. The appetite for highly seasoned and indigestible food, is sometimes very pernicious.

The appetite sometimes craves *excessive* indulgence in food, that is not injurious when taken in suitable quantities. All such artificial and perverted appetites as are injurious, are sinful and ought to be corrected. That this can be done is evident from the fact that many have corrected the appetite for each of these indulgences, and have experienced great benefit in so doing. This proves that the appetites are susceptible of a voluntary action, and that they are to be trained and regulated like other properties of the mind.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE PROPENSITIES.

This term is applied to several desires of a specific character, which are easily distinguished from the appetites, on the one hand, and the affections on the other. While they are more important, and seem to deserve a higher rank than the appetites, they seem to be less elevated, and less worthy of regard than the affections.

1. **DESIRE OF LIFE.**—Men desire life, and cling to it ordinarily with a strong grasp. This desire leads men to make efforts to preserve life, and provide for its support. It leads them to seek remedies, and submit to painful operations in sickness, for the recovery of health. We discover this propensity by consciousness in ourselves, and we see its operation in others. There is evidence that this exists originally in every individual.

Cases of suicide do not furnish an objection to this view. These cases are to be accounted for, not by the supposition that this propensity is wanting, but by the overpowering action of some other propensity or passion.

The love of life is at first instinctive, but it early receives more or less control from the will; and may therefore be said to have a voluntary action. It may be greatly increased or repressed by a voluntary course of conduct.

2. **DESIRE OF HAPPINESS.**—All persons desire to be happy; but all do not take the wisest course to become so. The desire is originally instinctive, but, like the other properties, it is capable of being increased, diminished, and variously directed by the will. It has, when thus influenced, a moral character. It is sometimes called Self Love; and its inordinate action, Selfishness. Then Self Love and Selfishness have been confounded; and controversies of a serious character have been embarrassed by this proceeding.

The desire of happiness, or self love, (if this term be used in the same sense,) is not *necessarily* sinful or *selfish*, in the proper sense of this term. It is a necessary part of our mental structure, and *essential* to our welfare.

It is sinful in just that degree that it is unrestrained, and unregulated by conscience, or is inconsistent with love to God, and love to men, in its operations. It is a very active principle, and stimulates more or less all the other propensities. If perverted or inordinate in its action, its mischiefs are very great. It is not however our duty to eradicate this desire, any more than any other.—It is our duty rather to discipline it wisely, and use it properly.

3. DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE.—This is early manifested. The infant in the arms of his mother, is eager in pursuit of knowledge. His earliest efforts to use his *senses* give evidence of this. He is gaining knowledge by every experiment, and manifests great pleasure in his attainments.

His numerous questions when he is able to talk, and his eagerness for “story after story,” exhibit this desire. This has also a voluntary as well as an instinctive action. It is doubtless universal with children, but it will often be found, after a time, that this desire is much less apparent than at first. There are two ways, at least, in which this may be occasioned.

One is by discouraging the efforts of children, either by refusing to aid their inquiries, or filling the mind with false or foolish stories, or fictitious ideas; or by pursuing wearisome or repulsive methods of teaching, so that real knowledge is not gained.

Another way is by exciting the mind too strongly, and overtasking its energies, so that it will at length falter.—Either of these courses is very pernicious.

The desire of knowledge is too important to be dealt with in any manner which shall cripple or destroy it.—Its voluntary action is of a moral nature; and the voice of God in his works, and in his word, requires that it should be properly trained in the pursuit of truth, and

that man should seek for knowledge, as for "hid treasures."

4. **DESIRE OF IMITATING.**—This is closely connected with the desire of knowledge. Children desire to do what they see others doing, and to make imitations of the objects around them. This principle is of great use in learning any art or trade. It is concerned in efforts for learning to talk, read, sing, write, draw and paint.

This renders it very desirable that children should have before them good models, in all these things. A child may as well learn to imitate good models, as bad ones; and the imitation of bad models, when confirmed by habit, is not easily corrected.

In the imitations of children, we gain some knowledge of their different original capacities. One child will imitate one thing, another some other thing, most easily. All do not seem to be constituted alike in this respect.—Some have much more skill in imitation than others, while they do not excel them in the power of acquiring or retaining knowledge. The power of imitation can be improved by effort, and consequently, has both a voluntary action, and a moral character.

5. **DESIRE OF POSSESSION OR OF PROPERTY.**—Young children manifest this desire, and it usually "grows with their growth and strengthens with their strength." It is a propensity which is so frequently perverted, that many have supposed it sinful. There is evidence however that it is an original propensity, implanted by him who formed the mind, and therefore, not *necessarily* sinful.—If properly regulated it may be innocent and useful.

It is important to us in making provision for the supply of our wants, and the wants of those around us. It is needed to prevent us from squandering and abusing the gifts of God. It also stimulates us to a proper use of our time, and abilities, and enables us thus to contribute to the happiness of others.

But its perversions, which are far too common, are exceedingly injurious to the person who thus perverts it, and often to others within the reach of his influence.—The bible marks this fault as one that is very offensive

to God as well as injurious to men. The necessity of controlling, and properly regulating it, is very great.

The man who has a strong desire for acquiring property, may check this propensity in some degree, by acts of benevolence.

Our Saviour's direction to the young man, to go and sell all that he had and give to the poor, was, in this view, exceedingly just and philosophical. But his love of money was too strong. He went away sorrowful, and would part with Christ and a treasure in heaven, rather than part with his property.

6. **DESIRE OF POWER.**—Power is not a *thing*, like property, to be examined by the senses; but it is a *reality*, which many eagerly pursue. The desire of power is early manifested, and continues to operate more or less through life.

Like the desire of property, it is often perverted, and excessive, and becomes highly injurious. But it does not follow that it is originally and *necessarily* sinful. Its instinctive action may be innocent and useful. It may be the occasion of active and vigorous exertion among men. It is a powerful spur to action, in the young mind.

The child loves to exert his strength, and delights in the exhibition of power he can produce. He loves to bring his power of body or of mind into conflict with that of his fellows, at play, or in school. He delights in mastering them. Here is the principle of emulation, in its objectionable features; and that spirit may go on to the most fearful perversions.

But it is also true that the love of power can be controlled, and its exercise directed to the noblest ends. It is true of this, that so far as it is susceptible of voluntary control, it has a moral character; and is virtuous, only when controlled by right feelings, and directed to right ends.

It is, when perverted, or misdirected, mischievous as it is sinful. It should therefore be carefully regulated, and subjected to the guidance of enlightened conscience. It should always be in accordance with the direction. "Love thy neighbor as thy self."

7. **DESIRE OF SOCIETY.**—This has been regarded by some as a mere modification of self love, and a result of circumstances. But it is difficult to watch the developments of infancy, without being convinced that it is an original or implanted propensity. The little child dreads to be alone. He likes to see a human face, and is unhappy if left long alone, unless he is deeply engaged in something that interests him.

A mother one day left her child asleep in the cradle to attend to something at a distance from the house. She was gone longer than she had designed to be, but not longer than her babe sometimes slept. On her return, all that remained of life to her infant, was a few feeble convulsive sobs, which, with its little face and pillow wet with tears, told her that the child had cried itself to death.

It doubtless awoke soon after she left, and finding itself alone began to cry, but there was no kind voice to soothe its sorrows, and then, possibly, fear or other emotions might have come in to hasten the result.

The child delights in seeing his little playmates, and joining them in sports. The little girl arrays her doll and arranges her crockery with new delight when her associates have come, even though she may quarrel with them in an hour.

The same principle is manifest in riper years, and through the whole of life. Those rare cases of persons who shun society are explained on other principles. Some damage has been done to the mind in such instances, thus furnishing an exception to a general rule.

Persons who have been excluded from society, by imprisonment, or exile, have testified to the misery they felt in this privation. Some have actually died under its influence. Others have coveted and cultivated the society of brutes, even such as spiders and ants, to relieve their loneliness.

The existence of civil society, with its institutions, is explained by the admission of the social principle, and cannot be satisfactorily, by its denial. This propensity is liable to abuse in two ways. One of these has been noticed, where persons from a consciousness of guilt or

a feeling of shame, or some real or supposed injury, become misanthropic, and desire to avoid society.

In other cases, persons can be happy no where but in society, even for a day, or an hour. They must live at some place of common resort or they are wretched. They have no sources of happiness within, and are unfitted for any business.

These evils, if they cannot be remedied, may be avoided. It was generally by a voluntary course of conduct that these persons became what they are. They ought not to despair of recovering from such a state, till every effort to reform has been exhausted and proved fruitless.

Great care should be taken to avoid the vices which pervert the desire of society. Provision should be made, by parents and guardians of the young for the indulgence and cultivation of the social principle. This may be done by a rational intercourse, in which amusement and instruction can be combined. It is, however, important that every mind should be so furnished as to enjoy solitude, and it is thus best fitted to profit by social intercourse.

8. **DESIRE OF ESTEEM.**—As naturally as persons desire the society of others, they desire also their esteem and approbation. Without this, society could not long be desirable. Society that should greet us only with frowns and reproaches would be intolerable.

This desire of esteem is originally universal, although there are some who seem to take a sort of pride in outraging public sentiment. These rare cases do not invalidate the general rule, but rather confirm it; for many who seem thus regardless of the opinions of others, have, not unfrequently, some friends or associates who will applaud them for outraging it; and finally enrol their names as reformers.

Others again, from conscientious motives, may feel obliged to incur the displeasure of men, by reproving their faults; not because they undervalue or disregard the good opinions of men, but because they value the approbation of conscience and of God more.

The desire of esteem, in its instinctive action, is not *necessarily* virtuous or vicious, but simply innocent and useful. It is often a powerful principle of action, and restrains many from vicious courses who do not feel the restraints of a higher principle. But it is not sufficiently elevated to be a safeguard of virtue in all cases. Is my course of conduct *right*? Will it be approved of God? These are much more important questions, than "What will men think of this? What will the world say? What will be the verdict of posterity?"

Still, we may not disregard or attempt to eradicate the desire of esteem; but rather strive to regulate it by higher principles, and elevate the standard of opinions by which men award approval. Public sentiment is a mighty power, because men are so constituted as to feel it. We must endeavor to render it a safe and healthful power, and to wield it on the side of virtue.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE AFFECTIONS.

To this class of mental states we accord a higher rank than to those modifications of desire hitherto examined. We necessarily feel a higher regard for those cords which bind us to our families, our friends, and fellow beings associated with us, than to those which draw us to the mere *accidents* of our life, or the things necessary to life, and to physical or animal gratification.

The affections are more complex than the appetites or propensities, embracing both an emotion in relation to an object, and a desire of good or of evil, to that object. The affections are also exercised generally towards



intelligent beings capable of perceiving and reciprocating the attachment. They may be considered in two classes. (1) Those which embrace a painful emotion and a wish to avoid, or a desire of evil to the object which causes the emotion. Those may be called *Malevolent Affections*. (2) Such as embrace a pleasant emotion, and a desire of good to the object which occasions the emotion. These are called *Benevolent Affections*; and they naturally occupy in our estimation a higher rank than the others.

**THE MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.**—The term malevolent, is liable to mislead or perplex the mind, in relation to the precise character of the Affections. We are accustomed to connect with it the idea of sinfulness.

There is the more danger of mistaking the original character of this class of affections, from the fact that they are so commonly inordinate, excessive, and mischievous. But it must be kept in mind that *none of the original elements* of the human constitution, in their *instinctive action*, are *necessarily* sinful. They become such by perversion or abuse.

The malevolent Affections, therefore, in their original and *instinctive exercise*, may be regarded in the same light as the *Appetites*, and the *Propensities*, as neither virtuous nor vicious; but simply innocent and useful when kept in their proper place, and directed to their appropriate end. That they have their use may be seen if we examine their nature and proper sphere of action.

**FEAR.**—It is in the restricted and limited meaning of the term malevolent, that the principle of fear is placed in this class. Whoever has experienced fear, knows that it embraces both a *painful* emotion and a *desire to avoid, oppose, or remove* the object of fear. This brings it within the scope of the definition. But it is quite certain that this principle may be very useful both in protecting us from injury and danger, and restraining us from sin. It is powerful in its influence on society in connexion with the penalties of law.

It is powerful in the school-room and in the family, when not abused.

It is appealed to with great frequency in the bible, and

is thus seen to occupy an important place in relation to the moral government of God. "The fear of the Lord is the *beginning* of wisdom."

Many fear God before they begin to obey and love him, or to seek his favor. It may be objected that fear and love are blended in the feelings of Christians towards God, and therefore the principle of fear should not be classed with the *malevolent* Affections.

The answer is, the principle of fear still retains its distinctive character. It is not now the fear of personal suffering, or punishment from God. It is the fear of grieving, displeasing, dishonoring or offending him. The *thought* of doing this, produces a *painful emotion* and a *desire to avoid it*. This is a right and useful exercise of fear. More than this—it is virtuous. It is associated with love to God, and a sense of right and duty.

It is controlled by these higher principles, and we here discover its voluntary action.

But it is equally true that fear may be, and frequently is abused and perverted; so as to become one of the meanest and most mischievous passions, and the occasion of many vices.

If parents, teachers, or rulers were to rely on this principle alone, and to appeal to it exclusively, in the government of the human mind, the debasing effects of this course could not be estimated.

Men governed solely by fear are grovelling slaves to this perverted passion. Men wholly destitute of fear, in any of its forms, would be almost certain to be slaves to some other passion.

Any system of government or of moral influence which excludes the principle of fear, and avoids all appeals to it, is not adapted to the nature of man.

On the other hand, a system that deals exclusively, or chiefly with this principle, is fitted to distract and debase the nature of man. The nice balancing of a system of government, or of moral influence, so that the whole mind shall be reached, and all its elements happily influenced, requires the wisdom of Him who made the mind.

**RESENTMENT OR ANGER.**—This was referred to under the head of instincts. That it has an instinctive action

we cannot doubt, if we notice the conduct of very young children. It may be regarded as an implanted or original element of the mind ; and we can see that, in its appropriate sphere, it *may be* both innocent and useful.

Through the whole of life, and especially in childhood, there are numerous cases where we have occasion to ward off injuries, and avoid dangers. These occasions arise so suddenly, that reflection and reasoning are too tardy to meet the crisis ; and there is need of a principle that shall come to our aid instantly, and stand by us till the danger is past, or till reason can direct. Here is the appropriate work of instinctive resentment. It can summon the energies of the soul and body, to instantaneous effort.

But in this very fact is its great liability to excess and perversion. It is not always ready to yield to reason and conscience. The elements of the soul aroused and excited by it, are apt to rebel against the decisions of these higher attributes of the mind, and demand supremacy themselves.

So far as resentment thus invades the province of other departments of the mind, or resists, or controls, the decisions of the reason, and conscience, its action is voluntary and responsible. It is exceedingly liable to do this, so that it is very difficult for us to meet with exhibitions of anger which do not seem to be sinful.

That there are possible exercises of resentment, which are not sinful, we have evidence from reason, and from the scriptures ; but its excessive and sinful indulgence, are so common that we need constantly to remember the caution ; "*Be ye angry and sin not. Let not the sun go down upon your wrath, neither give place to the Devil.*" There is no place more accessible to him than the breast of an angry man.

There are various modifications of the principle of resentment. We see these diversities often in childhood. One child will be easily thrown into a passion—a slight affair will rouse his little wrath to violence ; but it is soon over and he is cheerful as ever. We call him *passionate*.

Another is not suddenly roused, but when once excited, his anger is not easily allayed. He carries it like a raging fire in his bosom, and it is seen like a portentous cloud in his countenance. We say he has an angry look. We dread his presence and his designs, and feel that if such a disposition gain the strength of manhood, it will be fearful.

We see one with such a disposition, sometimes laying plans to injure those who have caused this anger, and finally executing these plans, with dreadful energy. This is the spirit of *Revenge*.

Sometimes the individual dares not wreak his vengeance on the object of his anger, and will perhaps vent it on a brute, or even a lifeless thing. Here is *Desperation or Madness*.

I knew a boy, who was angry with a man. He would not attack the man, because he was afraid of him. In his rage he flew at the man's cart wheel, and kicked it repeatedly, with violent screams, so that he bruised his own feet severely. That same boy when he grew up to manhood, killed a young man—his companion—with a fire shovel.

Another child is always uneasy and dissatisfied ; he is constantly complaining and finding fault. We say he is *peevish or fretful*. Some grow up with this disposition, rendering themselves and every one about them unhappy.

Sometimes this spirit creeps imperceptibly, into the mind of one who had not manifested it in childhood. It poisons domestic happiness wherever it goes, and may lead on to insanity in its worst forms.

We sometimes see a child very unhappy, because his brother or sister, has some gift or privilege, which he has not. He is disposed either to destroy this, or to make its possessor unhappy. This is *Envy*.

This was the feeling of Joseph's brethren towards him as recorded in Genesis. His father had given him a coat of many colors, and perhaps other marks of distinction,—but his brethren "hated him and could not speak peaceably to him." The whole story of Joseph, is very in-

structive in relation to the causes, nature, effects, and cure of envy.

**JEALOUSY.**—This is another and a peculiar modification of resentment. A child is sometimes jealous, if he sees another child in his mother's arms, and apparently sharing the love that had been bestowed upon himself.—He will sometimes manifest his resentment, either towards the mother or the child. A little girl of three years was much pleased with the birth of a sister; but when she saw that the little one occupied the chief part of her mother's care and attention, she was wretched, and thought her mother had ceased to love her. She wished her sister dead; and one day, while her mother stepped out, leaving the infant in the cradle, she inflicted a wound upon it with the sharp point of the scissors, with which she was playing, and caused its death.

A little boy who was much delighted with a new born sister, was told by the nurse that his sister would *now* have his place; and that "he would have to take care of himself." He remembered and reflected upon the remark. His mother's attention to the little one seemed to confirm it; and a most injurious effect was produced upon his young affections. The actions of the mother, and the pleasures of the sister, were viewed with jealousy, and it was several years before he came to love either as they deserved; although both were very affectionate and kind to him.

Candidates for office or public favor are sometimes jealous of each other; and warm friends, by becoming rival candidates, are sometimes converted into the bitterest enemies.

The most striking exhibitions of jealousy are in cases of love. It is the peculiar characteristic of jealousy, that *it may be excited to its highest pitch, in relation to an object tenderly loved.* The jealous person imagines that his attachment is not reciprocated, or that another attachment, or some other object, will prevent the indulgence of his affection.

In this state of mind every trivial occurrence—a mere word or look—is strangely magnified; and even entirely

misapprehended, and perverted ; and helps to fan into a flame, a blind and furious passion.

———"Trifles light as air,  
Are to the jealous, confirmations strong  
As proofs of holy writ."

Some such trifle may arouse the mind to dreadful paroxysms, and bloody deeds. The most terrible conflict, is sometimes occasioned. At one moment he may cherish towards the object of his passion, the tenderest affection, and be almost tortured with the strength of this affection, —at the next he may plunge a dagger to her heart.

At one moment he may soar in ecstasies of hope, and revel in scenes of approaching bliss ; and in the next, destroy his own life, in the blackness of despair.

A passion so fearful, surely demands control, and the duty of checking and regulating the principle of resentment, in all its modifications, is one of the most important connected with education.

God has placed natural checks to it, in the human mind, and in the circumstances of life.

1. Reason and conscience, and the power of voluntary control, are all fitted to this end.

2. The exercise of anger is painful in itself. An angry, peevish, revengeful, envious, or jealous person, cannot be happy.

3. He feels that he cannot cherish these feelings, and retain the respect and esteem of others.

4. He cannot respect himself. He feels as if he had lost his balance, and his standing in his own estimation. He is ashamed of himself.

5. He finds that his passions subject him often to real injury, and he suffers in his person, or property, in consequence of the damage he has done in anger.

6. It is often followed by bitter remorse, when the injury cannot be repaired.

7. The exhibitions, or the results of it in others, are very painful or disgusting, and are fitted to hold men in check.

We may avail ourselves of these checks, and of considerations of a moral nature, to guard us from this evil.

We can carefully repress outward expressions of an-

ger. If we indulge angry words, or angry looks and actions, the passion will increase. If we earnestly suppress them, the feeling will gradually subside.

If a boy strike or otherwise insult you, you will perhaps feel the risings of anger; and if you prepare to retaliate, if you look for a stick or a stone, if you shove up your sleeve, or pull off your coat, or raise your hand to strike him, your anger will increase, and you know not where it will stop.

But if you stop and think, and make no effort to injure him, your passion will be more likely to cease. Several considerations may arise to check the feelings of anger.

Perhaps he did not *intend to injure or insult me*. It might be the result of sudden passion, and that he will repent in a short time, and make explanation or restitution.

Perhaps he did it under some misapprehension, and an explanation may lead him to see and confess the wrong he has done, and to do justice of his own accord.

Perhaps I shall injure him more than I intend. Under excitement, I am in danger of going too far.

If I am angry, there is danger that I shall not judge accurately in the case.

I am interested, and therefore likely to be a partial judge.

I shall not be likely to reform him or get justice to myself if I assail him in anger. The injury I do to him will not benefit me.

I am liable to err, and then I shall need a forbearing spirit exercised towards me. I should do to others as I would they should do to me.

I have offended God, the best of all beings, the Father of all; and if he will forgive me, ought I not to forgive my frail, erring brother?

The precepts and the example of Christ teach me to forgive those who injure me; even those who "*despitefully* injure and persecute me."

I will endeavor by kindness and forbearance to reform him who injures me, and to do him good. If he hungers, I will feed him; if he thirst, I will give him drink. If it is necessary that he should be imprisoned, for crimes he has committed, I will visit him there with kindness.

Such considerations will help us to subdue anger.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

This class embraces those complex mental states which combine a pleasant emotion with *good will*, or desires of good to the objects which occasion them. It embraces the affections which bind us to our fellow creatures, and produce the charm and happiness of social and domestic life.

**THE PARENTAL AFFECTION.**—We begin with this because it was the first which came to our aid. It nourished, clothed, caressed, and sheltered us, before we could understand its value, or its strength; or know our own necessities.

It must have been an original or implanted affection, or it never could have been so universal in its operation, or so powerful, persevering, and unwearied in its efforts. Who but a mother can understand the strength of a mother's love? Yet no mother can describe it. She can only act it out.

"I thought," said a mother, "when I had but one child, I never could love another so well; but when I had a second, and a third, I found I loved these, if possible, better than I had the first. Now that I have ten children, I find I have a *whole heart for each of them*. My affection *grows stronger* for each of them as they become older."

This, like the other forms of desire, has an instinctive action, and is therefore an original principle.

It has also a voluntary action, and can be increased or diminished—properly regulated or perverted. It has, then, a moral character, and must be regarded and treated as such.

There is danger of its perversion. It is liable to become excessive, so as to be blind to the faults of children, and shrink from correcting them.

It is sometimes so strong as to lead parents to throw



away their own lives, in hopeless efforts to save their children.

It sometimes leads them to grieve excessively at their loss ; to become insane, or to pine away and die of grief.

It may be so perverted, or overborne by some other passion, that parents forsake their children, and leave them to perish, or destroy them by their own hands.

It is possible for a parent, by unkindness or by intoxication, or other vicious indulgence, to destroy his attachment to his children, and treat them uniformly with cruelty. But all these facts can be explained, without denying that the parental affection is implanted and original.

**THE FILIAL AFFECTION.**—This is the affection which children bear to their parents. It is reasonable that parental love should be repaid by the love of their children. God has provided for this in the constitution of the mind. The infant soon begins to know and return a mother's smile, and cling to her with affection.

This is not, at first, so strong as the parental affection ; and it is often said that children can never know the strength of the parental affection till they become parents. This is undoubtedly true ; but many persons can bear witness to the fruits of parental love, and dwell upon it as one of the most cherished recollections of childhood. This, like the parental affection, has both an instinctive and a voluntary action, and can be improved and increased, or weakened and destroyed.

Its strength is sometimes excessive and injurious, but it is also frequently perverted, so as to manifest itself in disobedience and unkindness. Intemperance has led many young persons to abuse their parents, and "bring down their grey hairs with sorrow to the grave." Such conduct is monstrous.

There may be some cases where children become so much engrossed in other cares and interests, that they fail to treat their aged parents with proper respect, and to supply their wants with filial care. These are very painful exhibitions of ingratitude.

It is far more pleasant to think of those cases where children make great efforts to promote the happiness of their parents. A father died, leaving a family without

suitable means of support. The oldest son, a boy of twelve or fourteen years, exerted himself in every way to provide for their necessities. Whenever he could get employment and earn any thing, he carried it with delight to his mother.

One day as he was carrying bricks up a ladder for the mason, he fell to the ground and broke his thigh. He was at first severely stunned, but when he so far recovered as to perceive what had occurred, he burst into tears, with the exclamation, "*O, what will my poor mother do now?*" He thought more of his "poor mother," than of his own sufferings.

**THE FRATERNAL AFFECTION.**—It is this which binds together brothers and sisters in the same family. Having both an instinctive and a voluntary action, it is always found to some extent, and can be greatly modified by circumstances and education. Some brothers and sisters are much happier in the family circle than others, and nearly all might be happier than they are, by the proper cultivation of this affection.

It will be marred in proportion as children cultivate selfish feelings. It will always be more or less impaired, if parents use partiality in the treatment of their children.

It is sometimes so perverted that there exists, between children of the same parents, the most cruel hatred. The division of property among children is sometimes the occasion of enduring strife and hatred. There is something very odious in such exhibitions of human depravity—such perversions of an affection, which is the source of so much delight, when "brethren dwell together in unity."

**HUMANITY.**—The affections of the human soul are not exhausted in the range of the family circle. We find attachments springing up within us for those who are our companions in childhood. We become attached to those we associate with at school.

We find a kind of fellow feeling and attachment among the laborers in a particular establishment—between persons of the same profession, denomination, or association. These attachments are modifications of the principle of humanity, or love of the human race.

We are so constituted that there is a peculiar feeling excited in us by every thing relating to man. In the human mind, as well as in the bible, we see evidence that God requires men to love each other *as men*—as beings of one race.

Some have denied the existence of this principle of humanity, but the evidences of it are abundant. They may be found (1) In the feelings which children manifest towards other children in distinction from animals. (2) In the feelings which men experience on being deprived of human society—and then of being restored to it again. (3) In the regard which men manifest for the esteem and approbation of their fellow men. (4) In the humane feelings which savages often exhibit towards strangers. (5) In the provisions for relieving human suffering, even among uncivilized men. It is true that these feelings of humanity are often overborne and counteracted. But this is also true of the domestic affections, which are stronger in their nature, as well as more limited in the sphere of their operations.

There is evidence that this feeling of humanity is original, or that the basis of it, at least, is laid in the structure of the mind, in the fact that it can be called into exercise, and modified by so many different relations and circumstances.

These circumstances cannot *create* a faculty or capacity of the mind, any more than they can create a whole mind. They can only call into exercise and modify such as already exist. All the attachments which thus spring up, in the relations of life, are so many evidences of this general principle of humanity, or love of the human race. These attachments sometimes become exceedingly strong, and furnish illustrations of what is called FRIENDSHIP. There are instances of this kind between persons of the same sex, which seem to equal, in strength, the highest exhibitions of the domestic affections.

Here it is that we may find the basis of that affection, which joins husband and wife, in the marriage relation. Every human being, is constituted with a capacity to perceive, and reciprocate feelings, and expressions of

affection;—not in relation to those of the same family, or neighborhood merely,—but of the same race.

Then as there are endless diversities in the elements and shades of character, there is something in each individual, which may adapt itself to what is peculiar to another individual.

Some persons seem peculiarly fitted to be associated in the nearest relations of life; while in others the traits of character are very discordant, and cannot be easily or happily associated.

Still it is true that all the propensities, and affections, may be so far under the control of the will, and of moral restraints, that elements of character, which seemed very discordant, have sometimes been assimilated. Persons of very different temperaments and dispositions, have been united, and by mutual forbearance and self discipline, have lived happily together, in the nearest of earthly relations.

**PATRIOTISM, OR LOVE OF COUNTRY.**—This is another modification of the principle of humanity. It is modified by the relation we sustain to our fellow men, who inhabit the same country, and have certain interests in common with us. This feeling has its uses, but is sometimes inordinate, and influenced by false notions of honor. It may sometimes be marred by national pride and vanity.

There is not, perhaps, danger that we shall love our country too well, if that love is controlled by the nobler principles of rectitude and benevolence, and directed to right ends.

**PITY OR SYMPATHY.**—This affection embraces a *painful* rather than a pleasant emotion; but as it includes a desire of good to its object, it belongs to the *benevolent*, rather than the *malevolent* affections.

It is instinctive in its action, and consequently an implanted affection; but it is also capable of being greatly modified by effort and education. It is not *necessarily*, either virtuous, or vicious, in its merely instinctive action; but is of great value to society, when rightly exercised. Its exercise, though painful, is often salutary.

The benevolent efforts it occasions to prevent or relieve suffering, are a source of enjoyment, and thus compensate for the painful emotions of sympathy.

But this principle is often abused. It is sometimes prostrated, so that man does not feel for man.

The warrior may so seal up his heart against its power, that he can strew fields with the dead and dying; and neither the sight of the one, nor the groans of the other, nor the thoughts of widows, and orphans, made such by his ambition, can move his heart, or call forth a tear of sympathy.

A man can deal out intoxicating liquors for gain, till his heart becomes hard, so that the tears of a heart-broken wife, or the entreaties of suffering children, have no power to restrain him from selling it, again and again, to the ruined husband and father.

Pity may also be too strongly excited, so that its power to relieve suffering is prostrated. There may be such a morbid exercise of sympathy as shall interfere with the claims of duty, and of justice, in the administration of government.

It may take such methods to relieve suffering as shall tend rather to increase it, by increasing its cause. Persons are sometimes imposed upon, by appeals to their sympathies, from wicked and designing men, who put on the appearance of poverty, and suffering, in order to effect their purposes. Its moral character is connected with its voluntary and modified action. It is vicious when misused, or perverted, and virtuous only when controlled by nobler principles of benevolence, and justice.

**GRATITUDE.**—This is a complex affection, exercised in relation to benefactors. It embraces—1, A feeling of pleasure in view of a benefit conferred upon us.—2, A pleasant emotion in relation to the benefactor or person who conferred the favor.—3, A desire of good to the benefactor; and—4, A feeling of obligation to him.

It also commonly includes the idea that the benefit was *intentional*, and the effect of his good will to us.—At least if we perceive that the individual had selfish or mischievous designs, this modifies, if it does not destroy the *essential* elements of gratitude.

This feeling is sometimes strongly manifested by savages. Instances of it may be found in histories of the American Indians.

But there are also instances of base ingratitude in civilized and christian nations. There is great ingratitude in every act of unkindness and disobedience to kind and affectionate parents.

Pupils sometimes are guilty of ingratitude to their teachers, and give them needless pain and anxiety.

The people of a country sometimes exhibit this base principle, in relation to national benefactors. This was often the case with the ancient Greeks and Romans.

There are many instances of ingratitude recorded in the bible; but the most striking is that exhibited by the jews in relation to the Saviour.

Before the Saviour appeared, they had often exhibited ingratitude, by killing and stoning the prophets and messengers of God, notwithstanding he had done so much for their welfare. He says of them "*I have nourished and brought them up as children, but they have rebelled against me.*"

When the Saviour came it was to bless them, and turn them from their iniquities, and thus fit them for happiness and heaven. But with few exceptions, they refused his kind offers. "*He came unto his own and his own received him not.*"

They sought to destroy him, and finally secured false witnesses to testify against him. He was found innocent even of the charges brought by false witnesses, and was so declared by the judge. But they cried out "*Crucify him! CRUCIFY HIM!*" They put him to death without the shadow of a crime.

The most common and the most criminal ingratitude now exhibited in the world is *ingratitude to God*. He has created and he sustains all men, and gives them every good gift which they enjoy. Life, health, reason, knowledge, happiness, and all the things which cause it, are his gifts. Yet how many abuse these gifts and forget the Giver! Many who take pleasure in the gifts *mis*-take this pleasure for *gratitude* to God. But mere pleas-

*ure is not gratitude.* If men were more grateful to God, they would be more grateful to each other; and there would be more kind acts to occasion gratitude.

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## CHAPTER XXV.

### LOVE TO GOD.

The "great Commandment" is, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and, thy neighbor as thyself.*" We have seen that man is created with a *capacity* to love his neighbor, and that this love can be exercised. It can be greatly increased, or diminished, by a voluntary course of conduct; and is sometimes exercised in a very high degree. Man has then the *original capacity* necessary for obeying this part of the command.

*Is there, also, evidence that he has capacity to love God?*

*Does he exercise this as extensively and naturally as he does the other?*

Philosophy has necessarily something to do with these questions, as matters of fact. They belong to the phenomena of mind, and are matters to be examined. Several circumstances go to prove *that man was originally created with the principle of love to God.* 1. The existence of the other affections leads to this conclusion. This argument is based upon Analogy. If man has affections, which are exercised towards every other being, to whom he sustains any sort of relation, analogy would teach that he should have affections for the SUPREME BEING; to whom he sustains the highest relation.

If he has regard for the human race—for *men*—as in-

*telligent beings, he ought to have for God, the Supreme Intelligence.*

If he has affection for a *human benefactor*, in the exercise of gratitude, he ought to have for the *Author of all gifts*—the Universal Benefactor.

If he can reciprocate love, exercised towards *him* by an *earthly and imperfect* being, he ought to be able to love that *perfect, exalted* Being, who *so loved the world* that he gave his only begotten Son, for human welfare.

If even a child can love his father and his mother fervently, he ought to have the capacity to love his **HEAVENLY FATHER**. Such is the teaching of analogy.

2. There is a necessity, in the other affections and propensities, for the control of such an affection. The mind needs something above itself to love. Something that is perfect, and so elevated that the soul may constantly be making progress towards it. The human mind has necessities for *adoration and worship*. All its powers cannot be exercised without this.

Yet this object of worship, must be more elevated than man, or the soul is debased by its devotion. All the lower affections of the soul, will thus be without a safe guide, or restraint, if there be not this controlling affection, placed on some elevated object, which man can justly adore and worship, as well as love.

Love to God seems to be the only affection sufficiently elevated for this purpose. There is no being inferior to God, and superior to man, revealed to us, with sufficient clearness to answer this purpose. No other is needed. No merely created being would be suited to our necessities in this respect, so far as we can tell.—We need love to God, as a controlling principle.

3. When man was first created, God pronounced him good. Would he have done so, if this attribute had been wanting? Must there not have been a radical defect? Other animals were perfectly adapted to their state, and the enjoyment of happiness; but man, as an intelligent and accountable being, would not be without this. He cannot be permanently happy, nor perfectly discharge his duty without love to God.



4. Man was "created in the image of God." God must love himself—the perfection, and the source of all that is lovely—Man could not therefore be like God, if he did not love God.

5. God requires men to love him with all the heart. But what meaning or propriety of this, if in the heart, as he originally made it, there was no *capacity* to love him. The command implies the existence of such a capacity.

6. The scriptures clearly teach that the affection—love to God—is to be exercised extensively by men; and great provisions have been made by him, to awaken and call into exercise this love.

7. Multitudes of men have testified, that they have experienced the exercise of this love; and have lived and died, bearing this testimony, in circumstances to prove both their *sincerity*, and the *truth of their statements*.

8. The experience and testimony of this "cloud of witnesses" is not, that, when they began to love God, a new *faculty* or *capacity* of the mind was created, but rather that there was a *new exercise* of a capacity which originally belonged to the mind.

The christian who feels the love of God in his heart, wonders that he never exercised that love before. He feels guilty that he did not do it. But he could not feel so, unless there had been a *capacity* to do this, previously, any more than he could feel guilty for not seeing, if the sense of sight had never been bestowed till then.

*Do men uniformly exercise this affection, in the same manner, as the other affections?*

Several considerations show that they do not.

1. We witness the other affections unfolding themselves, as early as children gain a knowledge of the objects to which these affections stand related. Some have *theorised* that, as soon as they could understand the character of God, they would love him too; but experience teaches that it is not so. In nearly every case, if the character of God is clearly unfolded, as it is in the bible, they will at times, show a decided aversion.

Parents that have labored hard to persuade their chil-

dren to love God, can understand this matter, if those do not who have never tried.

2. There is no example in history, where a people generally exhibited love to a pure and holy God, unless he had made special efforts to secure that love.

3. The Jewish nation for whom wonderful exhibitions of God's power and love were manifested, frequently rebelled against him, and finally rejected and crucified his Son.

4. The scriptures distinctly declare that all men *sin* against God. They assert that death came into the world by sin, and death passes upon all men for that all have sinned. Sin is the transgression of the law, and if willingly and deliberately persisted in, it implies that men do not love God, or his law.

5. A succession of revelations, and providential arrangements have been made to men to persuade them to be reconciled to God. This was the object of the messages sent by prophets, and this the object of the mission, the sufferings and death, of the Saviour. This was the commission given to the apostles, and all the ministers of Christ who should follow them. They are ambassadors for Christ, beseeching men to be reconciled to God. All these arrangements are based on the fact that men do not, naturally, love God.

6. The scriptures ascribe love to God, wherever it exists, *to the agency of God, in connection with these arrangements.* The apostles speak of the love of God, as "shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."

"We love him because he first loved us."

They represent all holy affections as the "fruits of the Spirit."

They speak of christians as "born of God,"—"created anew in Christ Jesus,"—"Renewed in the spirit and temper of their minds."

All such expressions imply a great and important change in men, in connexion with the exercise of love to God, and proceed upon the fact that there was a time when they did not love him.

Some of them might seem to convey the idea of a literal creation of a new faculty; but others show that this

is not their meaning. All may be explained in perfect harmony with the supposition that the capacity to love God originally existed, but was not till then exercised; and that it was called into exercise by divine agency.

7. Another proof that men do not naturally love God, is found in the consciousness and common sense of men. This is manifested in various ways.

Those who become christians and give evidence that they love God, with scarcely an exception, declare ~~unhesitatingly~~, that there was a time when they did not love him.

Those who choose to live in sin often show a strong disposition to reject, or neglect the bible altogether; or to explain away, or modify its descriptions of the character of God. They show thus that the character of God as there revealed, does not please them. *They do not love to think of him*, as arrayed in the attributes unfolded in the scriptures.

All nations which have exhibited any regard for moral virtue, or any ideas of a Supreme Being, have seemed to be conscious that some change was needed in man to fit him to dwell with God. Hence the sacrifices and expiations they have introduced into their worship.

8. The absence of the exercise of this principle, best explains the irregular and perverted action of all the lower affections. This irregularity is every where manifest. Scarcely do we meet with a perfectly regulated mind; and this is just what we should expect, if such an affection were stricken down or crippled, so as to cease its control.

It is also in favor of this view, that when the love of God becomes predominant, all the other affections are brought into a better state of harmony, and their action is better regulated.

If this reasoning is conclusive, the results to which it leads are very important. It is plain that the love of God ought to exist in every mind, as a *controlling* affection. It will be impossible to train and regulate the mind in the best manner, without this.

This reasoning also shows that God has made pro-

vision for the restoration of this principle, and that it has actually been restored, and exercised in many cases.

It is also interesting to know that this provision is abundant; so that the mind that hungers and thirsts after righteousness, may be filled. We are assured that God is more willing to give the Holy Spirit, to them that ask him, than parents are to give good gifts to their children.

It will then follow that if any person fails to exercise love to God, he is as guilty as he would be to neglect, abuse, and pervert any other affection; and more so, in proportion as this is more important than any other affection, and as God is more worthy of love than any other being.

It seems also a necessary conclusion that it is possible to abuse and pervert the provisions of God's love for the re-establishment and exercise of this affection, as it is to neglect, or pervert any other gift or affection. It is of vast importance that human responsibility, in this respect, should be deeply felt; and have its influence in all systems of education, and all efforts of self improvement.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

**CONSCIENCE.**—This department of the sensibilities embraces that class of feelings which have relation to considerations of right and wrong. All the sentiments of duty, justice, rectitude, obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, have relation to this department of the mind, and imply its existence.

If we have feelings of obligation, of approval and dis-

approval, of right and wrong, Suggestion assures us that there is in the mind a *capacity to feel* these relations.— This capacity we term the *Moral Sense, conscience, or conscientiousness*. The emotions and feelings of this department may then be called conscientious feelings or moral sensibilities.

We know by consciousness that there are such feelings, as certainly as we know that there are feelings of hunger and thirst, desire and aversion. We see their operations or effects in others, as certainly as we see the operations and effects of any other class of feelings.

Assuming the existence of the moral sensibilities, we may examine their phenomena and relations as we do other mental states. The classification of these is more simple than of those pertaining to the natural or animal sensibilities. The rank they occupy is as much higher than that of the others, as the nature of man is more elevated than that of the brute.

In the absence of love to God this is the noblest element in man's nature; and in the absence of a revelation, the conscience, if not perverted, gives to man the strongest expressions of the will of God. This is expressed in the language of the apostle. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, *are a law unto themselves*; which show the work of the law *written in their hearts*; their CONSCIENCES *also bearing witness*, and their thoughts the meantime *accusing or else excusing* one another."

#### DIVISION OR CLASSIFICATION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

There are two forms in which the moral sensibilities are manifested.

1. EMOTIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG, OR MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

2. FEELINGS OF DUTY, OR OBLIGATION.

Both these mental states we may know by consciousness, and may learn the relations they sustain to each other and to other departments of the mind. The emotions are first in order, and are distinct from the feelings

of obligation, as the natural emotions are prior to and distinct from the desires. We must *approve* a particular measure or course of conduct and believe that it is *right*, in order to feel under a *moral obligation to perform it*. We must *disapprove* a particular practice, and believe that it is *wrong*, in order to feel a *moral obligation to avoid or oppose it*.

The relations of the moral sensibilities to the other departments of the mind, are important, and should be distinctly understood.

Like the natural sensibilities, they are in immediate connexion with the INTELLECT. Moral emotions take their rise in the action of the Intellect, as certainly as natural emotions.

We must *know* an action in order to *approve* or *disapprove* it, as certainly as we must hear a sound or see a color, or have *conceptions* of them, in order to feel emotions of pleasure arising from them. Emotions of approval or disapproval arise as spontaneously in relation to some objects and actions, as do emotions of *pleasure* or *pain* in relation to others.

If I see a boy abuse his play-fellows, or take what belongs to another, or disobey and grieve his kind parents, or his teacher, I *feel* that *he does wrong*, as certainly and perhaps as suddenly, as I *feel pain* if he strikes me.

The connexion of the moral sensibilities with the Will is also very intimate. If I feel under obligation to do a particular thing, that feeling has a direct tendency to produce action. As remarked in relation to *desires*, it may not result in action, because there may be some obstacle to prevent it; but this is its tendency.

The relation of the *moral* to the *natural sensibilities* is then very important. The two classes lie, as it were, side by side, between the *Intellect* and the *Will*.

Every motive addressed to the mind of man and designed to lead him to act, must reach the Will through the one, or the other, or both of these classes of the Sensibilities.

Both classes, we have seen, are fitted to produce voluntary action. Natural emotions occasion desires, and these have a tendency to influence the Will.

Moral emotions are followed by feelings of obligation, and these also have a tendency to move the Will.

But these do not *always* tend to move the Will *in the same direction*. Sometimes we desire to do things which we know we ought not to do. Sometimes we desire to be excused from doing what we know we ought to do. In both of these cases there is room for mental conflict, and there is a hesitation, a kind of balancing between a desire and a feeling of obligation. Sometimes this conflict may be very great, and the mind is agitated and embarrassed, so that the individual seems unable to do either one thing or another.

But there are times when *duty* and *inclination* lie in the same direction. A man may strongly desire to do what he knows to be his duty. This duty is then a pleasure. Desire and the feeling of obligation are in harmony, and the will acts promptly and vigorously under their combined influence.

There are many interesting practical bearings of these relations and influences of the moral sensibilities which cannot now be noticed. Some of these will necessarily claim attention when we come to examine the will, and others more properly belong to a work on Education.

The relations of the moral sense to the Intellect, however, demand farther consideration, from the fact that it has often been confounded with the intellect, or has been regarded, as a mere secondary principle, resulting from Education.

CONNEXION OF THE MORAL SENSE WITH REASONING. Some have been disposed to merge conscience in the reasoning power, and this circumstance would naturally lead to the conclusion that there is a very intimate relation between them. This is undoubtedly true. But there is this radical distinction: Reasoning is not an *emotion* or *feeling*. It may occasion feeling—it may be sustained, aided, biassed or embarrassed by *feeling*; but is not identical with it. It does not belong to the sensibilities. The moral sense, does belong there. Its appropriate elements are as we have seen, emotions and feelings.

This distinction is decisive. These feelings are no

more to be confounded with reasoning, than the pleasure which the scholar feels, after he has mastered a hard sum, or demonstrated a difficult problem, is to be confounded with the process of reasoning by which he mastered the difficulty.

The province of reason is to perceive and test relations; that of conscience is to feel and manifest emotions. The relation of the two is therefore as intimate as that of knowing and feeling. Several considerations then properly belong to this view of the subject.

1. The moral sense is capable of being modified by circumstances, as certainly as any principle of the natural sensibilities. If a change of intellectual states, or an increase of knowledge will produce an effect upon the natural emotions and desires, a change in the Intellect may also produce a change in moral emotions and feelings of obligation.

2. The moral sensibilities will conform, in a great degree, to the state and changes of the Intellect, and especially of the reasoning power. We often witness illustrations of this. Some event has occurred, and great injury has been done. We perhaps censure all the individuals concerned in it. But we find afterwards that some of them did not aid or encourage the conduct, but did all they could to prevent it. We not only acquit them, but applaud their conduct.

3. The moral sense is not an *infallible rule* of conduct. It is no more infallible than reason and knowledge or opinions are. It is possible to pervert and mislead it as it is to pervert the reason and blind the judgment.

4. A man may be guilty while yet his conscience does not accuse him. It will not follow that a person is perfectly innocent or entirely free from sin, because he feels no remorse.

This might be the case if one had so perverted and seared his conscience that it had become torpid and ceased to remonstrate.

This might be the case if one was ignorant of sin, or of the standard by which it is measured.



It might also be the case if one was ignorant of himself, and unconscious of his own thoughts and feelings, or immediately forgot them.

5. There must be somewhere a standard of right and wrong, and some things must be, in their very nature, right, and others wrong, independently of the human mind, of human opinions and practices. Without this there could not be a moral sense in men, or there would be nothing adapted to it in the universe, and it could never be exercised. Men could no more have ideas and emotions of right and wrong, without there were *realities*, of this nature, than they could see without light, or without there were objects to be seen.

6. There should be earnest efforts to ascertain the true standard of right, and wrong, and to keep it constantly in view, in all our reasonings, opinions, and conduct. It is only thus that we may hope to keep a "conscience void of offence towards God and towards men."

7. The proper training of the moral sense is one of the most important departments of Education, and for several reasons :

It is, as we have seen, a very elevated principle, and in the absence of love to God, the most important *regulating* power of the mind. But from its close relation to the reasoning power, it is liable to be misled. Still, if highly developed and cultivated, it will often aid in detecting the wrong conclusions of false reasoning.


Men sometimes *feel* that the conclusions to which their *reasonings* have led them, are wrong. They are often held back by conscience from acting up to their pernicious theories. We say of such a man, "His *heart* is better than his *head*."

The conscience being so influential in controlling the will, it is of vast importance that its dictates should be right.

It is also liable to be overborne by desires and passions, while its proper place is to regulate and control them ; and, like the voice of God in the soul, to say with decision to them, "Peace, be still." It must be trained, expanded, and elevated, or it cannot do this.

It must be trained and elevated in order to respond to the motives which God holds out to the mind, to restrain or recover it from the dominion of sin. The strongest appeals of revelation are made to this principle.

To this point must the efforts for the reformation of men be finally addressed in order to be permanently successful. Other principles in man may be addressed with some effect, but no other can be relied upon with so much hope of success as this, if it is properly disciplined and enlightened.



## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE WILL.

The phenomena and relations of the human Will, have occasioned some of the most perplexing questions, and controversies. No other department of the mind has been so much in dispute as this, and yet, perhaps no other has been so little explored, in the spirit of true Philosophy.

Some have doubted whether a *philosophy* of the will were *necessary*, or *practicable*. Its phenomena have often been confounded with those of the sensibilities, so that desires and volitions have been regarded as identical, and the terms used as synonymous.

Some who have seemed thus to confound these, have contended that the Will *is governed*, and *NECESSARILY governed by the strongest motive*. They have also shown that they regarded the *strongest motive* as nothing more or less than the *strongest desire*.

How these positions can be maintained in consistency with each other, we need not now stop to enquire.

Most of the discussions relative to the Will, have been in regard to its *freedom*, its *power*, and its *government*. Few have attempted to trace all its relations to the other departments of the mind, or examine its phenomena as matters of philosophical enquiry. The only work known to the writer which attempts this, with satisfactory results, is the volume on the Will by Professor Upham.

In this treatise we can attempt but a mere outline of the subject, in accordance with its design as an introduction to the study of the mind. We will endeavor to deal mainly with those facts which seem to be well established, or which may commend themselves to experience and common sense.

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE MIND.

RELATION TO THE INTELLECT. 1. It has already been

intimated that the action of the Will, is subsequent to that of the Intellect. We must know what is to be done before we will to *do* it.

2. We must ordinarily *know* or *believe* that a thing *can* be done, before we will to *attempt* it. We find it hard to *attempt* what we *know* to be impossible, even when urged by the will of another person.

3. The acts of the will do not *immediately* and *certainly* follow those of the Intellect. We do not always will to *do* or to *attempt* what we know can be done.—Some other mental state—a *feeling of obligation*, or a *desire*—comes between the act of the intellect and that of the will. This we can know from consciousness, in every *deliberate* action, and there is reason to believe that this is always the case, even in those actions which are the most sudden and unpremeditated.

4. The will may exert a very extensive influence over every department of the intellect. This influence may be *indirect*, but it is real and abiding. We have power to fix our attention on a particular subject,—to read, think, converse, and write upon it—and thus exert an important influence over our minds. It is thus that we gain knowledge.

We cannot make much progress in knowledge without this power of *fixing the attention*. But this power of attention depends very much—although not entirely—upon the will.

It was by a voluntary act that I decided to write this book ; and it was by a series of such acts that I took up one subject after another, and fixed attention upon it. I then thought, and perhaps read and conversed upon it before writing and arranging the several topics. But in doing this a very decisive influence was exerted upon my Intellectual states. If I had not been thus employed, I should have been thinking of other subjects, and perhaps those of a very different character.

But there is another view of the influence of the Will over the Intellect. We have already seen that the sensibilities exert an important influence over the Intellect. Our thoughts, and reasonings, as well as our actions, are

often influenced by our feelings, desires, propensities, and passions.

But all of these have a *voluntary*, as well as an instinctive action; and as they are more or less under the *indirect control* of the Will, the Intellect, through them, receives more or less influence from the Will. There is much truth in the old adage,

“ Convince a man *against his will*,  
He holds the same opinion still.”

RELATION TO THE SENSIBILITIES. 1. The acts of the will which occasion outward action, or action of the body, are subsequent to the exercise of the sensibilities, but are *in immediate connection with them*. It is from this close connection that Desires have often been confounded with Volitions. It is certain that desires do often entirely coincide and harmonize with volitions. Men are very apt to *will* and *act* in accordance with their desires. But this is not always the case, as we have before had occasion to remark. There is a *direct tendency* in desires to produce *volitions* and *actions*; but this tendency is not always *effectual*. There are sometimes obstacles of a *prudential* character to prevent it. A man may desire property which does not belong to him. He may have strong inclination to take it, and be prevented only by fear of detection and exposure; or by the penalty of law.

Many persons are restrained from doing what they desire to do, by a regard for the opinions, or the authority of others. Scholars at school are often prevented from doing what they desire to do, by a dread of punishment, or by a regard for *their own reputation*, or for the *feelings of their teacher*.

But there may also be obstacles of a *moral* nature. We may be *tempted* to do certain things which we know are *wrong*. We may feel a strong desire to do them, but the thought arises, *it is not right*. I *must* not do it—*Conscience* forbids it—the *Law of God* forbids it.

Here then we find two classes of influences in the sensibilities, in direct contact with the will; and each fitted to move it, but perhaps in entirely opposite directions. They *may* be in harmony—they *ought* to be—but they are not always; and here is ground of mental strife.

2. It is also true that the will has more or less control over *each* of these influences fitted to act upon itself. Acting in harmony with desires, or some master passion, it may trample down the Conscience, and resist its power. It may thus for a time, effectually escape from its restraints.

Acting vigorously in harmony with conscience, it has a great control over the desires, so as to weaken, and subdue them, in a great measure. It may act promptly in opposition to them, and even bring them in some cases to be in harmony with the conscience.

#### DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS.

This distinction, ~~has~~, perhaps, been made sufficiently plain in preceding remarks; but as it has so often been lost sight of, and as discussions have frequently been embarrassed by confounding the two, a more full view of the evidence on which the distinction rests, may be necessary.

1. We may say that the distinction is clearly asserted by *consciousness*. This is shown in the remarks just made on the relation of the will to the sensibilities. We as well know that we sometimes act against our desires, and are constrained to do so by a sense of duty, or a regard to some *prudential* motive, as we know that we act at all.

2. We see this distinction illustrated in the conduct of children.

"Charles," said an older sister, "will you go and bring me some wood?"

"I can't," was the ready reply.

"Oh! yes you can, if you are disposed to," said the sister.

"Well, I don't wish to—you may bring in your own wood."

"My son," said the mother, go and bring in some wood."

The boy hesitated, and she was obliged to repeat the command in a firmer tone. He then left his play with a sullen countenance, and brought the wood, but threw it down with violence, and in the wrong place.

Now here is a very common and decisive illustration of the distinction in question. We might say, for we often use words thus loosely, that he brought the wood *against his will*; but this would not be strictly true.—He did *will* to bring it.—But he did not *desire* to do it. His limbs would not take one step towards the wood without an *act of the will*. But he did it *reluctantly*. He would have refused if he had thought it safe to do so.

3. We witness illustrations of this distinction in all the relations and employments of life—among the rude and the cultivated, and by persons of every grade of character. We see the desires of good men often restrained by a sense of duty, and the desires of bad men, restrained by a dread of consequences.

4. Language, both in conversation and in books, implies this distinction. “I would *like* to do this for you, but I cannot. It would not be right. I *wish* it were in my power to aid you, but I cannot without wronging others.”

We *desire* life, health, and happiness; but it would not be a just use of language to say we *will* these things. It is true that language is not always a just criterion, in a case like this, because it is often used defectively.—These very terms are sometimes confounded, and used interchangeably. But if the distinction is clearly, and frequently made, both incidentally and deliberately, it affords evidence that there is foundation for the distinction.

5. There is evidence in the language of the bible of this distinction in the DIVINE MIND. It is strikingly illustrated in numerous passages and events. God chastises those he loves, not because he *delights* in their sufferings, or *desires* their unhappiness; but for other reasons.

The whole history of the Jewish nation is full of illustrations of his love and regard for their welfare; yet he sometimes inflicted upon them sore judgments. “How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together!”

But his love for them, and his desire for their welfare, did not prevent him from inflicting sore judgments upon



them, when they rebelled and refused to listen to his counsels. He did not *desire* their destruction. His language is, "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he turn and live. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?"

Yet he evidently *willed* the desolation, wasting distress, and destruction of that people, for their incorrigible transgressions. He solemnly and repeatedly predicted it. He sent against them the sword of fierce and cruel nations. "He poured upon Israel the fury of his anger, the strength of battle, and set him on fire round about." He says, "Who gave Jacob for a spoil and Israel to the robbers? Did not the Lord?"

In the language and conduct of the Saviour, this distinction is repeatedly seen. Standing in view of the "beautiful city," he exclaimed, "Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee! How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, but ye would not!" This is the language of unaffected tenderness and love. "And yet," says Professor Upham, "soon afterwards the sign of the Son of Man appeared in heaven; the sun and the moon were darkened; the earth mourned; there was famine, pestilence, and earthquake; of the beloved and beautiful Temple not one stone was left upon another; and all Jerusalem, that delight of the whole earth, was bathed in blood and wrapped in fire. Not because the Saviour had ceased to love it and to desire its good, but because the measure of its iniquity was full; and the dictates of eternal justice compelled him to *will*, and to inflict a punishment which a being so infinitely benevolent could never have *desired* to see." \* \* \* \* "It neither is nor can be true of God, that He ever *desires* the infliction of punishment, though the obduracy of transgressors often lead him to *will* it."\*

If such distinction then exists in the *Divine Mind*, and if man in the "great outlines of his mental constitution," is formed "*in the image of his Maker*," it follows that this distinction exists *in the mind of man*.

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\* The Will, § 58.

6. Distinguished writers on the mind have often made this distinction deliberately. Among these may be mentioned the names of Mr. Locke, Mr. Stewart, Dr. Reid, Dr. Good, and Sir James McIntosh. Mr. Locke, after giving some explanation of the distinction in question, says, "This, well considered, plainly shows that *the will* is perfectly distinguished from *desire*, which, in the very same action, *may have a quite contrary tendency from that which the will sets us upon*. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time that I am speaking, I may *wish* may not prevail on him. In this case it is plain the WILL and DESIRE run counter. *I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends the other, and that the direct contrary way.*"†

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### GOVERNMENT OF THE WILL.

It has already been remarked that most of the discussions in regard to the Will have related to its *Freedom*, its *Power*, and its *Government*. It may be further remarked that the discussions have been more especially connected with the questions relating to its Freedom and its Government. The Power of the Will is, however, always involved in all questions pertaining to its freedom and government, and cannot fail to have its bearing on these discussions.

Two leading tendencies have been manifest in controversies concerning the will. One is to magnify its free-

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† Locke's Essay, Book II, Chapt. 21.

dom, till it seems to spurn the restraints of law or government, and to live and act in a kind of omnipotence of its own.

The other tendency is so to view its subjection to law, as to invade or destroy its essential freedom, and utterly prostrate its power, or subject it to the despotism of an unbending fatality.

Each of these tendencies is unhappy. The true view doubtless is, that the government of the will is *essential to its freedom*; and, of course, in harmony with it.

It may perhaps be confidently asserted, that there is and can be no foundation or safeguard for the exercise of either the *freedom* or *power* of the will, except in its subjection to law. This may at first seem paradoxical, but it will perhaps appear evident in the course of the discussion. We shall need here, as in the other departments of the mind, to examine one thing at a time, and the subject first in order is, properly,

#### THE SUBJECTION OF THE WILL TO LAW.

This is first in order, because, if the freedom of the will is, as intimated, necessarily connected with and based upon its government, we must understand the nature of its government, in order to understand and rightly estimate its freedom.

It will also be seen that the *fact* of the subjection of the will to law is preliminary to all questions in relation to the *mode* of its government. Is it then a matter of fact that the will is *governed* or is *subject to law*? Several arguments go to show that it is.

##### 1. *Our own consciousness.*

We are often conscious of doing things that we should not do but for the influence exerted over us by others. Just as the last sentence was written, a little son came to the door of my study and said, "Father, a gentleman below wishes to see you."

I was sorry to leave the subject unfinished, and went down with reluctance. Now here was a decisive influence exerted over my will by the statement of that child. It was my duty to go down, and my will was governed

by that sense of duty ; but that sense of duty was occasioned by the statement of the child.

The case stated by Mr. Locke, as quoted in the last chapter, is in point. "A man whom *I cannot deny*, may *oblige* me to use persuasion to another."

In this and similar cases the consciousness of the person asserts that he acts in a particular way, *because he is obliged to* by some motive of duty or expediency thus presented. His will is governed or influenced by that of another person.

2. *What we witness in others confirms this view.*

The case of the little boy who refused to bring wood for his sister, is in evidence here. His will was governed by the decisive authority of his mother, as the primary cause. Instances are innumerable in childhood where the will of the child is governed by that of the parent or the teacher.

3. *All government proceeds on the assumption that the will is subject to law.*

Why is law imposed? Why ~~are~~ penalties fixed? Why are they ever inflicted, if the human will cannot be governed, and if the penalties of law have no adaptation to influence it?

The mother who commanded her son to bring the wood, proceeded on the assumption that his will could be governed or controlled. This is true of every effort to control the will of a child by authority.

It is equally true of every effort to influence the will by appealing to the consciences of men.

This also is the secret of all efforts to hire or bribe men, or in any way influence them by rewards. They all proceed on the assumption that the will can be governed. All the commands in the Scriptures, and all the motives they contain, imply that the will can be governed.

4. *Systems of education assume that the will can be governed.*

It is not in the power of one man to teach or train another, unless he can exert some control over his will.

It were vain to build a school-house if the youth of the neighborhood could not be brought into it.

It were idle to employ a teacher if pupils cannot be induced to receive instruction. He cannot instruct them unless he can gain their attention ; but this attention, as we have seen, depends much upon the will of the pupil. He must govern in order to teach well, but government is a control over the *will*.

It is a vain thing to write a book on the mind, or on any other subject, if no one will study it. Every writer and every publisher proceeds on this principle in the preparation of books, and endeavors to prepare them in such a way that they will exert an influence over the will, as well as over the thoughts and feelings.

This is the assumption in all efforts to train up men for particular professions. It is taken for granted that the minds of men and their conduct may be influenced by the practice of the several professions. The mechanic strives to excel in his art, because he believes that men will be influenced by this, and be more likely to give him employment than if he were a bungler.

5. *The society of men, in foreseeing the conduct of others, implies this.*

This is sometimes strikingly illustrated. Some men have great shrewdness in discovering the character of others, and presuming how they will act in particular circumstances. This shrewdness is a result of an intimate knowledge of human conduct ; and indicates that the will is subject to law, and will act in a certain way in view of certain motives.

In promoting any benevolent object, the skilful moralist adapts his arguments and motives to the circumstances and mental habits of those he would influence. He avoids certain things, because they would repel and offend those he desires to win. He uses such motives as are right in themselves, and as are also adapted to the capacities and the circumstances of those he would benefit.

This skill implies that the will may be influenced in one way, by one kind of motives, and in another way, by different motives.

Missionary and other operations, depending on the voluntary contributions of men, proceed on the assumption that men will be influenced to sustain these operations in view of appropriate motives. They spread their appeals before the community, and pursue their plans, guided by a wise foresight of the amount of means that will be furnished. With but a small amount in hand, and perhaps with an empty treasury, they yet make contracts, to the amount of many thousands of dollars, to be met during the year.

6. *The foreknowledge and predictions of the Deity imply that the will may be governed.*

The most remarkable events recorded in the Scriptures, were not only foreknown, but predicted long before their occurrence. Yet these events involved the voluntary conduct of myriads of men, embracing those of several generations.

This could not be so, if God did not know beforehand, how all these men would act, in view of the circumstances in which they were placed.

If any one were to deny this view, and affirm that he, by a direct act, compelled each individual, at the moment, to act just as he did act, he would only assert that the will of all these men was governed by a direct act or will of the Deity. This position, whether true or false, would be a full assumption of the doctrine that the will is subject to law.

7. *The fact that the human will is limited, demonstrates that it is subject to law.*

There are many things that the human will can never accomplish. It is not in the power of man to *will* to do this. It is not in the power of man to will to create or to destroy a star in the heavens. He cannot create, or even *will* to create a living bird, or fish, or insect of the meanest rank. But just so far as the will is limited or restrained in any way, it is subject to law.

8. *There seems to be an absolute necessity that the will should be subject to law.*

It would be the most dangerous thing in creation to be left free from the restraints of law. We could not rec-

concile such an event with the wisdom and benevolence of God. Who would dare to live in a world where there were no restraints upon the human will, and where men were disposed to sin? What possible influence could reason and conscience have over us, if the will knew no laws or restraints? So far as conduct and character are concerned, these powers might as well not exist; for if the will is not subject to their restraints, the conduct cannot be.

9. *The fact that the mind is created and sustained by a power above itself implies its subjection to law.*

Can we conceive of a created thing that is not dependent? Can a thing be, in any just sense of the word, dependent and yet not subject to law? To assume that the mind of man is not subject to law, is to assume that God is not its author, and that it has no author, and no necessities to be supplied by any power above itself. But if the mind, as a whole, has a Creator, and is subject to law, then the *will*, as a department of the mind, must be.

10. *Analogy in this connexion teaches the same doctrine.*

We have seen that the Intellect is subjected to more or less restraint, from the other departments of the mind. Our desires, propensities, passions, and prejudices have an extensive influence upon the Intellectual operations. The Will has an important influence upon the Sensibilities; and through these, as well as in connexion with attention, exerts its influence over the Intellect. Now if the will is not in like manner subject to law, and to the influence of these other departments of the mind, it is a perfect anomaly in our mental constitution.

11. *Sudden changes of the will, in connexion with a change of circumstances, show that it is subject to law.*

How often do we decide to perform certain operations, and then change these decisions, because of a change of circumstances.

A council of surgeons, on a certain occasion, decided to take off a limb from a diseased patient. The time was fixed at eleven o'clock the next day. They assembled at the time, but found the man so feeble, that they

did not think it safe to perform the operation. In a few hours the man was dead.

A thief broke into a store in the night, and had succeeded in collecting a quantity of valuable goods, into a pile, with a view to carry them off. A person sleeping in the store was awaked, and came so suddenly upon him that he fled, leaving all behind him, and also his weapons and dark lantern upon the counter, and his collection of false keys in the door.

12. *We sometimes experience mental conflicts that prevent or delay action.*

This could not be so if the will were not subject to law. We may feel some inclination to act in a given way, but other considerations oppose this, so that, in common parlance, men say: "I cannot decide now,"—"I wish I knew what to do,"—"I must take time to consider."

All such expressions denote that opposing and conflicting motives are acting on the will, and preventing, or delaying the decision. In this sense these motives are *influencing or governing* the will.

13. *We sometimes witness the effect of violent passions in controlling the will.*

In these instances we speak of persons thus influenced, as governed by passion. Men often do things while in passion, which they would not do otherwise; and thus show that the will may be governed by another department of the mind.

14. *The appetites may control the will.*

Hunger or thirst, when intense, will induce men to take whatever will satisfy the appetite, regardless of the right of property. An appetite for intoxicating drinks, may lead men to the violation of all duties and obligations, which they would not thus violate, but for the cravings of the appetite.

The effects of the indulgence of these appetites may be such as to urge men to the perpetration of the most fearful crimes. In such cases men often say; "Rum did the deed," implying that the will was *governed* by the excitement of the liquor.



15. *An argument may be drawn from the Universality of law.*

It must be admitted that every thing in creation is subject to law, unless it be the human will. If the will is not subject to law it is an anomaly, not only in the mind, but also in the universe. The belief of the universality of law is very general, and it seems to be well founded. It is sometimes strikingly and beautifully expressed.

Montesquieu, in his work on the spirit of laws, says, "All beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man, their laws, the beasts their laws, ~~man~~ his laws."

The following passage from Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity has been often admired, for its beauty as well as its truth: "Of law, no less can be said, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage; the very beast as feeling her care the greatest, is not exempted from her power; both angels and men and creatures, of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."

If such is a true view of the universality of law in general, the same is true of the *particular law of creation*. We are so constituted that we necessarily ascribe every effect to some cause. We cannot know or conceive of a dependant or limited object, or event, without feeling that it had a cause. The same principle applies to the human will in all its manifestations. When any wrong act has been committed by a person of our acquaintance, we instinctively inquire "Why did he do it?" "What led him to perpetrate the deed?" We thus assume that some cause influenced or *governed* his will.

The same train of remark would apply also to the *law of uniformity* as witnessed in the operations of nature. But it does not seem to be necessary to pursue the argument on this point farther. The evidence of the subjection of the will to law is not exhausted, but it is believed that what has been advanced is entirely conclusive, and fully establishes the fact, if it can be sustained by evidence. A more full view of the subject may be seen in the work of Professor Upham.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### NATURE OF THE LAWS OF THE WILL, OR MODE OF ITS GOVERNMENT.

The importance of the subject under consideration is so great that it would be improper to dismiss it without some notice of the *mode*, or *manner* of its government, and the nature of its laws. The importance of this subject cannot well be overstated. The following language is not too strong :—

“ If we can predicate law of spiritual existence, or spiritual attributes, or spiritual action, in any case whatever, we can do it equally well of the will of man.— The proposition, therefore, has a distinct and substantive meaning. And as such, it admits of the application of inquiry and argument, and is susceptible of being either affirmed or denied. \* \* \* And if its truth be satisfactorily established, then let it have its full practical effect.

Let us remember, that in this simple proposition we find the golden link, which binds us to the throne of God. If my will is not subject to law, then God is not my master. And what is more, he is not only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so.

But on the other hand, if my will is not independent, in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things, ever attends my path ; and whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I can never annul his authority, or evade his jurisdiction.”\*

The important bearings of the subject evidently demand some farther notice of the laws of the will. It is worthy of remark in the outset, that we may expect to find the laws of the will adapted to its own nature. If in its nature it differs from mere inert and lifeless mat-

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\* Upham on the will.

ter, we may expect its laws to be different from those of matter. This general principle we find every where illustrated as stated by Montesquieu. "The *Deity* has *his* laws, the *material world* its laws, the *intelligences*, superior to man, *their* laws, the *beasts* *their* laws, *man* *his* laws."

In proportion then as we understand the nature and operations of the human will, may we understand the nature of its laws.

#### NATURE AND INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.

It is a common remark that the will is governed by motives. "*We never act without a motive.*" This is the language of experience and common sense. A just view of the nature and influence of *motives* will therefore give us a just view of the laws of the will.

But what are *motives* as connected with the will?—They are, as the name implies, influences fitted to produce *movement*, or action of the will. Whatever has any tendency, either *directly* or *indirectly*, to move the will, may be called a motive. It is then manifest that motives are exceedingly numerous and various.

All the objects around us, which awaken desire or aversion, are, in this sense, motives. All events, circumstances, or appearances, which appeal to any principle in the whole range of our appetites, propensities, passions, or affections, are motives.

But it is equally true that these internal principles are themselves motives. Every form of desire, and every prudential consideration has a tendency to produce volition. The same is true of every feeling of obligation.

There is thus a foundation for a division of motives into classes. One obvious distinction is into *External* and *Internal* motives.

**EXTERNAL MOTIVES.** In this class may be embraced all objects which exist in nature, and which are external to the mind. These become motives by being perceived by the mind, and giving rise to some emotions and desires, aversions or obligatory feelings.

**INTERNAL MOTIVES.** In this class may be embraced all the forms of desire and aversion, and all the obligatory feelings; whether these are occasioned by external objects, or by the processes of thought within the mind itself.

It is worthy of particular notice, in this connection, that what are termed *external* motives, derive their power over the will, from the elements of the mind itself. — They can reach the will only through the Intellect and also through the sensibilities. We must perceive these objects, and have some feelings in relation to them, in order that they should have an effect upon the will.

It is then obvious that all external motives derive their power over the will, in a great measure, from the mind itself. But it is also true that the objects themselves, which we thus call motives, have something in their nature, adapted to the nature of the mind, and fitted to awaken its desires or aversions.

Another division of motives is into those which have reference to the question of right and wrong; and those which have no reference to this question.

Motives which have reference to right and wrong may be termed **MORAL MOTIVES**.

Those which have no regard to morals, or to the principle of rectitude, may be conveniently termed **PERSONAL MOTIVES**; because they generally regard ourselves *personally*, or our personal *interests* and *desires*. This class may perhaps admit of another division, of some importance, which may be designated by the terms **DESIROUS** and **PRUDENTIAL** motives.

I may do a certain thing because I *desire* to do it. But I may desire to do what I am restrained from doing by a *dread* of the consequences. I may be prevented from doing some things which *are not wrong in themselves*, but which would not be *prudent*. Public sentiment, or a regard to my reputation, might lead me to avoid them.

All instances where men are governed by expediency or a regard to consequences, and where the question of right and wrong is left out of view, may be embraced in this class. The motives which govern in these cases may be called *prudential motives*.

It is true that desirous motives may harmonize with those of a *prudential* nature; because men may desire to do only what is prudent. But it is equally true that they may, and frequently do desire, and actually perform, what they know is very imprudent.

#### HOW OR IN WHAT SENSE MOTIVES GOVERN THE WILL.

It is important to understand, so far as we can, the precise province of motives, so as to ascribe to them only their appropriate and actual influence. It may be impossible to do this fully, but a few remarks may aid us in some degree.

There are, as we have seen, in the remarks just made, and also in treating of the sensibilities, different classes of influences in immediate contact with the will, and fitted, in their very nature, to produce voluntary action. But these tendencies may be in different directions.—There is thus a foundation for internal strife, or conflict, as has been before remarked. If in such cases, the will acts at all, it must act in accordance with one or the other of these conflicting tendencies. If desire urges the will in one way, and a regard to consequences urges it in another and opposite direction, the will must act with the one, and against the other, if it acts at all.

So in regard to moral motives. If desire urges me to do what I know is wrong, and feel under obligation to avoid, I must act in accordance with one of these motives, and against the other.

A common explanation of this would be that the will is governed by the motive with which it acts; and this would be called the strongest motive. But it has already been observed that the government of the will is not of the same kind as that relating to matter. We may, in addition to this, state

1. That the government of motives is not such as to destroy the inherent energy of the will. The will has power appropriately its own, as we shall have occasion farther to illustrate; and when it is said that the will is governed by motives, it must not be understood that its power is annihilated by them, or becomes a mere passive engine.

2. The government of motives is not such as destroys the *freedom* of the Will. Freedom, as we shall soon endeavor to show, is as essential to the will as power or government; and its laws are so framed as to recognize its freedom, as really as its existence.

3. All motives are susceptible of some modification—some increase or limitation—from the mind itself; and, indirectly, by the *will* as a department of the mind.—We have had occasion to notice repeatedly the indirect control of the will over the Intellect and the sensibilities.

Motives then are not absolute, independent, and uncontrollable agencies which men have no power to modify or restrain. They may be very energetic and decisive in their action, but they are not such as to annul the freedom, or annihilate the power of the will, unless in cases of disordered mental action.

4. These remarks prepare us, in some measure, to estimate the assumption that the will is *governed*, and *necessarily* governed by the strongest motive.

That motives differ greatly in strength is certainly true; but the question returns, How is this strength to be estimated or ascertained? It is quite certain that what would strongly move one man, to perform a certain act, might not influence another at all; or might even prevent him from performing it.

It is also certain that the same motive which would influence a man at one time, might disgust and offend him at another. It is obvious, then, that if motives are to be estimated by themselves, and apart from the mind which is influenced by them; it is not true that the will is always governed by the strongest motive.

Ten dollars would be a stronger motive, in this sense, than ten cents; but some persons would do for ten cents what others would not do for any amount of money.

Three cents, at one time, would have induced certain persons to sell to an intemperate man a glass of ardent spirits, who now would not sell it at any price.

But there is another difficulty. There are, as we have seen, different classes of motives, and it is difficult to compare and measure those of one class by those of another. How can we measure a feeling of obligation

by any rules of proportion and weight, or estimate it in dollars and cents? How can we compare a desire of wealth or of power with the tooth-ache, so as to say which is the strongest motive?

The answer to all this may be that we are to determine the strength of motives by their *effects*. "*That, it may be said, is the strongest motive which actually controls the will.*"

To this it is replied, that the assumption under consideration is then nothing more or less than *that the will is governed, and necessarily governed by that which governs it*. This, as may be readily seen, is a mere truism—an *identical proposition*—and is worthy of a place by the side of another of some celebrity, viz: "Whatever is, is."

In conclusion, it may be remarked that there is no occasion for the assumption referred to; and that it rather embarrasses than aids discussions of this nature. The more safe and intelligible position is, that, while the human will is, and from its very nature ever must be subject to law, and powerfully influenced by motives, yet it is in connection with these motives, that the *freedom* and the *power* of the will are called into exercise and regulated.

Motives are as essential to the manifestations of its *freedom* and *power*, as they are to its government. Motives therefore must be adapted to these three ends, and so adapted as not to sacrifice one of these attributes in securing another.

It may also be remarked, that both motives and the mind itself, may be so perverted as to produce the most fearful and mischievous exhibitions of human character.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Many unsuccessful attempts have been made to define the term Freedom, as applied to the mind. Four reasons, at least, may be given for this want of success, and for the conflicting opinions which have been exhibited in discussions upon this subject.

1. The term freedom doubtless expresses a *simple mental state*, in distinction from a complex one. It is therefore impossible to give a *verbal definition* of it which shall convey a just idea.

2. It is like other mental states, susceptible of modifications, and may exist in different degrees. It may be increased and diminished by various influences. It may be, in certain cases, overborne, prostrated, or perverted. It is manifest, therefore, that different minds would be apt to define the term Freedom, or have ideas of its nature, much in accordance with their *own* state of Freedom.

3. It is possible, in estimating the freedom of the Will, to overlook its government. Both views, its freedom and subjection to law, are necessary, in order to a right estimate of either.

4. There is also reason to believe that examples are very rare, if ever seen among men, of the highest possible exercise of this freedom. The want of such examples, and of the experience which they unfold, may operate to embarrass our ideas of Freedom.

These difficulties may not, however, be insuperable. Freedom, as it actually exists among men, is a matter of personal and individual consciousness. It is capable of being understood, if it cannot be defined in words. If we cannot see exhibitions of absolute or perfect freedom, we can conceive of it.

There is reason to believe that every person has the idea of Freedom, as distinctly formed as any other sim-



ple idea which depends upon consciousness and suggestion.

It seems necessary that one should have the idea of freedom, in order either to affirm or deny its existence, or any of its modifications.

Without attempting a verbal definition of freedom, we may attend to the circumstances in which it exists, and its relation to other phenomena of mind. Its true import may be better illustrated in this way than by a *verbal* definition.

It has already been made to appear, that,

The freedom of the will does not imply that it is *un*-governed. Its subjection to law has been established by evidence, and its freedom is necessarily such as not to conflict with that doctrine. But this truth may be seen in several particulars.

1. Freedom of the will does not imply that it is unlimited.

There are some things, as already intimated, that the will of man cannot do, or even attempt to do.

2. The freedom of the will is not such that it cannot be influenced by other elements of the mind. Desires and obligatory feelings, as we have seen, are both fitted to influence the will. All the feelings, embracing the appetites, propensities and affections, may have an influence on the will, in its ordinary state of freedom.

3. The freedom of the will is not such that one person can have no influence over another.

It is a fact of common observation and experience, that all who associate are exerting influence upon each other. Parents influence their children; children their parents, and each other. Teachers influence their pupils, and are influenced by them. It is so with all other relations in life. There is a mutual influence of mind upon mind, wherever there is communication of any description.

Nor does this influence *necessarily* destroy or impair freedom. We may be conscious of as high a degree of freedom, in actions which we perform at the request and for the benefit of others, as in any efforts for ourselves.

4. The freedom of the will does not exclude a Divine influence over it.

The Scriptures teach that God exerts an influence over the minds of men, while at the same time they are represented as possessing the elements of freedom. Holiness is represented as a result of Divine influence, and all holy affections are described as the fruits of the Spirit. "*The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us.*"\*

The influence thus exerted on men, does not impair their freedom. Those who exercise holy affections in a high degree, are conscious of as high a state of freedom, to say the least, as when acting from selfish feelings.

5. The freedom of the will is not such that it cannot be impaired, or perverted, and essentially destroyed.

It seems to be one of the conditions of all gifts bestowed on man that they can be perverted. The freedom which is connected with man's moral nature, appears to be such that he can abuse every thing within his reach.

The food designed for our nourishment, the air we breathe, the organs of sensation, the power of speech, of thought and reason, all our propensities and affections can be perverted, in the exercise of our freedom.

It would be singular if the element of freedom itself should not be subject to the same law, and susceptible of similar perversion or prostration. Facts sometimes occur which clearly prove that freedom may thus be impaired, and in various degrees, from that of slight defect to that of entire prostration or slavery.

**WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFECTION OF FREEDOM—OR FREEDOM IN THE ABSOLUTE SENSE ?**

This question is one of great moment, and should be treated with seriousness and care.

1. We may say, in the first place, that there is a necessity for *Harmony* in all the operations and departments of the mind.

Mental harmony is essential to *absolute* mental free-

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\*Romans, 5 : 5.

dom. If some master passion sways men, in opposition to the dictates of reason and conscience, the harmony of the mind is unsettled, and the will borne away. We speak of such a man as the slave of passion.

In all cases where a predominant appetite or propensity leads men to violate conscience, the freedom of the will is, in some measure, injured; and if such a course is persisted in, this freedom is, at length, prostrated.

One man, in this way, becomes a slave to the appetite for strong drink—another to that of opium.

One man is led captive by a desire of wealth; another by the desire of power; another by the desire of applause. Either of the desires, by excessive indulgence, may become predominant, and impair the freedom of the will.

The necessity of mental harmony becomes thus very apparent. One department of the mind must not invade the province of another, or be excessive and inordinate in its action. Each power or faculty must act in harmony with the other, and within its own sphere. Every appetite, propensity and affection must be directed to its own appropriate end, and be exercised within proper bounds.

2. The mind must be in harmony with its Author, in order to secure *perfect* freedom.

This view results from the fact that the mind is not independent and unlimited. If the mind has a Creator—if it is constantly sustained by a power above itself—and is, as we have seen, subject to law—it seems a necessary conclusion that its freedom can be preserved inviolate, only by obedience to law. If God is the Author of the mind, and of the laws which govern it, a violation of these laws must inflict an injury on the mind itself. "*He that sinneth against me, wrongeth his own soul.*"

Such is the language of the Bible; and such is the teaching of Philosophy, when justly interpreted.

The language of the Saviour clearly shows that transgression is at variance with perfect freedom. "Whosoever committeth sin is the *servant* (or slave) of sin."—"Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his *servants* (or slaves) ye are to whom ye obey?" Rom. 6: 16.

He plainly teaches that true freedom is found in obedience to his requirements. "*If ye continue in my words then are ye my disciples indeed, and ye shall know the truth, and THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.*"

This view of freedom enables us to see the necessity of a regulating principle, or affection, which shall secure mental harmony. Such a principle the law of God, and the Gospel of his Son, agree in pointing out. The first and great commandment is, "*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart.*"

Love to God—supreme love—seems to be the proper Affection for the regulation of all the others, and for securing freedom of the will in the highest or absolute sense. Obedience to the second command; "*Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,*" will be comparatively easy if the first is perfectly obeyed.

Love to God represses the inordinate love of self, and kindles up the expansive benevolence which seeks the welfare of a neighbor. It enables him who exercises it to see a neighbor, and a brother, wherever he sees a man; and then the will acts freely and delightfully in the relief of suffering, and the increase of happiness, wherever there is occasion for such action.\*

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\* See Note at the close of the volume.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

**FREEDOM AS IT ACTUALLY EXISTS AMONG MEN.** In the last chapter we have contemplated freedom in its perfect, or absolute sense; as secured by mental harmony, and harmony with God. It may be objected to this course, that it does not meet the question fully, in relation to freedom as it exists among men. It may be said that freedom, in this higher sense, is not uniformly exhibited. The question returns, What is the true doctrine in relation to the Freedom of the Will, as experienced, and exhibited by the common mind, in its ordinary action? Do men generally possess freedom of the Will, in any appropriate sense of the term?

That freedom, like other attributes of the mind, has its limits and modifications, we have seen in the last chapter. That different persons may have and exhibit different degrees of freedom, we might expect as well as that they should differ in any of the mental powers or in bodily stature and strength. But does freedom exist, notwithstanding these diversities? Does every man possess a share of freedom? Several considerations go to show that he does, and that this is one of the original and necessary elements of a rational and moral being.

Before proceeding to state these considerations, we may need to notice another element in the constitution of the mind, which may serve as a controlling principle. That element is the Moral Sense, or Conscience.

There is reason to believe that where supreme love to God reigns in the heart, this affection and conscience are in perfect harmony. But where the love of God is wanting, the conscience still remains; and if not perverted or prostrated by abuse, it serves as a monitor and guide. If conscience is enlightened and obeyed, and all the elements of the mind are in harmony with this, there will be a good degree of mental freedom.\*

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\*The student should here review the relation of the Will to the Sensibilities, Chap. XVII.

If conscience is violated, and its decisions opposed by other mental states, the will, as we have seen, is more or less embarrassed in its action. *Perfect* or *absolute* freedom cannot thus exist. The actual freedom of men is doubtless more or less *modified*, by violations of conscience, but not ordinarily *destroyed*.

The opinions of Bishop Butler, and other distinguished writers, coincide with this view.

"Whoever will consider his own nature, will see that the several appetites, passions, and particular affections, have different respects among themselves; they are restraints upon and are proportioned to each other. This proportion is just and perfect, when all those under principles are perfectly coincident with *conscience*, so far as their nature permits, and in all cases under its absolute and entire direction. The least excess or defect, the least alteration among themselves, or in their coincidence with conscience, though not proceeding into action, is some degree of disorder in the mental constitution."

Dr. Price is still more definite.

"The conscience of a man, is the man; the reflecting principle is our supreme principle. It is what gives our distinction as intelligent creatures; and whenever we act contrary to it, we violate our natures, and are at variance with ourselves. \* \* \* When any one of our instinctive desires assumes the direction of our conduct in opposition to our reason, then *reason* is overpowered and enslaved, and then *we* are overpowered and enslaved. On the other hand, when our reason maintains its rights, and possesses its proper seat of sovereignty within us; when it controls our desires, and directs our actions, so as never to yield to the force of passion, then are we masters of ourselves, and free in the truest possible sense. A person governed by his appetites is most properly a slave. \* \* \* There is but one just authority in the mind, and that is the authority of *conscience*. Whatever *conquers* this, puts us in a state of oppression."

It will be seen that Dr. Price uses the terms reason and conscience as synonymous, as some other able writers have done. This does not necessarily produce confusion if we bear in mind the close connection of conscience

with the reasoning power, and also remember that it is the conscience that is meant by the writers of these extracts, whence the term is used. In the evidences that the will is free, which we now are to examine, it will be kept in mind that it is freedom in this general and modified state that is intended.

#### EVIDENCES OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

1. *From consciousness.* The freedom of our own Will, in the language of Mr. Stewart, "we know by consciousness; and we can have no evidence of any truth so irresistible as this."

Professor Upham asserts that "every man knows himself, in the exercise of volition, to be free. It is a knowledge which we possess not by deduction, but by a species of intuitive conviction; not by inference, but by an original perception."

2. *The power of men to form the abstract idea of Freedom.* This idea of freedom is developed, doubtless, by suggestion. But how could this idea be suggested if there were no experience or consciousness in the soul to give occasion to the suggestion? Can one born blind have a clear idea or conception of light, or colors? Can one who never heard, have a distinct and just conception of sound? No one will pretend this. But as well might they have those ideas without sight or hearing, as to have a distinct conception of Freedom if they had never experienced something of its nature.

3. *Occasional instances of thralldom or slavery of the will confirm the general doctrine of its freedom.* These cases are always the result of some irregular or distorted action of the mind, and afford a contrast to the healthful and natural results. - If a man were to assert, that he was conscious of being in a state of mental slavery, the common sense of men, who believed him, would give him credit for having done violence to his nature. The experience of the great mass of men would set down such a case as an exception to a general law.

It is also worthy of remark, that the assumption itself

implies, that he who makes it, has the *idea* of freedom ; and consequently must have had some experience of it.

4. *The nature and influence of motives imply the freedom of the Will.* The views expressed on this subject in Chap. XXIX, may here be referred to, and examined. Motives furnish the occasions of volitions ; but the nature, as well as the office of motives, is such that the Will is under the necessity of deciding between them, when there are conflicting motives. If desire urges the will in one direction, and a conviction of duty urges it in another, there may be a degree of embarrassment in the action of the will, but there must still be action. The decisions of the will, and the actions which spring from these decisions, are evidences of its freedom.

The will has some power over the motives which influence it. We have it in our power to occupy our minds with one class of motives, and to pass by another class ; and thus, in some degree, control the motives which influence us.

5. *The invitations and requirements of the Scriptures imply that men are free.* Men are invited to trust in God—to be the disciples of Christ—to come to him—to take up the cross and follow him. He holds out encouragements and inducements to men to follow him.—He appeals to the various principles in the human breast, to secure their confidence and love. All such invitations and encouragements imply the freedom of the will, and the possibility of choosing and acting in view of motives.

All the requirements and commands of the Scriptures, and all the warnings and threatenings addressed to men, to restrain or recover them from sin, proceed from the assumption that they have the power of choice.

6. *The general usage of language is based upon the doctrine of human freedom.* All languages have terms expressive of the idea of freedom. We speak of the actions of men as *their own*—the manifestations of their feelings and wishes.

In books, and in grave discussions of all descriptions, the conduct of men is investigated, and is censured or approved as if it were the exhibition—the spontaneous



expression—of a *free will*. It is not to be supposed that this universal and spontaneous usage of language proceeds upon a mistake.

7. *The conduct of men with equal clearness teaches the freedom of the Will.* Their language and conduct, in this respect, coincide.

Parents, in counselling and correcting their children, assume that their conduct is the expression of a will that is free. All rational family government is adapted to the nature of free voluntary agents, and not to the nature of the brute, or of mere inanimate matter.

All attempts at government in civil society, however defective, still afford evidence that the freedom of the will is recognized, as one of the elements of human nature.

All efforts to control or change the opinions, or the practices of others, proceed on the assumption that the will is free to follow the dictates of reason, of duty, or of interest.

8. *The power to suspend a decision of the will is evidence of its freedom.* A farmer, in good circumstances, was requested by a neighbor who was engaged in speculations, to join him in an enterprise which promised rich returns. The prospects were so fair, and presented with so much adroitness, that the farmer was nearly persuaded to embark. Still there was some doubt and hesitancy in his mind, and he concluded to delay his decision till the next evening.

The next evening he had concluded "to let *well enough alone*," and thereby saved his farm and his peace of mind. Had he decided the question the evening before, he would probably have engaged in the speculation, and shared the disappointment and loss it occasioned. His safety was found in his ability to suspend the decision of the will upon that question for twenty-four hours.

In numerous instances persons thus suspend decisions of the will, sometimes with advantage and at others with great damage. Such suspensions of the will's action clearly teach its freedom.

9. *Feelings of approval and disapproval, in view of human conduct, are based on the conviction that the will*

*is free.* If we witness kind and benevolent actions, which are the spontaneous exhibitions of a benevolent heart, we have feelings of approval—If we find that a gift were extorted in any way so as to destroy its voluntary nature, or if an act was evidently performed from selfish motives, we no longer have the feelings of approval which accompany genuine acts of benevolence.

When we witness acts of unkindness and vice, we have strong emotions of disapproval, because we believe the actors are free in their wrong doing. If we ascertain that their freedom was impaired by any causes beyond their control, our estimate of their guilt is essentially modified.

10. *Feelings of obligation also imply the freedom of the will.* We do not feel under obligation to do what we know to be impossible, or what we know to be wrong. Our obligatory feelings thus indicate the freedom of the will, and the ability to attempt what we feel under obligation to perform.

11. *Feelings of self-condemnation and remorse imply the freedom of the will.* We may regret that which we could not avoid, but we do not feel *condemnation* or *remorse* for any act that we could not prevent. Every pang of remorse is evidence of the existence of freedom. We feel in such cases that we could have avoided that for which we feel condemned. It is the voluntary nature of our conduct that gives occasion for remorse and self-condemnation in every act of sin.

12. *Genuine repentance and confession of sin spring from the conviction of freedom.* True penitence is manifested by confession and the abandonment of sin. If men manifest feelings of penitence, and confess and forsake sinful indulgences, we cannot resist the conviction that they were free in the practice of sin, as they are in confessing and forsaking it. This conviction springs from our own experience and consciousness, by which we perceive the nature of sin, and of penitence.

We find this conviction so wrought into our very nature, that when tempted to excuse or palliate any act of sin, because of temptations or provocations, there is still

the consciousness of guilt remaining. It cannot be removed by such palliations or excuses. The spirit must find relief in penitence and confession.

The evidence that the will is free, might be increased, but perhaps no evidence can be more decisive than that which springs up in the consciousness and intuitive perceptions of men.

#### THRALDOM OR SLAVERY OF THE WILL.

The possibility that the freedom of the will may be impaired or destroyed, has been more than once alluded to, but the importance of the subject renders it desirable to refer to it again. It is proper to state that the freedom of the will can be embarrassed, both by influences from without the mind and by the elements of the mind itself. The influences from without, however, act on the will only through some of the elements of the mind. The principal sources of danger are within.

The term slavery or thraldom, as applied to the will, may be as difficult to define as freedom, because it expresses a simple idea ; but some of the causes of it can be stated, which may render its nature apparent.

Sudden appeals to the principle of fear, sometimes paralyze or enslave the will. Some persons, on discovering their dwellings to be on fire, become entirely helpless. They have no power to do any thing for the rescue of their persons or property.

Some have been frightened by ferocious animals, or by sounds or sights, so as to become helpless.

Others have been terrified by the prospect of suffering, at the stake or on the rack, so as to lose their self-control. Others, again, who have not shrunk in view of terrors, have yet been overcome by their sufferings when punishments have been thus cruelly inflicted. Promises have sometimes been extorted in this way, and secrets disclosed, which nothing but real suffering could draw out. A degree of violence is, by such suffering, brought to bear upon the will.

It is also true that either of the appetites, propensities, affections, passions, and prejudices, may be so excited

and increased, as to bear disastrously upon the will and make man a slave.

The appetite for intoxicating drinks may be so excited that it prostrates reason and conscience, and all the domestic affections; and the will becomes its grovelling slave.

Inordinate ambition may enslave the will, and expend its energies in scenes of carnage and blood.

Prejudice may become an unreasonable tyrant, and employ the human will in the most servile and debasing actions.

Anger, in some of its various modifications, may become the ruling despot, and the will must do its dreadful work of cruelty or revenge.

But it is unnecessary to specify more particulars; the necessity of guarding the freedom of the will by a just discipline, balance, and harmony of all the mental powers, cannot be too deeply felt.

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## CHAPTER XXXII.

### POWER OF THE WILL.

The Power of the will has been necessarily involved, in the examination of its government and freedom; but it still deserves a separate consideration. There is reason to believe that embarrassment has sometimes been occasioned in discussions pertaining to the will, by confounding the elements of freedom and of power—as if there were no distinction to be made between them. Freedom and power are so commonly associated, in the action of the will, that it is not singular they should have been confounded.

The distinction is, however, easily perceived. A child may have as perfect freedom of the will as a man, but his will is feeble in its action, compared with that of the man.

The will may have terrific power in a man, when its freedom has been well nigh destroyed. In marked instances, where violence has been done to the freedom of the will, as in cases of insanity, or of the dominion of passion, there may be exhibitions of voluntary power of the most desperate character.

It is evident that power and freedom, as attributes of the will, are distinct from each other, from the fact that we naturally form the abstract idea of power, as readily as freedom, in this connection. The action of the will suggests the existence of the one element as decisively as the other.

But it is still true, that these two attributes of the will modify each other, and both freedom and power are essential to the completeness of character which every person should desire.

That the will has power, is evident from several considerations.

1. FROM ANALOGY. The mind, as a whole, certainly has the attribute of power in a high degree. What power can a human being exhibit that does not emanate from the mind? The body is a mere instrument of the mind. When severed from the mind, the body has no power, but is an inert mass, subject to influences over which it can have no control.

It might be said that there is no power in existence but that of mind. There is abundant evidence that every created thing is a result of mental power. "There is no power but of God," and yet the universe is full of its manifestations.

The human mind is one of the striking exhibitions of Divine power, and is itself endowed with something analogous to that which gave it being. Each mind has a share of power, and the exhibitions of that power are manifest wherever human beings exist.

But if this is true of the whole mind, it must be true of the Will, as one of its departments.

2. FROM EXPERIENCE AND OBSERVATION. We witness exhibitions of the power of the human mind in the arts and sciences, and in all the employments and intercourse of men. But no department of the mind furnishes more striking exhibitions of power than the Will. The highest efforts of genius,—the profoundest reasonings,—the strongest influences which man exerts upon his fellows, exhibit the power of the Will as strikingly as they do of the Intellect.

One of the most marked differences we discover among men, is the diversity of voluntary power. This difference is often exhibited by young children in the same family. One is easily controlled, and yields readily to the will of the parent. Another has a will of his own, and yields it with great reluctance.

In every stage of life—in all the employments of men; among the ignorant and the learned—the rich and the poor,—in public and responsible stations, and in the most obscure and humble walks,—we discover this marked diversity in the energy of the will. But this diversity could not be thus exhibited, if power were not an attribute of the will.

3. FROM CONSCIOUSNESS. If consciousness is a ground of belief on any subject, it is on this. We are conscious of volitions as well as of desires, or mental states, of any description. We know by consciousness that our volitions differ greatly in strength, and that they sometimes have a wonderful energy. We as well know that we have strong volitions, as that we have strong feelings, or intense thoughts. We are sometimes ready to attempt enterprizes which involve great energy of the will, and a long succession of voluntary acts. Our confidence, in attempting any such enterprize, involves a conviction of the energy or power of the will. We rely upon that power as confidently as on any element of the mind that we possess.

4. FROM THE POWER TO FIX ATTENTION UPON A PARTICULAR SUBJECT. We examine a subject by fixing attention upon it; but this is done by a voluntary act, or a succession of such acts. It may be admitted that the attention is not always equally under the control of the

will, but it is so far a result of voluntary effort as to demonstrate that the will has power.

5. FROM POWER TO SUPPRESS THE SIGNS OF SUFFERING. Some have been able to endure the most cruel tortures with calmness and serenity of countenance. The energy of soul which thus endures, and which holds in check the signals of distress, resides essentially in the will. Other elements of the mind have their influence, in directing and sustaining the voluntary power, in such emergencies, but there must be inherent strength in the will itself.

6. FROM THE CONTROL WHICH MEN HAVE OVER THEIR APPETITES, PROPENSITIES AND PASSIONS. If men are sometimes enslaved by vice, it is also true that in some circumstances those addicted to excessive indulgence of vicious habits, will suppress these with great decision.

The man whose habits of profaneness have become desperate, will, in the presence of some persons, refrain from it entirely.

The passionate man will, in some circumstances, suppress and conceal his anger, and wear a serene countenance.

The victim of intemperance will sometimes hold his appetite in check for weeks or months, and then return to its indulgence with more destructive energy.

Still more interesting exhibitions of this power of the will, are seen in the permanent control which is gained over the appetite for intoxicating liquors. The Temperance Reform has illustrated this energy of the will, in multitudes of cases, where it had been apparently prostrated and enslaved.

7. FROM THE PROSECUTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GREAT ENTERPRISES. This is illustrated in all departments of human effort.

The discovery of America by Columbus, after all his preliminary struggles and perplexity, exhibits great strength of purpose, or voluntary power.

The overthrow of the slave trade by the efforts of Clarkson, Wilberforce and their associates, exhibits great energy of the will. The discouragements and dis-

appointments, which held them from this result for twenty years, could not turn them from their purpose.

The efforts of John Howard, to explore the prisons of Europe, and relieve the sufferings of their inmates, indicate great energy of the voluntary power.

In scenes of war and conquest, we witness great energy of the will exhibited by a Hannibal, a Scipio, an Alexander, a Cæsar, and a Napoleon.

The student, in the silence of night and retirement of his solitary chamber, sometimes exhibits a noble energy, which in the end secures the happiest results. Martin Luther exhibited this energy while pursuing his studies in the solitude of a monastic cell, as really as when proclaiming and defending the doctrine of the Reformation.

Saul of Tarsus evidently exercised power of the will, in treasuring up knowledge while a student of Gamaliel, as really as when pursuing the work of persecution ; or when proclaiming the gospel which he had labored to destroy.

#### DIVERSITIES OF VOLUNTARY POWER.

The differences among men in the power of the will have been briefly alluded to, and deserve a more particular attention. There are differences undoubtedly in this respect, in the original structure of minds. It is reasonable to suppose there are differences of this nature in the mind, as there are in all other parts of creation.

Seldom do we meet with two objects in nature precisely alike. It is not often that we meet with two persons who precisely resemble each other in their forms, features or complexions. There is probably as much diversity in mental constitution, as in external appearances.

If this is true of the mind in general, it is doubtless true of the will in particular. We notice this difference in the earliest days of infancy, and through all the later periods of life.

Education also produces differences in the power of the will, as really as it does of the intellect, or any of its faculties. In some instances the will remains unchecked and unregulated ; and, under the guidance and impulse of violent passion, it acquires a power that is fearful.



There are other cases where the energies of the will are repressed, by undue severity of discipline ; and the whole character suffers a damage from which it never recovers.

There are also cases where a judicious discipline has imparted strength, and vigor, to a will originally weak, and secured a well balanced character, when, by a different course of discipline, serious defects would have been perpetuated.

The differences of voluntary power do not always correspond with the differences of intellectual and sentient power. A person may have an energetic will, and at the same time a strong developement of the Intellect, and the Sensibilities, to balance it. Reason and conscience, and the benevolent affections, may be so vigorous, that nothing is to be feared from the most energetic voluntary power.

But there may also be an energetic will joined with violent passions and propensities, with but feeble restraints of reason and conscience to regulate its action.

There may be a vigorous intellect without a corresponding energy of conscience, and the benevolent affections ; and then the action of the will may be violent, eccentric, and injurious.

There may be strongly developed intellectual powers, and an equal degree of benevolent feeling, and moral sentiment, while there is a deficiency of voluntary power. The will may be too feeble to carry out the decisions of reason and conscience. It is sometimes said of such an one that " he is a very good man, but he has *no force of character*."—" He has mind enough, but is *wanting in energy*." Examples of this description may be met with frequently in history, and also in the common walks of life.

In some, the energy of the will is most remarkably displayed in a patient endurance of hardship or suffering ; in others, by self-possession, firmness, or decision, in maintaining a position in the face of danger and difficulty ; in others, by rapid and vigorous execution of every purpose : in others still, by patient perseverance, that

progresses more slowly, but never tires or falters till the purpose is accomplished.

#### SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL.

It would be improper to leave this subject without some notice of a question which has been so often debated as that relating to the self-determining power of the will. If the phenomena of the will are, as we have supposed, so extensively matters of experience and observation, it may, at first, seem strange that some should confidently affirm, and others deny, that the will has a self-determining power. The mystery, however, may possibly be solved, or at least, the difficulties attending the discussion may be perceived.

There are two questions, which are sometimes confounded in this discussion, which ought to be kept distinct.

1. Has the mind, as a whole, a self-determining power?
2. Has the will, as a department of the mind, a self-determining power?

If the first of these questions should be answered in the affirmative, it would not follow that the second might be. Each must stand on its own merits.

It might, however, be urged, that if the mind, as a whole, has the power of self-determination, the will itself, as a department of the mind, must have *its share of this power*. It is a matter of fact, that men do sometimes change their opinions, purposes, and practices; it seems necessary, therefore, to conclude that they have power thus to change; and that the mind has, either within itself, or within its reach, the power of self-determination. A single example may illustrate this.

A person may have formed the habit of profane swearing, and become so confirmed in it, that oaths seem to be as familiar as the use of language. He may feel no special compunction in the use of them.

He can, however, fix his attention upon the habit, as a matter of examination. He can think upon it, and consider attentively its advantages and disadvantages.

He can learn the opinions of virtuous men in regard to it; he can see what is said of it in the Scriptures, and

how God regards it; he can interrogate his own conscience, and his sense of propriety; and keep the question before him, whether it be a good and right practice.

Such reflections have a direct tendency to produce emotions and feelings of obligation, to break up the habit referred to. Few persons could thus reflect upon such a habit, without feeling that it ought to be abandoned.

These feelings of obligation, and perhaps also motives of interest, have an influence upon the will, and may result in permanent reformation.

Such instances have frequently occurred, and they demonstrate the fact that the power of originating determinations, and changes of purpose, belongs to men. But they do not show that a self-determining power belongs to the will. In the case supposed, the change was not secured by a mere volition. The power of thought, and feeling, was necessary to a change of purpose and of life. The Intellect and the Sensibilities were as really concerned as the Will, in producing the change.

It may be true that the change of conduct would not have occurred, but for the acts of the will which fixed attention upon the habit; but it may also be true that this attention and reflection, would have produced no change, if there had been no corresponding action of the sensibilities.

Emotions or feelings of obligation, or motives of some sort, must have come to act upon the will, with increasing power, or the habit would have still continued. So that it might as well be asserted that there is a self determining power of the Intellect, or of the Sensibilities, as of the Will.

It is also interesting to notice, that in such cases of reformation, resulting from deliberate reflection, there is usually some influence lying back of that action of the will which fixed the attention. There was perhaps a word of counsel, or a recollection of early counsels which had been unheeded; or there was some inconvenience or uneasiness arising from the habit in question, which secured the act of the will and directed the attention to this investigation.

It may be seen thus that the action of the will is always connected with the action of other departments of the mind. This view is in perfect accordance with the idea of the unity of the mind, and the mutual dependance of all its departments. The will has power appropriately its own, but it is not an independent power; it is such as admits of increase or decrease from the other elements of the mind. In all instances of self-determination, there is involved the action of other departments of the mind, as really as of the will; so that a self-determining power of the will seems impossible. All that can be claimed, is, that it has its share of power, in common with the other departments.

It is doubtless true that the share of power properly belonging to the will, in distinction from the other departments, differs in different persons; but it would be a strange mind indeed that had all its energy centred in the will; so that no modifications of volition or of action were occasioned by the intellect and the sensibilities.

## CONCLUSION.

In drawing these discussions to a close, several considerations are naturally urged upon us.

1. The extent and importance of the study here entered upon. It must be felt by all who have gone over these pages, that they have only just commenced a study which may well claim some portion of their attention through life. The study of more extended treatises, and especially those of Professor Upham, is earnestly recommended. But the study must be pursued by a careful attention to our own mental states, and the exhibitions of mind we meet with in the intercourse of life. Every human being we meet with, may give us lessons in this study.

2. The necessity of studying the *disordered action of the mind*, as well as its natural and healthful action. We should not hesitate to study character, however irregular and eccentric it may seem. The strongest specimens of human nature we meet with, may afford us important instruction. The Annual Reports of our Insane Hospitals, afford some important lessons in Mental Philosophy.

The most valuable work, known to the writer on this subject, is the small volume of Professor Upham on *Disordered Mental Action*. A work of Dr. Rush on *Diseases of the Mind*, may also be read with interest.

3. The necessity of properly disciplining the mind. It must be evident that all departments of the mind admit of the influence of education. The Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will, alike demand the influence of cultivation. The Affections, the Moral Sense, and the Will, have been too much overlooked in systems of education; and the Intellect has suffered from this error, as really as from the neglect of intellectual culture.

The discipline of the Will is one of the most interesting departments of education, as it involves the cultivation of all those elements which act upon the will. We cannot cultivate and regulate the voluntary power justly, unless all the other departments are so regulated, that no appetite, propensity, affection, or passion shall transgress its proper bounds, or act inordinately. All must be in harmony with each other, and in harmony with conscience; or the Will must experience more or less of embarrassment, and the life and character be proportionately defective. Our object, in all investigations of this nature, should be to gain practical wisdom in the formation of character, and the discharge of duty. Impressed with the exalted nature, and the high responsibilities of a rational and immortal mind, we should desire to know and train its capacities in such a manner as shall best display the glory of its Creator.

## NOTE.

We see the union of freedom and of mental harmony strikingly illustrated in the life and language of the Saviour. "I came down from heaven not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me." "I have meat to eat that ye know not of." "It is my meat to do the will of my Heavenly Father and to finish his work."

His life accorded with this language—He went about doing good—He endured persecution, abuse and insult in every aggravated form, that he might do good to men. His object was to bring the guilty and the lost to be reconciled to God, that they might be saved. His love was stronger than death. The full prospect of its cruel agonies on the cross, could not quench his love or restrain his efforts for human welfare. He died by wicked hands, breathing out the same ardent love for man—even for his murderers.

His desire for their reconciliation did not cease, even when overwhelmed with suffering and sorrow. It was exhibited affectingly in the prayer which burst from his lips amid the agonies of death—"Father, forgive them, they know not what they do."

But his love for man was not more apparent than his regard for the Divine Will. In the garden of Gethsemane, when the dreadful sufferings which he was soon to endure were distinctly before him, and his "soul was exceeding sorrowful even unto death," he prayed, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me, nevertheless not as I will but as thou wilt." "If this cup may not pass from me except I drink it, *thy will be done.*"

He firmly took that bitter cup and drank its very dregs, and thus exhibited harmony with God and ardent love

for man. He thus appealed in tender accents to the hearts of men, at the same time that he opened a way for their approach to God. He gave to the world a noble comment on that prayer which he taught his disciples ; "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." His sufferings and death furnished the very arguments which should persuade men to be reconciled to God, and secure their harmony with him, without doing violence to the freedom of the human Will.

The Saviour, at the same time, exhibited a perfect example of that freedom of the will secured by mental harmony, and by harmony with God. His whole life exhibited this. The most subtle temptation had not power to enslave his will, or draw him from his purpose.—There was no element in his nature that could do violence to his freedom, or prompt him to one wrong action.

The most aggravated abuse was repaid by love. The spirit of compassion was gushing forth from his heart for human woes, even where those woes were occasioned by the wilful crime of the sufferer.

Yet this compassion was not such as to prevent or embarrass the freedom of the will, in the exercise of justice, or of duty. When duty required him to rebuke transgressors and denounce woes upon them, he did so with unshrinking fidelity.

When the dictates of eternal justice demanded the overthrow of Jerusalem, the beloved city, for the incorrigible transgression of its inhabitants, he could declare its coming ruin with unfaltering voice. With a heart full of tenderness, and his eyes flowing with tears, he could view the devoted city, whose children he would have gathered with parental tenderness, and still announce the coming doom—"Behold your house is left unto you desolate." "There shall not be left here one stone upon another which shall not be thrown down."

Nor did he shrink from the execution of this threatening. Before a generation passed, as we have already seen, he sent into the temple executioners, famine, pestilence, fire, and sword, and laid the city in ruins. In the exercise of mercy, and of judgment, the freedom and energy of his will were equally manifest.



No one element in his nature could displace or enslave another, or prevent its appropriate exercise. In him was no sin, and in the elements of his being there was no discord—nothing to disturb the harmony of the mind—and nothing to embarrass its freedom.

We have thus before us one vivid illustration—one perfect example of mental freedom which can be studied with advantage. In proportion as we become like him, shall we experience something like the same freedom.

If we become united to him by affection, as the branch is united to the vine by its natural connection, this cord which holds us thus in harmony, shall draw us to a state of higher freedom than any selfish interest or personal effort can secure. “If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.” His service is the highest freedom that the soul can find.

# QUESTIONS

TO

## YOUTH'S BOOK ON THE MIND.

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### NOTE TO THE TEACHER.

QUESTIONS are prepared to this work, at the desire of the publisher, in accordance with the wishes of teachers whose judgment is respected. They are designed to *aid* teachers, not to supersede their efforts. It is not to be supposed that all the questions are written, which might be useful. Many may be added by the judicious teacher, which shall assist the pupil in understanding more fully the principles involved. Many illustrations of the various mental phenomena may be brought from the experience and observation of the pupils, and many may be furnished by the teacher. It is believed the questions here submitted, are sufficiently full to enable any *competent* teacher to conduct a class with pleasure and profit, both to teacher and pupils. It is believed that in nearly every common school, a class may pursue this study with great and lasting benefit, if this book, with the questions, is fairly used. The teacher should require the class frequently to review previous lessons. It is well, at each recitation, to review the previous one. At the close of each general department, the whole ground, previously gone over, should be carefully reviewed. In such reviews, questions should be varied, and the pupil required to give the substance of the lessons, without being aided by all the particular questions.

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### CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTION.

What is said of the Study of the Mind? How does it compare with other studies? What considerations show its importance? What is the first benefit stated as resulting from this study? The second—The third—The fourth—The fifth—The sixth—The seventh?

### CHAPTER II.—THE MIND.

Can we study the Mind in the same way as we do material objects? By what can we know it? What are some of its acts? May we speak of various mental *powers* or *faculties*? Does this

imply that the mind has various divisions or parts, like a material object? Does the admission of various mental acts and faculties deny the unity of the mind? Or, to study the mind, as a whole, should we examine its acts separately? What three things are necessary, to study the mind with advantage? What general division was formerly made by philosophers in the departments of the mind? What is a more convenient division? What mental states and faculties are in the first division—In the second—In the third? What may we call the first class,—The second—The third? What three terms may express the three departments?

### CHAPTER III.—THE INTELLECT.

What department may we study with advantage first? Why? In performing any operation, what is first necessary? What next? What next? Do we always notice the mental process? What two sources of knowledge has the Intellect? What two methods of acquiring it? What term is applied to knowledge of objects around us? What to the knowledge of the mind, within itself? Does the term External Intellect, imply that any part of the mind is external? Why then is the term used? What kind of knowledge do we gain first; that of objects around us, or of the mind? Have we more than one way of gaining knowledge of objects? How does a child early show signs of noticing objects? What term is given to the feelings which objects of sight occasion? What term expresses the feelings produced by hearing? What are the feelings produced by touching an object? What feelings arise from tasting an object? What from smelling? Name the five senses, and their uses. What name is applied to the eyes, ears, and other channels by which we gain sensations? Can we remember when we began to use these organs? Could we begin to reason or remember, before we gained any knowledge by the senses? Does a child know many things before he can call their names?

### CHAPTER IV.—PERCEPTION.

What faculty of mind is nearly related to Sensation? Has it been difficult for persons to distinguish them? Give the first illustration of the distinction. Give the second illustration. Give the illustration from the Æolian Harp. Give an illustration of the perception of taste. Give the example of perception of touch. State the difference between Sensation and Perception. Would sensation alone often mislead us? Can we acquire a great amount of knowledge by sensation and perception? What does knowledge thus gained afford? How does knowledge reach the mind through the senses? Can we discover the mind by the senses? Has the brain any connection with the acquisition of knowledge? How does this appear? How does an injury of the brain affect the mind? Does excessive or wrong use of the mind, affect the

- brain? What general conclusion then follows, in relation to the connection of the mind with the brain?

## CHAPTER V.—KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

Can we know how much knowledge is gained by the senses? Is it necessary? Is the sense of smell among the most important? What should we lose, if deprived of the sense of smell? Mention some of its specific uses. How may it be improved? In what circumstances? Is the sense of taste more or less important than sight? What does its proper use afford? What other sense does it assist? Mention its uses in chemistry. When did we learn to distinguish objects of taste? What is said of the sense of touch? Does it assist other senses? What do we learn by touch? How does it appear that the form of objects is first learned by the touch? Give the illustration from persons born blind, who have been restored to sight. The illustration from a painting. A bird in the air. Objects seen in the fog or mist. Objects upon the ocean or across a river. Persons standing in the door of a church. Is there evidence that the experience which enables us to judge, by sight, of the size and distance of objects, was first gained by touch? How is the sense of touch greatly improved? What illustration of this, in blind persons?

## CHAPTER VI.—KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

What are we able to perceive by the sense of hearing?—To share?—To gain? What is said of sound in the natural world? If the sense of hearing is improved by exercise, what can we distinguish? Do persons born deaf, learn to talk? Do children, who become deaf after learning to talk, ever lose the power of speech? What is said of the blind in the Institutions for their instruction? Do we learn to judge of the distance and direction of sounds, by the sense of hearing? Is this an original or an acquired capacity? Of what is the sense of sight an extensive source? What are some of the objects of which we gain knowledge by sight? Do we acquire the power of judging of the size and form of objects, by sight? How can the eye be improved? What is the use of a well-trained eye? Can the eye be aided to see distant and also minute objects? *What instrument aids in viewing the stars and other distant objects? What aids in examining very small objects?*

## CHAPTER VII.—IMPROVEMENT OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

How may the powers of the body and mind be improved, and how injured? What is the first truth stated on this subject?—

The second—The third—The fourth—The fifth? If the organs of sensation are improved, what is the effect upon the sensations and perceptions? How are habits of sensation and perception formed? What is the effect of good habits, thus formed? What is the first thing necessary, in securing right habits?—The second—The third—The fourth?

## CHAPTER VIII.—MENTAL STATES ARISING FROM SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

What is said of the knowledge derived from the senses? How does this knowledge secure an increase of knowledge? What are some of the mental states which arise in connection with sensation and perception? Describe attention. Is it in any degree voluntary? Can all persons fix their attention at pleasure? State some instances of diversity in the power of attention. What is said of Julius Cæsar? Bonaparte? President Dwight? On what does the difference in the power of attention depend? What reason is there for cultivating the power of attention? What is the process of reflection? On what does the power of reflection, and increase of knowledge by it, depend? What are ideas? What two classes of ideas are mentioned? Define a complex idea. Does the word tree, express a simple or complex idea? Mention some of its parts. Can a simple idea be divided? Can it be defined by words? Can we understand it, and distinguish a simple idea? What is the mental process in abstraction? Illustrate it in the case of color. What are the uses of abstraction? What is the process of classification? Illustrate it, in relation to the weight and lustre of metals. Give examples of general abstract ideas. How do we form groups or classes, so as to have ideas of species, genera, &c.? Are classifications always correct? Give the first example. Give the illustration on Pitcairn's Island. Give the one furnished by Captain Cook.

## CHAPTER IX.—CONCEPTION.

What other states of mind do conceptions resemble? Give the author's illustration of conception. How do conceptions differ from sensations and perceptions? How do they differ from recollections? In what respects are conceptions useful? Illustrate their use in reference to objects of sight. What is said of blind persons? Of Milton? Of conceptions of sound? Of Beethoven? Of the effect of music? Of conceptions of touch, taste, and smell? Can the conceptions be improved? What are their use, when thus cultivated? Do conceptions ever produce momentary belief? Give the first example. What is said of Sir Joshua Reynolds? Of a little boy? Are conceptions ever joined with perceptions? Give an illustration. Can ghost stories be sometimes thus explained? What is said of fictitious representations?

## CHAPTER X.—DREAMING.

Define dreaming? What other mental states do dreams resemble? What are conceptions sometimes called? With what are dreams frequently connected? Give an illustration. What is said of Condorcet? Of Franklin? What do we learn from the Scriptures in relation to dreams? What is said of President Edwards? Give the author's illustration of dreams occasioned by sensations. What is said of a French Officer? What may cause us to dream of walking on hot sands, or coals, or on a volcano? Are dreams always coherent? What is the first reason assigned for their incoherency? Are some of the senses partially awake in dreams? What other cause of incoherency is named? Do we ever have any degree of voluntary control over our limbs, in dreaming? May there be also an irregular or imperfect control over our thoughts in dreaming? Do dreams ever appear real? What illustrations of this are furnished by children? Do dreams strongly affect the feelings? What illustration is given by the author? What is said of Incubus, or night-mare? What is the first reason assigned for the apparent reality of dreams? The second reason? What is said of efforts to reason away this apparent reality, while dreaming? Do we accurately measure time in dreaming? What is said of this? Give the quotation from Prof. Upham. Is it supposed that waking thoughts are ever as rapid as dreams? Why then does time seem so long in dreams? What is Somnambulism? What example is given by the author? What is said of a farmer? What do such cases prove? What opinion do such examples confirm? What is said of the experiments made by Cabanis?

## CHAPTER XI.—INTERNAL INTELLECT.

What other sources of knowledge has the mind? What opinions have been advocated by philosophers, on this point? Do writers agree as to the extent of knowledge thus gained? Do all classify these internal states alike? Does the author propose to go into these controversies? What is his object in the work? Where do we find the beginnings of knowledge? To what does knowledge, thus secured, give rise? What difficulty does the close connection between external and internal knowledge occasion? What mental states have been already named, as belonging to the internal intellect, but which take their rise from sensation and perception? (See p. 20.) What others are here mentioned? Do we know with certainty that we believe, disbelieve, doubt, or deny a statement? How do we gain this knowledge? How can you define consciousness? What three ideas are embraced or assumed in every instance of consciousness? Is there any room for mistake in the interpretation or recognition of consciousness? How does this appear? In what cases may consciousness mislead us? What is said of its natural or health-

ful action? Are we warranted in believing truths discovered by consciousness, as fully as those discovered by the senses? What is said of objects of consciousness? Of what are we said to be conscious, in the first period? In the second—The third—The fourth—The fifth—The sixth?

### OBJECTS NOT KNOWN BY CONSCIOUSNESS.

What is stated in the first period, as not known by consciousness? In the second—The third—The fourth?

## CHAPTER XII.—SUGGESTION.

What facts does the term Suggestion, express? What two terms are used to express the two things? What does Original Suggestion express? Illustrate its use in regard to external objects—In relation to the mind. How does consciousness stand related to suggestion? Illustrate this. What is the first thing specified, as known by suggestion? The second—The third—The fourth? Illustrate this in relation to Personal Existence and Identity. What is the fifth thing specified? Illustrate it. The sixth—Illustrate it. The seventh—Illustrate it. The eighth—Illustrate it. The ninth—Illustrate it. The tenth—Illustrate it. The eleventh—Illustrate it. The twelfth—Illustrate it. The thirteenth—Illustrate it. The fourteenth—Illustrate it. The fifteenth—Illustrate it. The sixteenth—Illustrate it. The seventeenth—Mention particulars, and give the illustration. The eighteenth—Give the illustration of the first principle. Give the principle suggested, where means are conspiring to produce a result. What is said in relation to laws of matter and of mind? What in relation to every purely simple idea? To what are those ideas sometimes ascribed, instead of suggestion? What reason is given for preferring the term Suggestion?

## CHAPTER XIII.—RELATIVE SUGGESTION.

With what does suggestion often stand connected? With what are perceptions or feelings of relation concerned? Are relations numerous? Illustrate this in reference to objects of sight. With reference to objects of sound. Is the same thing true of objects of taste, touch, and smell? Illustrate with respect to objects of touch—Of taste. Does the same principle apply to the objects of the internal intellect? Illustrate this in relation to trains of thought—Emotions—Volitions. What relative idea is suggested by the term Father? By the term wife—Husband—Child—Brother—Sister—Cousin—Uncle—Nephew? What kind of relation is expressed by each of these terms? What relation is suggested by the term President—Governor—General—Captain—Judge—King—Emperor—Dictator—Deliverer—Oppressor? What parts of speech in language express relation? [*Let the teacher here require the pupils to name all the different terms they*

*can think of to express family or blood relations, and so of all the other classes enumerated in the same paragraph.]* What is said of a man who is skilful in perceiving and tracing relations, and coming to right conclusions?

## CHAPTER XIV.—ASSOCIATION.

What is the term Association used to express? Will one idea suggest the same train of associations to all minds? Will it secure the same trains, at all times, to the same mind? Illustrate this in respect to China. Illustrate the idea as connected with the price of tea. If associations are various, are they wholly arbitrary, or accidental? What is the first primary law named? Illustrate it. What does resemblance in dress sometimes cause? What may call up a departed friend, on the principle of resemblance? Does a resemblance of tones of voice call up an absent person? Must resemblance extend to all particulars, to call up associations? What is the second primary law named? What effect is produced by seeing a blind person? What occurs if we see one in deep sorrow? By seeing poor, ill-clad children? What is the third primary law named? Illustrate this. What may the recollection of our early school days occasion? What is the fourth primary law? Do causes lead us to think of effects, as well as effects to think of causes? What do we associate with the stumps of forest trees? A razor?

## CHAPTER XV.—SECONDARY LAWS.

Can the diversity in trains of association be accounted for, in any degree? What is the first circumstance, or secondary law, that causes diversity? Illustrate it. The second? Illustrate it. The third? Illustrate this in relation to common labors—In the love of a mother for a child. Give the instance of the death of a child. What is the fourth law or circumstance named? Give the first illustration. How is this principle exhibited in the case of an aged slave? What is the fifth law? Illustrate it. What apparent exception is there to this law? Is this exception real? How can it be explained? What is the first cause of this strength of early recollection? What is the second cause—The third? Why are the laws of association, in the second class, called *secondary laws*? What is the first example named, of casual association? What is the second—The third—The fourth—The fifth?

## CHAPTER XVI.—MEMORY.

With what other mental states is memory connected? Define memory. How is it modified? Is memory a safe ground of belief? Do we remember all events alike? Do all persons remember the same particulars, when witnessing the same scenes?



Why is this? What is said of the strength of memory? Give the first illustration—The second. What is said of a Roman orator? Of remembering persons? Of remembering minute particulars? What kind of memory is this called? Illustrate what is called a philosophic memory. Which is the more useful? Can the two kinds of memory be united? Is there such a thing as intentional recollection? How is this effected? Can we aid recollection by reasoning? How? Illustrate intentional recollection in children. What three things are necessary to a good memory? What is the defect in some persons, as to the first of these? What in relation to the second—The third? Can memory be improved? What is the first step? What injury results from neglecting this? How can this object be gained in relation to objects of sense? Illustrate this by a musical instrument. In relation to directions in a journey. How is it with facts in geology, mineralogy, &c.—With plants—Facts in natural philosophy—Geography and history? What is the effect of exercise? Illustrate it. What is the fourth thing mentioned, as improving the memory—The fifth—The sixth? What is said of artificial memory? What is supposed by some in relation to the duration of memory? What is said of persons recovered from drowning—Inflammation of brain? State the case described by Dr. Flint. What other instances are mentioned? What inferences have Mr. Coleridge, and other writers, drawn from such facts? How do these considerations compare with declarations of the Bible, in reference to a day of judgment? What caution do these facts afford, in relation to the treatment of young minds? What encouragement do they afford? What is said of a father's counsels and a mother's prayers?

## CHAPTER XVII.—IMAGINATION.

With what is imagination connected? How may it be regarded? Is its influence on reasoning always safe? What is imagination? Is it a simple or a complex state? What mental states are embraced in efforts of imagination? With what is it attended ordinarily? With what is it sometimes confounded? Does it belong to the Intellectual or the Sentient department? Illustrate the processes of imagination in the painter. What are the four things noticed in this process? To what other art does this process apply? What poem is mentioned as an example? What is said of the design and outlines of this poem? What kept his attention upon the plan and outlines? What do the scenes described show? What was previously necessary, in order to describe such a garden? What is supposed to be the effect of becoming blind, on his descriptions? Why could the imagination produce the more perfect picture, for his being blind? Are selections which the mind makes in a picture of imagination, wholly arbitrary? How does it appear that they are not? What, in such pictures or descriptions, displays the gifted and cultivated mind? What seems to be the utility of imagination? What two

courses have been pursued in relation to it? The effect of these courses? What is the true view? What is necessary, in view of its tendency to perversion? What is said of its right use? How does it affect human happiness? What is its use in teaching? What is said of the preacher—The writer—The composer of music—Of reasoning—Forensic debate? In what book do we discover marked exhibitions of imagination?

## CHAPTER XVIII.—THE SENSES.

Why is reasoning reserved for the closing subject in this department? How are important results brought out by reasoning? What is its range? Of what is a train of reasoning made up? What is said of the propositions employed? Of antecedent propositions? What is a proposition? How many general departments of reasoning? How do they differ? What is that called, which uses the methods of demonstration? What does moral reasoning embrace? What is embraced under the head of demonstrative reasoning? What can we demonstrate? What does every problem embrace? The things given, with which to begin the demonstration, are called what? What is said of arithmetic? What do we find when numbers are added? What when one is subtracted from another? When multiplied by another? When divided by another? Can we have a large number of terms, and of results to be reached in mathematical questions? What is said of Geometry? Of the use of triangles, circles, &c.? What can thus be determined, in relation to distant objects? What is said of the astronomer? What is true of the results of demonstrative reasoning? What is the opposite of the results of demonstration? What is the first benefit mentioned, of demonstrative reasoning—The second—The third? What is said of the general use of demonstrative reasoning? What is the ground or reason of the first caution in regard to its use? The second reason? What is said of a student? The third reason—The fourth? Are these *necessary results* of mathematical reasoning? How may such tendencies be avoided? May one kind of reasoning aid us in the other? In what does moral reasoning differ from demonstrative? What five things are there, common to both? What is the first named difference? What are conclusions, entirely satisfactory, sometimes called? What terms express some of the different degrees of belief? How is this manifest in Courts of Justice? What is the second difference stated? Illustrate this. What is the first method of reasoning mentioned? Illustrate the example of a dwelling. What results can we reach in this way, by examining the works of creation? On what *assumed* propositions does this reasoning depend? What is this reasoning called? The second method? Illustrate the example of a school. Illustrate this in the case of a Court? How can this be applied to God? What is this reasoning called? The third method? Illustrate this in regard to the magnet. What is said of magnets made by a galvanic batte-

ry? How was one magnet proved to be iron? What may be said of the safety of reasoning by induction? What weakens evidence furnished by induction? The fourth method? What is the foundation for reasoning from analogy? Illustrate this in relation to the earth and the planets. What is said of the safety of reasoning from analogy? The fifth method? When is this method necessary? How is it employed in Courts, or in conflicting statements? What is said of the value of circumstantial evidence? Can it always be relied on? When is there danger in being governed by it? The fifth method? On what do we depend, in testimony? How do we apply reasoning to testimony? What is demanded in examining conflicting testimony?

## CHAPTER XIX.—USE AND IMPROVEMENT OF REASONING.

Have all men equal powers of reasoning? Do men who have been defective in reasoning, ever acquire the power of reasoning well? On what does such improvement depend? What is the first practical hint for the improvement of the reasoning powers? The second—Third—Fourth—Fifth—Sixth—Seventh—Eighth? Six species of sophism are named; what is the first? The second—Third—Fourth? Does error ever become popular? In what connection, usually? What is said of vicious conduct? The fifth sophism—The sixth? What is the ninth practical hint in reasoning—The tenth? How is this direction violated? What is likely to be done by each party, in a discussion? What is said of claiming the victory, after a party discussion? The eleventh hint? Is this often violated? The twelfth? What is said of the violation of this rule? The thirteenth? Mention the questions to be considered in regard to testimony. The fourteenth? What is said of a wrong life? Of experimental evidence? How does a right life affect our reasonings? To what truths does this principle especially apply? What is the testimony of the Saviour? What is said of the evidence on which faith rests? What is necessary, in order to feel the full import of the gospel? Is any one warranted in rejecting Christianity, till he has submitted his heart and life to its control? What is said of one who rejects it, without this evidence?

## CHAPTER XX.—THE SENSIBILITIES.

What does the term Sensibilities embrace? What is said of the relation of this department to the intellect? To what does the action of the intellect give rise? What is said of objects of sensation? Is the same true of trains of thought? What is said of emotions and desires? How should these be studied? What is the first or general division of the sensibilities? What is said of the natural sensibilities in men? What advantage in this division? What do the natural sensibilities embrace? What is

said of these? When have they a moral character? What do the moral sensibilities embrace? How do they arise in the mind? What is said of them? With what do the natural sensibilities rise in connection? The moral sensibilities? Which class are the more simple? Which the more important? What general division is made of the natural sensibilities? Which deserve notice first? Why? How do emotions differ from desires? What is said of each? What is said of emotions and desires in the next paragraph? How various are emotions? In what two respects do emotions differ? In what two classes are emotions arranged? What is said of the strength of emotions? Of their influence? What emotions are first noticed? Give the author's illustration. Four things are noticed in the example; what is the first—The second—The third—The fourth? Are these elements noticed in other examples of the beautiful? Must all be embraced, to awaken emotions of the beautiful? What is said of form? Do all forms please? What is said of color? Of young children, in relation to color? Of motion? Of a child? Of the ocean? The ship? The steamboat, and its wake? The fish? The birds? Of sounds? Give the several examples? Do all sounds please? What do not? What circumstances affect us in regard to the pleasure of sounds? How are we affected by intimate acquaintance with objects and countenances? What is said of places? What place is named? Give the example in relation to relics? What is said of works of art and trains of thought? Of demonstrations and arguments? Of descriptions? Of traits of character? What is the next class of emotions? How do emotions of sublimity, differ from those of beauty? What is said of the sources of sublime emotions? Give the illustration. What is said of emotions of sublimity, which become intense? What is the character of emotions of the ludicrous? What name do we give those scenes, or traits of character which excite mirthful feelings, but which can scarcely be called ludicrous? What is said of some persons? Of the susceptibility of our nature to be thus affected? What is usually found in whatever excites emotions of the ludicrous? How is the incongruity sometimes occasioned? How at other times? What benefit in such exhibitions? How used? What is said of one who attempts to be habitually witty? Of the use of humor or wit upon persons? Of the ordinary use? Of the use by the teacher? How should they be used? Which term expresses the stronger emotion, in the first class? Which the weakest? The same in the second class—The third—The fourth—The fifth—The sixth?

## CHAPTER XXI—DESIRES.

How do desires stand related to emotions? In how many classes are they arranged? Name them. What is seen in all these? What is said of desires in relation to emotions? What in relation to the will? What is the first statement in relation

to deseres—The second—The third—The fourth—The fifth? How do they begin to operate? How do they afterwards come to be controlled? What is thus indicated? How do the instincts of men compare with those of brutes? Why is this? What is said of the instinct of brutes? The beaver—The bird—The ant and bee? When is instinct especially noticed in man? What is the first named act of instinct—The second? Illustrate it. What is necessary to set in motion all the organs? The third exercise of instinct? Illustrate it. What is said of resentment? What are the appetites? What is hunger—Thirst? What is said of them? What is their object? How do they begin to act? What effort do they occasion? What is said of their moral character? How are they easily modified? What is said of artificial appetites? Give examples. What is said of *excessive* indulgence of appetite? Can vicious appetite be corrected? How is this evident? What do such reformation prove?

## CHAPTER XXII.

To what is the term propensities applied? What is their comparative importance? What is the first named propensity? What is the use of this desire? How do we discover this propensity? Does it belong to all men? How are cases of suicide to be accounted for, if all have a desire to live? What is the earliest form of action, of this principle? Has it ever a voluntary action? How can it be influenced by voluntary control? What is the second propensity named? Is this universal? Do we all become happy? Why? Can this be influenced at all by voluntary conduct? What is said of its character, when thus influenced? What other name has been given to it? What has its inordinate action been called? Is it proper to confound the terms, self-love and selfishness? What injury has been done by this? Is the desire of happiness *necessarily* sinful or selfish? What is said of its use? When is it sinful? What is said of its activity? Of its perversion? What is then our duty in regard to it? What is said of the desire of knowledge? What evidence that this exists in infancy? How does gaining knowledge affect the infant? Has this principle both an instinctive and voluntary action? Does it always remain strong as it is at first? In what ways may this be occasioned? What is the second way of effecting this? What is said of the importance of the desire of knowledge? Of its voluntary action? What motives urge us to cultivate it? What is said of the desire of imitation? Of children? What is the use of the desire of imitating? What is said of models for children? What is the effect of bad models? What can we learn from the imitations of children? What is true of children in this respect? Can this power be increased? What does this prove? What is the fifth propensity noticed? What is said of children? What has its perversion led some to suppose? What of it as an original propensity? Of

what use is it? How does it affect the use of our time and abilities? What is said of its perversion? Of the Bible? How can a man check this propensity? What is said of the Saviour's direction to the young man? How did the young man regard it? What is said of power? Of the desire of power? Of its perversion? Of its instinctive action? Of its effects? Of the child? How does he love to use his power in relation to others? To what may this spirit lead? Can it be controlled and wisely employed? What is said of its moral character? When is it virtuous? What is said of it when perverted? How should it be treated? How has the desire of society been regarded by some? What do its developements indicate? What is said of the child? Give the incident of a child left by its mother. Was the desire for its mother probably all that caused death? How do children manifest the social principle? Is this principle manifest in riper years? How are these cases explained, where persons dread and avoid society? What effect has exclusion or banishment from society produced? What is said of society and its institutions? In what way is the social principle liable to abuse? What is said of the evils thus occasioned? Of recovery from these evils? Of avoiding vices leading to such evils? Of the duty of parents and guardians? How may this be done? What is necessary for the mind? What is the eighth propensity noticed? What is said of it? Of society without it? Is this principle originally universal? What is said of persons who delight to outrage public sentiment? Of the instinctive action of this desire? Of it as a principle of action? What is a higher principle of action? Ought this principle to be eradicated? How should we treat it?

## CHAPTER XXIII.—THE AFFECTIONS.

What rank is assigned to the affections? How would you illustrate this statement? Are they simple or complex mental states? What two things are included in them? Towards what are they exercised? They are embraced in two classes, what is the first? What name is given to them? The second class—The name? What is said of the term *malevolent* as applied to the affections? Is it understood that these affections, in their merely *instinctive* action, are *necessarily* sinful? How do they become sinful? How may they be regarded in their original instinctive action? Have they any use? What is the first named of this class? What two elements are embraced in fear? What uses has this principle? What use in society? In the school room and family? How treated in the Bible? What objection may be supposed, to placing fear among the malevolent affections? What is the answer? Illustrate this. What is said of this right exercise of fear? How is it controlled? What is said of the abuse and perversion of fear? Of the effect of relying upon this alone, in government? What is said

of men governed solely by fear? Of those wholly destitute of it? Of a system of government which excludes appeals to fear? Of a system which deals chiefly in appeals to fear? Of a system which is nicely balanced? What is said of the instinctive character of anger? Has it any use? In what circumstances? For what reason is such a principle, in some instances, needed? What is said of its action? In what is it liable to excess? What is said of the elements of the soul aroused by it? Of its excessive action? Is it common to meet exhibitions of anger which are not sinful? Is it possible that there should be such? What evidence of it? Illustrate the first modification of resentment—The second. How are we affected by witnessing such exhibitions? Illustrate the third, or that which is called desperation or madness. What is said of the boy who was angry with a man? Of the peevish or petulant disposition? How is envy illustrated? What is said of Joseph and his brethren? Of jealousy? Of a child? Give the instance of a little girl. That of a boy? Of candidates for office? What are the most striking exhibitions of jealousy? What does the jealous person imagine? What occurs in this state of mind? What is said of the conflict in such cases? Of the extremes of hope and despair? What does such a passion demand? What is said of natural checks to anger? What is the first named check?—The second—The third—The fourth—The fifth—The sixth—The seventh? What is said of checks of a moral nature? What can we do in this respect? What effect of indulging angry words, &c.? Of resenting an insult, as illustrated in the sport of boys? Of stopping and thinking? What supposition is first named, which may be considered? The second—The third? What if one is angry? If interested? Will resenting injury reform the offender? What is said of being liable to err? What of offending God? The precepts and example of Christ teach us what? What is a suitable resolution in relation to an offender? Suppose it be necessary that an offender be imprisoned for his crimes?

## CHAPTER XXIV.—BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

What do the benevolent affections embrace? What is their use? The first named? Its use? What is said of its origin? How does it appear? What illustration of its strength, in the language of a mother? What is said of its instinctive action? Of its voluntary action? Its character? Its perversion? What injury in its excess? How may it injure parents? What effect may the loss of children produce? What may follow its perversion, or its being overborne by another passion? How may a parent destroy attachment to children? What is the filial affection? Is this original? What is said of its strength at first? Of its action—Excess—Perversion? What has intemperance done to this affection? What is said of the treatment of parents? Of those cases where children manifest this affection?

Give the incident stated by the author. What is the object of the fraternal affection? What is said of it? Are all brothers and sisters equally happy? What is said of this? How is it marred and impaired? What is said of its perversions? What may occasion enduring strife? What is said of such exhibitions? Of the affections on the score of humanity? What attachments do we form? What is said of laborers, and persons of the same profession, &c.? What are these attachments? How are we constituted in this respect? Of what do we find evidence in the mind and in the Bible? Has the existence of this principle been denied? What is the first evidence stated of its existence—The second—The third—The fourth—The fifth? What is said of this principle being overborne? Is this true of other affections? What evidence that this principle is original? What cannot circumstances create? What do the attachments which spring up among men prove? What is said of the strength of such attachments? What is said of friendships between persons of the same sex? What other affections takes its rise in this principle? What is said of every human being? Of the diversities in character, and the adaptation of these elements? Are all persons equally fitted to be associated in this relation? How does it appear that discordant dispositions can be, in any degree, assimilated?

What is said of patriotism? How is the principle of humanity modified in patriotism? What is said of its uses? How may it be marred? What is said of loving our country?

What is said of pity or sympathy? Why does it belong to the benevolent affections? What is said of its action? Of its moral character? Its use? What efforts does it occasion? What is said of its abuse? Of the warrior? Of dealing in intoxicating drinks? What the effect of too strongly exciting it? What of its morbid exercise? What may be the effect of wrong methods of relieving suffering? How are persons sometimes imposed upon?

What is the nature of gratitude? Four things are said to be embraced in it, what is the first? The second—The third—The fourth? What effect upon the feeling of gratitude, when we find a favor bestowed from selfish or mischievous designs? What is said of savages? Of ingratitude? Of the treatment of parents? Of pupils? The people of a country? Instances in the Bible? What the most striking instance? How was this exhibited before the Saviour appeared? What was the object of his coming? How did men treat him? What is the most common and criminal ingratitude now in the world? What is said of the pleasure men take in God's gifts? What would be the effect of being more grateful to God?

## CHAPTER XXV.

What does the Bible require in relation to loving God and our fellow men? What is said of our capacity to obey one part of



this command? What effect is produced by voluntary conduct upon our love for our fellow men? What two questions arise in regard to loving God? Do these belong to philosophy? What does the author attempt to prove in regard to the first of these questions? What is the first argument? On what is it based? Give the illustrations in their order, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The second argument? What does the mind need? Why does it need this? Why must the object of worship be superior to the mind? What effect upon the mind to worship a low, grovelling object? What being alone meets this necessity? May not a limited, created being answer this purpose? What is the third argument? What is said of the adoption of low morals? Of man? The fourth argument—The fifth—The sixth—The seventh—The eighth? How does the Christian view his former neglect to love God? Could he feel thus if he had no capacity to love God? What does the author attempt to prove in relation to the question whether men generally exercise this principle, as they do other affections? From what is the first argument drawn? Do children manifest love to God, as naturally as love to their parents? Who can best judge in this matter? The second argument—The third—The fourth? What does deliberate perseverance in sin prove? The fifth? Illustrate it. The sixth? How do the scriptures represent holy affections? What do such representations imply? What might some of them at first imply? How may all be explained? The seventh proof? What do those who become Christians declare? What do those show who choose to live in sin? What do they not love? What is said of nations? The eighth proof? What is said of a properly regulated mind? What else is in favor of this view? What is said of the importance of this view? What is plain from it? Why? What else does the reasoning show? What is said of its perversion? Of what are we assured? What then follows? What is said in regard to the abuse of this provision? Of human responsibilities?

## CHAPTER XXVI.—CONSCIENCE.

What is embraced in the term conscience? What do feelings of obligation, approval, &c. prove? What is this capacity? What are the emotions and feelings of this department called? How do we know the existence of such feelings? What is said of them in others? Of the classification of these? Of their rank? Of it where love to God is wanting? What in the absence of revelation? What is the testimony of the apostle? In how many forms are the moral sensibilities manifested? What is the first? The second? How do we know these two states? Which are first in order? What is necessary before we feel obligation to pursue a particular course? What in order to feel obliged to avoid or oppose it? What is said of the relation of the moral sensibilities? How are they with respect to the intellect? Where do they take their rise? What is necessary in

order to approve or disapprove an action? How do they arise? What is said respecting a boy's misconduct? Of the connection of this department with the will? What is the tendency of feelings of obligation? Do they always result in action? Why not? What is said of the relation of the *moral* to the *rational* sensibilities? Of the two classes? Of motives? What do natural emotions occasion? What are moral emotions followed by? Do both these classes always influence the will in the same direction? What do we sometimes desire? What to be exempted from doing? For what is there room in these cases? What is said of this conflict? What occurs when duty and inclination urge in the same direction? What is said of the practical bearings of these relations? Why do the relations of the moral sense to the intellect require further notice? What have some been disposed to do? What conclusion would this lead to? Is there a distinction between conscience and reasoning? Illustrate it. What is said of the distinction? Of these feelings? What is the province of reasoning? Of conscience? What is said of their relation? Several considerations are mentioned as belonging to the subject; what is the first—Illustrate it. The second—Illustrate it. The third—Illustrate it. The fourth—Illustrate it. Suppose one had seared his conscience—suppose one ignorant of sin—suppose one ignorant of himself. Would it follow that one, in either of these cases, who had no remorse, had no sin? The fifth consideration? How does this appear? What is said of having ideas of right and wrong? The sixth? The seventh? What is the first reason for training the moral sense? Why is it liable to be misled? What may be its influence on reasoning, if properly cultivated? What do men sometimes feel? What is said of one who is held back by his conscience from the pernicious results of false reasoning? How is conscience liable to be overborne? What is its proper place? What is necessary that the conscience may respond to the motives God holds out to remove men from sin? What is said of the appeals of revelation? Of efforts for the reformation of men? Of other principles?

## CHAPTER XXVII—THE WILL.

What is said of the will? How has it been with this, compared with the other departments of the mind? What is said of our knowledge of the will? What have some doubted? With what has the will been confounded? What is said of some who have seemed to confound these? To what have discussions concerning the will, related? What is said of attempts to trace the relations of the will? What work is spoken of, as attempting this? What is designed in the present work? With what does the author propose to deal? What is the first topic noticed? The first remark in relation to the connection of the will with the intellect? The second? What is it hard to attempt? The

third remark? What do we sometimes attempt? What else is needed beside knowledge? How can we know this? The fourth remark? What is said of the influence thus exerted? What have we power to do? What is thus gained? What is said of making progress in knowledge? On what does the power of attention depend? Give the author's illustration? What process after deciding to prepare a book? What influence exerted by such a course? Is there any other view of the influence of the will on the intellect? What is said of the influence of the sensibilities? What is said of our thoughts, reasonings, &c.? What is said of the action of all these? In what way does the intellect receive an influence from the will? What is the maxim quoted?

What is the first remark in regard to the acts of the will? What has been occasioned by the close connection of volitions with desires? What is said of volitions and desires harmonising? Do men always act in accordance with their desires? What obstacles sometimes prevent men from doing what they desire? Illustrate this. How are persons often restrained? What is said of scholars? Of obstacles of a *moral* nature? Illustrate this? What is said of these two classes of influence? Of the harmony and strife? Of the control of the will over each of these influences? How may it do, acting in harmony with desires or passions? What is said of its acting in harmony with conscience?

What is said of the distinction between desires and volitions? What is the first ground of distinction? Illustrate this. The second. Give the illustration. What is said of this illustration? What is the reply to one who should say that Charles acted against his will? Third ground of distinction. Illustrate it. The fourth. Illustrate it. We *desire* life, health, &c. Is it proper to say we *will* these? Are the terms ever used interchangeably? Does this prove there is no distinction? If the distinction is frequently made deliberately, what does this prove? The fifth consideration. Illustrate this. What is said of the history of the Jews? What did not God's love for them prevent? How does it appear that he did not desire their destruction? What evidence that he willed it? What illustration is given of this distinction, in the conduct of the Saviour? What is said of the language of the Saviour? Give the quotation from Prof. Upham. What inference is drawn from this distinction in the divine mind? The sixth consideration. What names are mentioned? Give the quotation from Mr. Locke.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.—GOVERNMENT OF THE WILL.

What has before been said of discussions relative to the will? With which of the features have discussions been mostly concerned? What is said of the power of the will? Two

leading tendencies in controversies about the will, have been named; what is the first? The other? What is said of these tendencies? What is the true view? What may be confidently asserted in regard to the freedom and power of the will? What is properly the subject first in order? Why? How is this question of *fact* in relation to the *mode* of government? What is attempted to be proved in regard to the will? What the first argument? Illustrate this. What fact is stated? How was influence exerted over the will of the writer? What is said of the case stated by Mr. Locke? What does consciousness assert? The second argument. Illustrate it. The third. What questions are raised under this particular? What is said of the mother and her son? Of what other effort is this stated? What is said of efforts to hire or bribe men? Of the commands of scripture? The fourth reason. Give the illustration in the first paragraph. In the second. The third. The fourth paragraph. What is the fifth reason? [Instead of "*society*," read *sagacity* in this reason.] Illustrate this. What is said of promoting benevolent objects? What does skill in such cases imply? What is said of missionary operations? The sixth reason. Illustrate in the first paragraph. The second. The third. The seventh reason. Illustrate this. The eighth. Illustrate it. The ninth reason. Illustrate it. The tenth reason. Illustrate it. The eleventh. Illustrate it. What is said of a council of surgeons? What of a thief? The 12th reason. Illustrate it. What do such questions denote? The thirteenth reason. Illustrate it. The fourteenth. Illustrate it. What is said of the effects of the indulgence of appetite? What is sometimes said of such cases? The fifteenth reason. Illustrate it. Give the quotation from Montesquieu. The passage from Hooke. [In this passage, instead of "*beast*," read *least*. Put a comma after *care*, and read *as* for *is*. Omit the comma after *greatest*.] What is said of the law of causation? How does this apply to the will? What do we enquire when a wrong act has been committed? What do such questions imply? What is said of the law of uniformity?

## CHAPTER XXIX.

What is said of the importance of the subject, and of the *mode* of the will's government? Give the quotation. What may we expect in the outset, in relation to the laws of the will? Give the quotation from Montesquieu. In what degree may we know the laws of the will? What is a common remark? What then will give us a just view of the laws of the will? What are motives? What is said of their number? Illustrate this. What is said of internal principles of the mind? What division of motives is thus indicated? What are embraced in external motives? How do these become motives? What are internal motives? From what do external motives derive their power over the will? How do they reach the will? What is said of the

nature of external objects which move the will? What is another division of motives? What are the moral motives? Personal motives? What division of personal motives? Illustrate this distinction? What instances are embraced in prudential motives? What is said of the harmony of these two classes? What do men sometimes desire? What is it important to understand in relation to the government of motives? What is said of different classes of influences? What is said of the tendencies of these? How does the will act when there are conflicting tendencies? Illustrate this in the case of desire and a regard to consequences. Illustrate it in reference to moral motives. What is a common explanation of such cases? What has already been said of the government of the will? What is the first statement in regard to the government of motives? What must not be understood by the expression, The will is governed by motives? The second statement. What is said of freedom? The third statement. What then is true of motives? The fourth remark. What is said of difference in the strength of motives? What is quite certain in this matter? What else is also certain? What then is obvious in regard to the estimate of motives? Illustrate this. What other difficulty is there? Illustrate this. What answer may be given to all this? What reply to this? What remark in conclusion? For what are motives essential? How must they be adapted? What is said of perverseness of motives of the mind?

## CHAPTER XXX.—FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

What is said of attempts to define the term freedom? Four reasons are given; what is the first? The second. Illustrate this. The third reason. The fourth. What is said of these difficulties? Illustrate this. What is there reason to believe? What seems necessary? What is already made to appear? Several particulars are named as not implied in the freedom of the will? What is that? The second. Illustrate it. The third. Illustrate it. What is said of this influence? Of what may we be conscious? The fourth. Illustrate this. What is said of those who exercise holy affections? The fifth remark. What is one of the conditions of all gifts? What is said of food and other gifts? What do facts prove in regard to freedom? What kind of freedom is now to be considered? What is the first essential to it? What is the effect of a master passion? What of appetites and propensities? What forms of slavery of the appetites are named? In what other ways are men led captive? What practical remarks then follow? The second thing essential to absolute freedom? How does this view result? Illustrate it. What is the language of the scriptures? What is the testimony of the Saviour? What of Paul to the Romans? What does the Saviour say in regard to being made free? What does this view of freedom enable us to see? Where is such a prin-

ciple pointed out? What command embraces it? What is said of *love*? What of obedience to the second command? How does love to God operate?

## CHAPTER XXXI.—FREEDOM OF THE WILL, AS IT EXISTS AMONG MEN,

What is the freedom considered in the closing part of the last chapter? What may be objected to this view? What questions then return? What has been seen in the last chapter? What might we expect in regard to different persons? What does the author maintain in regard to the freedom of men? What does the author notice before stating the evidence that the will is free? What element answers as a controlling principle in the absence of love to God? What takes place when love to God reigns in the heart? What when love is wanting? If conscience is enlightened and obeyed what will follow? What when conscience is violated? What is supposed to be true of the actual freedom of men? Give the opinion of Bishop Butler? Give the extract from Dr. Price. What is seen in the extract from Dr. Price? What must be borne in mind to avoid confusion from this use of terms? What is the first source of evidence that the will is free? Give the quotation from Prof. Upham. The second source of evidence. Illustrate it. The third. Illustrate it. The fourth. Illustrate it. What is said of the power of the will over motive? The fifth. Illustrate it. On what assumption are all the commands and requirements of the scriptures based? The sixth. Illustrate it. The seventh. Illustrate it in relation to family government. Attempts at government in civil society. What is said of efforts to control or change the opinions of others? The eighth. Illustrate this in the case of the former. What is said of such suspension of the will? The ninth. Illustrate this. What is said of acts of unkindness? The tenth. Illustrate this. The eleventh. Illustrate it. The twelfth. Illustrate it. What is said of the strength of such convictions? What is said of the evidences that the will is free?

Is the freedom of the will ever impaired or destroyed? In what ways can this freedom be impaired? What is said of the influence from without? Where are the chief sources of danger? Can you define the term slavery as applied to the will? Why? What is the first method stated by which the will may be paralyzed? How may this occur? What is said of ferocious animals, &c.? How have others been terrified? What is said of sufferings by torture? What of promises extorted? What is said of appetites and propensities? Give an example of appetite? What of ambition? Of prejudice. Anger. What is said of the necessity of guarding the freedom of the will?

## CHAPTER XXXII.—POWER OF THE WILL.

What is said of the power of the will? What is there reason to believe in reference to the confounding of the freedom and power of the will? Is the distinction perceptible? How? What is said of this in man? What is said of marked instances? How is it evident that power and freedom are distinct? What is said of the action of the will? What is said of the two attributes? What is the basis of the first evidence that the will has power? Illustrate this. What is said of the body? What might be said of power? What of the human mind? What of each mind? If this be true of the mind as a whole, what is true of the will? The second evidence. Illustrate this. What is true of the will? What is said of efforts of genius, &c.? What is one of the most marked differences among men? What do we discover in every stage of life, &c.? The third evidence. Illustrate it. What are we sometimes ready to attempt? What does this involve? The fourth. Illustrate this. The fifth. Illustrate it. The sixth. Illustrate it. What is said of habits of profaneness? The passionate man. The victim of intemperance. What are more interesting exhibitions of this power? The seventh. What is said of the discovery of America? The overthrow of the slave trade. The efforts of John Howard. What is said of scenes of war? The student. Martin Luther. Saul of Tarsus. What is said of diversities in voluntary power? What is true of objects in nature? Of power. Mental difference. Of the will. When do we witness this difference? What is said of education? Illustrate this. What is said of other cases? Of judicious discipline. What is true of the differences of voluntary power. What may a person love? What is said of reason, conscience, &c.? What is said of an energetic will? Of a vigorous intellect. Of intellectual powers. What is sometimes said of a person with too little energy of will? In what way is energy of the will displayed in some? How in others? How in others? In others?

What question has often been debated in relation to the power of the will? What may at first seem strange in reference to this discussion? What is said of the mystery? What two questions ought to be kept distinct? If the first of these be answered in the affirmative, what is said of the second? What might be urged? What is matter of fact? What may we then conclude? Illustrate this in the case of the swearer? What can he do in regard to this habit? What can he learn in regard to it? What is the tendency of such reflections? Of feelings of obligations, &c.? What is said of such instances? What do they not show? What is said of the case supposed? What may be true in regard to the change? What is also true? What is said of emotions, &c.? What then might as well be asserted? What further is interesting to notice? What might have given rise to the first effort of the will? What is thus seen in regard

to the will? With what is this in accordance? What is true of the power of the will? What is involved in all instances of self-determination? What is all that can be claimed? What is true of the share of power properly belonging to the will? What is further said of it?

## CONCLUSION.

What is the first consideration in the conclusion? What is recommended in regard to books? What other methods of studying the mind? What is the second thing noticed? Illustrate it. What works are mentioned? The third remark? What is evident in this respect? Illustrate this. What is said of the discipline of the will? Of cultivating the voluntary power? Of harmony? What is the object of all investigation? With what should we be informed? What should be our object in knowing and training our capacities?

## QUESTIONS ON THE NOTE REFERRED TO PAGE 135.


How is the union of freedom and mental harmony illustrated in the note? What is the language of the Saviour? What is said of his life? What was his object? Of his love? His death? His desire? How was it exhibited? What else was apparent, as well as his love? What illustration is given? How did he exhibit harmony with God and love to man? What was effected by this? What did he give to the world? What did his sufferings and death prevent? What did the Saviour at the same time exhibit? How did he exhibit this? What is said of temptation? What is further said? What is said of abuse, and the spirit of compassion? What did not his compassion prevent? What is said of his rebukes of transgressors? Of the overthrow of Jerusalem? How did he view the city, and still announce its doom? What is said of the execution of this threatening? What is said of the elements of his nature? Of sin, &c.? Of this illustration? Of becoming like him? Of being united to him? What is the scripture quotation? What is said of his service?















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